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INTRODUCTION
The German Federal Constitutional Court recently de-
clared taxes on packaging material and fees for wastes
as inconsistent with the German Constitution.' This not
only demonstrates that economic incentives are highly
relevant in the debate about environmental instruments
in German law, but also opens up new opportunities for
emissions trading mechanisms. Although the environ-
mental taxation system and the emissions trading
scheme both belong to the category of economic instru-
ments that attempts to reduce environmental pollution
using market forces, they differ considerably in their in-
dividual concepts. Under a taxation system, the tax
(price) is set exogenously by the legislature and the
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doff, Germany. This Article was part of her LL.M. in Envi-
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307
308 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
pollution level is determined endogenously by the in-
dustry.2 Under an allowance trading system, the allow-
able pollution level is set exogenously by the regulator
and the price for an allowance is determined endoge-
nously by the market.3 Hence, in terms of environ-
mental protection, a trading system is arguably more
protective than a taxation scheme. In addition, an
emissions trading program may provide a welcome al-
ternative to current mechanisms and end the long-
standing German debate over environmental taxes. Al-
though the idea of introducing such a system into Ger-
man law has been considered before, no actual attempts
to realize this idea have been made. The reason for
such inactivity has been the German government's fear
of being burdened with an immense load of legislative
and administrative work, as well as uncertainty about
the eventual outcome. The latter concern may be ad-
dressed by an analysis of the effects of the emissions
trading program under the United States Clean Air Act("CAA").4+
The idea of employing market mechanisms to combat
air pollution was originally introduced thirty years ago
by J.H. Dales. 5 Since then, this proposal has become
2. See Michael C. Naughton, Establishing Interstate
Market for Emissions Trading of Ozone Precursors, 3 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 195, 202-03 (1994).
3. See id. at 202.
4. Clean Air Act §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q
(1994) (hereinafter CAA).
5. See JOHN HARKNESS DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND
PRICES (1968). Since then trading has been supported by
others. See generally Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn
from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 Allow-
ance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 70 (1998); Daniel J.
Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe: Tech-
nology-based Versus Market-based Approaches, 17 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 3-4 (1992) [hereinafter Dudek et al., Environ-
mental Policy for Eastern Europe]; Bruce A. Ackerman &
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
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increasingly popular, even among environmentalists.
Although a number of trading programs have been de-
veloped in several countries, the Acid Rain Program in
the U.S.6 is still the most comprehensive and complex
allowance market. It may therefore serve as the best
model for future programs.
The Acid Rain Program ("Title IV") provides for an in-
novative market-based allowance trading system de-
signed to reduce sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, one of
the primary precursors of acid rain. Under this system,
fossil fuel-fired power plants, the principal emitters of
SO2, are allotted tradeable allowances 7 based on their
past fuel usage and statutory emission limitations.
Each allowance entitles a facility to emit one ton of SO2
L. REv. 1333 (1985); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek,
Institutional Guidelines for Designing Successful Transferable
Rights Programs, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 391 (1989); Daniel J.
Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this
Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 222
(1988); Chelsea H. Congdon et al., Economic Incentives and
Nonpoint Source Pollution - A Case Study of California's
Grasslands Region, 2 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
185, 194 (1995); Horst Zimmermann & Bernd Hansjirgens,
Zertifikate im Instrumentvergleich aus ordnungspolitischer
Sicht [Comparing Allowances with Other Instruments from a
Command-and-Control Point of View], in UMWELTZERTIFIKATE -
DER STEINIGE WEG ZUR MARKTWIRTSCHAFT [EMISSIONS TRADING -
THE STONY PATH TO MARKET ECONOMY] 47, 59 (Holger Bonus
ed., 1998) [hereinafter Zimmermann & Hansjiirgens, Com-
paring Allowances with Other Instruments]; Joachim Wei-
mann, Wettbewerbspolitische Aspekte von Zertifikaten [Com-
petition Policy Aspects of Allowances], in UMWELTZERTIFIKATE -
DER STEINIGE WEG ZUR MARKTWIRTSCHAFT [EMISSIONS TRADING -
THE STONY PATH TO MARKET EcONOMY] 61 (Holger Bonus ed.,
1998); Richard Schmalensee et al., An Interim Evaluation of
Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 65
(1998).
6. Title IV of the CAA is called the "Acid Rain Program."
7. While the CAA talks of "allowances," this Article uses
the terms "allowance," "credit" or "permit" as synonyms.
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during or after the year specified in the allowance serial
number. At the end of any given year, the number of
allowances a facility holds must equal or exceed total
emissions at that unit; otherwise, stringent penalties
will be applied.8 The ultimate goal of Title IV is to de-
crease annual emissions of SO2 by ten million tons from
1980 emissions levels. 9 In order to reach this goal, the
CAA allows no more than 8.90 million tons of SO 2 to be
emitted by the electric utility industry per year. 0 A de-
tailed analysis of this Program and its effects may pro-
vide important lessons for how a similar program may
be introduced into the German law system.
The discussion of emissions trading is not restricted to
the national level. International representatives at the
Kyoto Conference in 199711 adopted the basic idea of
tradeable permits, while representatives at the Buenos
Aires Conference in 199812 and the future Conferences
of the Parties ("COPs") 13 are left with the responsibility of
arriving at the details. Future conferences may be more
successful if doubts about the efficiency of trading sys-
tems are resolved. Some critics have questioned
whether a trading system is a progressive means of
fighting air pollution or just an attractive-sounding no-
tion behind which polluting companies can hide their
discharges by acquiring "indulgences."14 Again, experi-
ence with the U.S. emissions trading program may be
useful in predicting the effectiveness of an international
trading model and how it would have to be structured in
8. See CAA §411 (a).
9. See CAA § 40 1(b).
10. See CAA § 403(a)(1).
11. The conference was held on December 8-11.
12. The conference was held on November 2-13.
13. The 1999 COP was held on October 25-November 5,
1999 in Bonn, Germany. The next COP will be held on No-
vember 13-24, 2000 at The Hague, Netherlands.
14. For a discussion of the criticisms of a trading sys-
tem, see Part I.A. 1.c.
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order to be effective. However, few legal analyses have
been undertaken on whether an emissions trading sys-
tem complies with international customary law and in-
ternational conventions.
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the legal and
practical difficulties as well as shortcomings of the ex-
isting Acid Rain Program in the United States. The
findings will help in evaluating whether and how similar
programs may be set up in Germany, as well as on an
international level, within the context of the interna-
tional climate change conventions. Furthermore, this
analysis proposes that an allowance trading system for
either SO2 or carbon dioxide (CO2) should contain cer-
tain mechanisms in order to be effective. Part I provides
a discussion of the U.S. Acid Rain Program with its
theoretical and legal background and current problems.
Part II examines whether it is legally feasible to intro-
duce a similar program into the German legal system.
This discussion does not only consider German law, but
also European and international law. Part III discusses
legal constraints of an international CO2 allowance mar-
ket and proposes some design features that support the
program's effectiveness. Part IV draws conclusions for
the introduction of a trading program in the real world
by including interdisciplinary aspects in the discussion.
Finally, this Article makes suggestions about long-term
air pollution policy.
I. THE U.S. CLEAN AIR ACT TITLE IV (ACID RAIN PROGRAM)
This Part analyzes the Acid Rain Program under Title
IV of the CAA by first reviewing the economic and his-
torical background of the program, focusing on some of
the problems with implementation of the program, and
finally drawing conclusions for other trading programs.
It is useful to review the background of pollution trading
in the U.S. in order to understand the Acid Rain Pro-
gram better, especially its difficulties. This Part con-
cludes that the trading system established by Title IV,
20001 311
312 FORDHAM ENVWRONMEITAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
despite several shortcomings, provides a substantial
structure for an economically and environmentally ef-
fective mechanism to reduce air pollution. Based on the
conclusions concerning the individual structural ele-
ments of the program, lessons for similar trading pro-
grams can be drawn.
A. Background of the Acid Rain Program
The following presentation of the background of the
Acid Rain Program includes the general economic theory
of emissions trading systems, the history of trading pro-
grams in U.S., and the legal framework of Title IV. A
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of economic
incentives, especially emissions trading, compared with
those of a regulatory approach demonstrates that nei-
ther program is clearly superior to the other.15
The Acid Rain Program builds upon prior experiences
with trading mechanisms. The most important of the
program's predecessors is the air emissions trading pro-
gram established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") in 1974.. This program offered sources 16
four alternatives for dealing with the credits acquired
through emission reductions: offsetting, bubbling, net-
ting and emissions banking. 17 A brief look at other
trading systems illustrates the popularity of the meth-
ods for dealing with emission credits. 18 A description of
how the Acid Rain Program is actually designed and
embedded in the regulatory framework of the CAA is
necessary in order to understand its current problems.
15. See discussion infra Part I.A. 1.
16. Throughout this Article, "sources" refers to various
industrial producers of pollution.
17. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.a.
18. See discussion infra Part I.A.2.b.
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1. Theory of Emission Allowances as Economic
Instruments
Under the traditional "command and control" regula-
tory approach predominantly used in environmental
law, a government agency is responsible for overseeing
pollution control. 19 The government agency controls the
level of pollution reduction through "various regulations,
allocates control responsibility among the polluters, and
establishes an enforcement mechanism to ensure that
reductions are met."20 Pollution reductions are generally
achieved by two control methods: performance stan-
dards and technology-based standards.21 In the first
case, the regulatory agency establishes a limit for a par-
ticular pollutant. 22 In the latter, it specifies a certain
technology for the control of a particular pollutant or
the level of reduction to be achieved by that
technology. 23 Economic incentive programs, on the
other hand, provide an economic benefit for pollution
reductions or an economic penalty for pollution. 24 These
programs seek to overcome what some contend to be
19. See generally Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in
Air Pollution Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air? A Study of the
South Coast Air Quality Management District's Regional Clean
Air Incentives Market, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359, 366 (1995).
20. Christopher S. Hooper, Limiting the Use of Emissions
Allowances: A Statutory Analysis of Title IV of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 566,
.569 (1996).
21. See Vincent Joseph Rafferty, Jr., Uncle Sam Goes to
Market: Federal Agency Disposal of Emission Reduction Cred-
its Under the Federal Property Management Regulations, 146
MIL. L. REv. 154, 168 (1994).
22. See id.
23. See id. at 168 & n.74.
24. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Eco-
nomic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Con-
trol / Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
289, 323 (1998).
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weaknesses of traditional regulation by spurring inno-
vation and providing continuous incentives.2 5
Among all economic instruments, emissions trading is
designed to trigger market forces leading to a more effi-
cient allocation of resources than traditional regulatory
alternatives, thereby making it possible to achieve the
goal of reducing emissions at a lower cost. Sources that
cannot achieve the targeted level of emissions can pur-
chase allowances from a party whose reduction exceeds
its mandated amount. Therefore, an incentive exists for
each party to reduce pollution below the legally required
level so that unused allowances may be sold.26 While
theoretically emissions trading has potential and actual
strengths, it nonetheless carries weaknesses and risks.
The differences that a system of environmental taxation
would make to an emissions trading program will be
woven into the following overview wherever they occur.
a. Strengths of an Emissions Trading System
An emissions trading market is expected to lead to a
cost-effective allocation of emission reductions. Not
only will sources benefit from decreased expenses by
participating in emissions trading, but government
agencies may also be able to spend less resources
regulating these sources. This latter assumption, how-
ever, is under dispute. 27 Furthermore, a trading system
may provide an incentive for development of innovative
25. See Wolfgang K6ck, Umweltrechtsentwicklung und
Okonomische Analyse [Development of Environmental Law
and Economic Analysis], NATUR UND RECHT 412 (1992) [here-
inafter K6ck, Development of Environmental Law], for an over-
view of the different economic instruments and their theo-
retical background.
26. See Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution
Trading Permits as a Form of Market Socialism and the Search
for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution, 6
FoRDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51, 51-52 (1994).
27. See discussion infra Part I.A.1.a.(l).
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technology to reduce emissions, which will ultimately
benefit the environment. If the industrial sources rec-
ognize the benefits of a trading system, they will play a
leading role on the trading stage. Finally, once a market
for emissions trading is established, sources will refrain
from engaging in litigation and exerting political pres-
sure.
(1) Economic Efficiency
The greatest strength of a trading scheme is its as-
sumed economic efficiency. 28 The theory under which
emissions trading reduces costs is straightforward. The
costs of controlling emissions varies among industrial
plants. If emission credits are transferable, sources
that can control their emissions most cheaply have an
incentive to do so since they will be able to sell any ex-
cess credits and make an additional economic profit.
Plants whose control costs are higher than the cost of
an allowance will be interested in purchasing those ex-
cess credits, thereby providing a constant demand for
credits. Whenever an allocation of control responsibility
is not cost-effective, opportunities for trade exist. When
all such opportunities have been fully exploited, the al-
location is cost-effective.
Theoretically, a trading scheme will lead to a more ef-
ficient allocation of resources than would occur through
government regulation. Not only will an emissions
trading program make it possible for industry to reduce
emissions at a lower cost, transaction costs involved in
finding the best reduction technology also would be re-
duced. 29 These cost reductions can best be understood
28. The analysis in the following paragraph is based on
a discussion found in THOMAS H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY 16
(1985).
29. See Dieter Cansier, Umweltzertifikat [Environmental
Allowance], in 2 HANDBUCH DES UMWELTRECHTS 944 (Otto
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by comparing the regulatory and the economic ap-
proaches.
Proponents of emissions credit trading system suggest
that regulatory mechanisms are unnecessarily expen-
sive because significant costs result from making cen-
tralized decisions on how to achieve pollution control
over the activity of numerous facilities and industries. 30
A regulatory approach that imposes uniform require-
ments largely ignores the substantial differences in
pollution abatement costs among facilities and is ineffi-
cient.3 ' This approach requires every source to institute
certain pollution control technologies. Additionally, in-
stallation costs are not taken into account. Since differ-
Kimminich ed., 1988) [hereinafter Cansier, Environmental
Allowance]; Alfred Endres, Umweltzertifikate - Die
marktwirtschaftliche Lisung? [Environmental Allowances -
The Solution of the Market?], in OKOLOGIE, OKONOMIE UND
JURISPRUDENZ [ECOLOGY, ECONOMY, AND JURISPRUDENCE] 57,
58 (Edgar Michael Wenz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter En-
dres, Solution of the Market]; John J. Fialka, EPA Plans Emis-
sions-Trading Program to Reduce Nitrogen-Oxide Pollution,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1998, at B11; JOHANNES HEISTER &
PETER MICHAELIS, UMWELTPOLITIK MIT HANDELBAREN
EMISSIONSRECHTEN, MOGLICHKEITEN ZUR VERRINGERUNG DER
KOHLENDIOXID- UND STICKOXIDEMISSIONEN [ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY WITH TRADEABLE EMISSION CREDITS, POSSIBILITIES FOR
THE REDUCTION OF CARBON DIOXIDE AND NITROGEN OXIDE
EMISSIONS] 6 (1991) [hereinafter HEISTER & MICHAELIS,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY]; Tom Jones & Jan Corfee-Morlot, Cli-
mate Change: Designing a Tradeable Permit System, in
CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 17,
17 (Tom Jones & Jan Corfee-Morlot eds., 1992); Gary E.
Marchant, Freezing Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An Offset Pol-
icy for Slowing Global Warming, 22 ENVTL. L. 623, 629 (1992);
Stavins, supra note 5, at 78. But see Jeanne M. Dennis,
Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions
Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,
40 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1137 (1993).
30. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 366.
31. See id.
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ent sources using different kinds of pollution control
technologies require different kinds of adjustments, the
costs of reducing a fixed amount of a pollutant may vary
among sources. 32 By mandating certain pollution con-
trol technologies, command and control regulation may
result in firms having to spend more money than they
might otherwise have spent on other technology that is
equally-efficient and is more suitable for their needs.33
A market-based trading system, on the other hand,
would target only those sources that could reduce costs
most effectively, perhaps saving billions of dollars.3 4
This system could provide a low-cost solution through
the sale of allowances. The market approach theory al-
locates reduction measures to the source that can do it
most efficiently. By reducing marginal costs, a market
price for reducing units of pollution is created.35 Fur-
thermore, the cost of pollution reduction will not exceed
the market price of a trading credit because of the inter-
action between supply and demand.3 6 The interaction
between demand and supply will remain constant as
every source has an incentive to reduce emissions up to
the market price of a trading credit in order to sell the
credit for a profit on the market.37 Sources which re-
duce pollution below their allocated level may sell their
surplus permits to other sources and thereby provide a
sufficient supply of allowances. Other sources could
save money by buying credits on the market instead of
installing emission-reducing technology, thereby creat-
ing a demand for credits.
Theoretically, market-based policies should yield lower
costs and greater efficiency than regulations. Whether
32. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 369.
33. See id.; Hooper, supra note 20, at 569.
34. See TIETENBERG, supra note 28, at 16; Polesetsky,
supra note 19, at 366.
35. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 369-70.
36. See id. at 370.
37. See id.
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this theory actually proves true and works successfully
for all kinds of industrial sources and different control
technologies is another question. For smaller sources,
which generally have relatively higher transaction costs
than larger sources, this mechanism may not work.
When a source searches for a trading partner, it incurs
transaction costs, which are fixed amounts. For exam-
ple, a small source capable of trading 100 allowances
has to spend the same amount as a large source looking
to trade 1,000. Therefore, market-based policies may
not necessarily yield lower costs and greater efficiency
than regulation.
The question of whether an emissions trading system
causes additional governmental administrative expenses
or reduces them remains unresolved. Some observers
believe that emissions trading would actually increase
administrative costs, because not only will monitoring
and control be kept at the same level, but allocation and
transfer of permits, general information services, and
the control of the competitive market will require more
personnel and money.38 In that event, the trading ap-
proach would not outweigh the regulatory system in
economic efficiency.39 The majority of commentators,
however, assume that administrative procedures would
be lessened and simplified and administrative costs
38. See e.g., Alexander Blankenagel, Umweltzertifikate -
Die rechtliche Problematik [Environmental Credits - Legal
Problems], in OKOLOGIE, OKONOMIE UND JURISPRUDENZ
[ECOLOGY, ECONOMY, AND JURISPRUDENCE] 71, 77 (Edgar Mi-
chael Wenz et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter Blankenagel, Envi-
ronmental Credits]; Gerhard Feldhaus, Marktwirtschaft und
Luftreinhaltung [Market Economy and Air Pollution Control],
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr 552, 554 (1984) [hereinafter
Feldhaus, Market Economy and Air Pollution Control]; Devel-
opment of Environmental Law, supra note 25, at 415.
39. See Development of Environmental Law, supra note
25, at 415.
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within a regulatory system would decrease.40 The proc-
ess of determining pollution control requirements within
a regulatory system requires substantial administrative
costs, as regulators must collect and analyze informa-
tion about control technologies for all kinds of polluters.
Tlqis research includes determining which control tech-
nologies actually function properly and whether it is
economically feasible to impose them on the
industries. 41 The process is long and may easily delay
the attainment of statutory objectives, which again is
ecologically undesirable. Therefore, a tradeable permit
market should shift some of the burden of emissions
control from government agencies to industry.
An emissions trading system is especially advanta-
geous in comparison with a system of environmental
taxation. In a tax system, the regulator must know the
external costs of pollution, for each pollutant at each
source. Those costs are generally difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the regulator to determine. After an initial es-
timate, they must incorporate changes in the impact of
the source's pollution, economic activity, and inflation.42
In contrast, an allowance trading system is capable of
determining the shadow price and is therefore prefer-
able.4 3 However, a tax system may still be attractive as
taxes may be more easily administered than permits,
and therefore may out-perform permits in ease of im-
plementation. 44
40. See, e.g., Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra
note 29, at 944.
41. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 367.
42. See Naughton, supra note 2, at 201-02.
43. See Wolfgang Gick, Zertifikate - ein geeigneter Weg in
der Umweltpolitik [Allowances - An Appropriate Path in Envi-
ronmental Policy], 4 AKTUELLE ANALYSEN 7 (1996) [hereinafter
Gick, Allowances]. The shadow price is the monetary cost of
the environmental harm a source causes.
44. See Tom Jones & Jan Corfee-Morlot, supra note 29,
at 18.
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(2) Innovative Efficiency
Another direct effect of an emissions trading program
is an increase in innovative efficiency. 45 However, viable
pollution control techniques may not be detected in a
centralized decision-making system because regulating
agencies, which must choose the technical solutiohs
mandated by their legislatures, generally do not have
the best information on the feasibility of pollution con-
trol technologies and the cost of potential solutions.46
Plant managers and their engineers are in a much bet-
ter position to discover appropriate pollution control
technologies. 47 If plant owners do not have incentive to
develop new technology, they may refrain from doing so,
fearing that the legislature may raise the mandatory
technological requirements and enact more stringent
standards. Thus, the firm's operating costs will rise. 48
An allowance trading system avoids this possibility. As
the right to pollute in such systems must be paid for,
sources have incentive to develop new pollution-
reducing technology. Rather than buying additional
credits, they will innovate. 49 The impetus to develop
45. See Endres, Solution of the Market, supra note 29, at
59; Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mobile: Emissions Trading
Gets a Boost from Mobile Source Reduction Credits, 13 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 225, 232 (1994/95); Marchant, supra
note 29, at 630; Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for East-
ern Europe, supra note 5, at 9.
46. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 366-67.
47. See Holger Bonus & Michael Hdder, Zertifikate und
Neue Institutionen6konomik [Allowances and New Institutions
Economy], in UMWELTZERTIFIKATE - DER STEINIGE WEG ZUR
MARKTWIRTSCHAFT [EMISSIONS TRADING - THE STONY PATH TO
MARKET ECONOMY], supra note 5, at 32, 39; Polesetsky, supra
note 19, at 367, 369.
48. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 367.
49. See Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra note
29, at 944. Concerning the spread of best available control
technology, Kloepfer points out the potential of a market fail-
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new technology may even create competition among fuel
producers and equipment manufacturers to develop
cleaner products. 50
(3) Environmental Effectiveness
The purpose of using an emissions trading program
is to achieve environmental goals effectively. The pre-
sumption is that a tradeable permit system is much
more successful in controlling air pollution than regula-
tion. In theory, prescribed emission standards will be
met since only holders of emission credits may emit the
regulated pollutant, and will do so only up to the
amount permitted under the allowances held. 51 How-
ever, a tradeable permit system may be less reliable
than regulation since the actual response of the mar-
ketplace cannot be predicted with absolute certainty.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether tradeable permits
are more effective than environmental taxation. The
most obvious difference between a tax and a tradeable
permit system lies in their structure. Under a permit
trading system, the allowable pollution level is set ex-
ternally by the regulator and the price for an allowance
is determined internally by the market. Alternatively,
under a tax system, the tax is set externally by the leg-
islature and the pollution level is determined internally
by industry.52 Accordingly, the given standard of emis-
ure. MICHAEL KLOEPFER, UMWELTRECHT [ENVIRONMENTAL LAw]
§ 5-304 (1998) [hereinafter KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw].
50. See Center for Clean Air Policy, Air Quality Publica-
tions, Greenhouse Emissions Trading: Improved Compliance at
Reduced Cost at 1 (visited April 13, 2000) <http://ccap.org>
[hereinafter Center for Clean Air Policy].
51. See, e.g., Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra
note 29, at 944; Endres, Solution of the Market, supra note
29, at 59.
52. See Naughton, supra note 2, at 202-03; Zimmer-
mann & Hansjdrgens, Comparing Allowances with Other In-
struments, supra note 5, at 50; James E. Krier, Marketable
Pollution Allowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 449, 453 (1994).
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sions cannot be exceeded in a tradeable permit system.
The trading mechanism, therefore, offers certainty and
is environmentally preferable to a tax system.
(4) Avoiding Litigation and Political Pressure
Since regulation may increase costs for industries,
those industries may try to mitigate these burdens by
exerting political pressure or engaging in litigation.5 3 In
contrast, litigation is not as prevalent in a market sys-
tem. The regulatory agency no longer mandates the in-
stallation of certain control technologies. Furthermore,
political pressure on the legislative bodies by the indus-
try should largely disappear as the legislature will leave
it to the polluters to make further reductions if they find
that doing so is worthwhile instead of imposing more
stringent standards. Thus, economic instruments such
as emissions trading lessen industries' need to exert po-
litical pressure on the governmental agencies and relieve
courts from litigation.
b. Weaknesses and Risks
Although there are many advantages to a trading
scheme, there may also exist in such a scheme several
weaknesses and potential risks. Some of these weak-
nesses and risks include pollution hot spots, monitor-
ing, and distributional problems, all of which create en-
vironmental, economic and technical difficulties. Even
though, at first glance, the advantages seem numerous,
one must not overlook the substantial uncertainty a
market always entails. Demand and supply can rarely
be accurately predicted. The following section discusses
some of the weaknesses and risks inherent in a trading
scheme.
53. See Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 367.
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(1) Environmental Risks of Marketable Credits
No trading program will ever be capable of completely
eliminating harmful emissions.54 Although this seems to
be a severe weakness of the program, it is doubtful
whether any other program could provide for a complete
avoidance of emissions. Much more serious is the fact
that, without any regional restriction, a trading market
has the potential to cause local pollution hot spots. If
emission reductions do not occur at the sources most
responsible for contaminating sensitive ecosystems,
those regions will be highly polluted. 55 Another envi-
ronmental risk of marketable credits is that the trading
system relies heavily on the assumption that pollution
discharges can be accurately monitored. Critics assert
that current technologies and systems of governmental
administration have not yet been able to adequately deal
with the monitoring problem.56
(2) Uncertainty about Economic Effects
While a tax is fixed and certain, prices of emission al-
lowances can only be estimated. 7 Thus, the potential
economic effects of a credit system are much more diffi-
cult to assess than those of a tax system. This may be
irrelevant since there is no need for the government to
determine the price of the credits. Nevertheless, un-
certainty about the potential economic effects causes a
far more serious problem for the market, because it
causes potential participants to refrain from actively
participating in it. The risk of unprofitable transactions
will keep sources from experimenting in the market.
54. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 39.
55. See Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra note
29, at 945. Krier, supra note 52, at 453.
56. See Development of Environmental Law, supra note
25, at 415; Polesetsky, supra note 19, at 371 n. 93.
57. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 7.
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Uncertainty about the price of the credits might even
lead to hesitation regarding future investments. 58
Therefore, it is unclear whether a trading mechanism
will lead to an increase in innovations.
(3) Technical Difficulties
Several technical difficulties will arise when the initial
allocation and subsequent devaluation of the allowances
occurs. Problems may arise when credits are initially
allocated by the government. A possible solution for
potential problems is to allocate the pollution credits to
sources based on their former permits (i.e., according to
the amount of pollutants that they were allowed to re-
lease under their former permits).5 9 As sources rarely
emit at the maximum level allowed, a tremendous
amount of pollution allowances may be created that do
not reflect true emission reductions. 60 This allocation
method would cause a second problem as permit hold-
ers would associate a right to pollute a certain amount
with their permits. This use frustrates the purpose be-
hind permits. A permit is granted with the expectation
that its holder does not harm the environment.61 An-
other method of allocating credits is based upon the
actual emissions of the utilities during a certain period
of time. However, this method would result in an un-
justified preferential treatment of those sources which
did not employ any pollution reduction methods during
that time period. 62
After determining the conditions of initial allocation of
credits, the government must also design a method for
58. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 10.
59. Most plants are required to have a permit in order
to be allowed to operate their facilities.
60. See Feldhaus, Market Economy and Air Pollution
Control, supra note 38, at 554.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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devaluing them over the course of time. If not, the final
goal of all environmental policy (to create air conditions
as clean and healthy as possible) cannot be attained.
However, finding an appropriate devaluation method
may prove to be a problem. In order to reduce the right
amount at the right time, a great deal of technical and
scientific data is needed far in advance in order to make
a sufficiently safe prognosis. 63 This will cause costs for
the agencies and possibly even compensate for the cost
savings achieved through the new approach.
c. Overall Assessment
Whether economic incentives are, on the whole, more
efficient compared with regulatory approaches, and
more specifically, whether tradeable permits are prefer-
ential to environmental taxes, is highly controversial.
Some commentators are generally against economic in-
centives. 64  They doubt that the expected economic
mechanism really works efficiently. An incentive to
continuously reduce emissions would require a continu-
ously increasing demand for allowances. An increasing
demand for allowances, on the other hand, would not
occur without an increase in environmental pollution
through economic growth. 65 Sources would not start
selling their credits just because credit prices are rising.
As there is always the possibility that other credit-
holders hoard their credits, sources might want to be
careful and keep their own credits should they need
them later on. All these potential imponderables would
make the market more unpredictable. 66 Another poten-
63. See id.
64. See infra notes 65-68.
65. See EcKARD REHBINDER, POLITISCHE UND RECHTLICHE
PROBLEME DES VERURSACHERPRINZIPS [POLITICAL AND LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF THE CAUSATION PRINCIPLE] 135 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter CAUSATION PRINCIPLE].
66. See id.
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tial problem with a trading system for air pollutants
would be the numerous sources that must be con-
trolled. Henceforth, the real problems of emissions
trading may not be theoretical, but logistical. Enforce-
able targets and a limited number of players are re-
quired. Measurement and monitoring systems have to
be effective. Also, the legislature must resist complaints
about difficulties of reducing emissions and not hand
out more pollution rights. 67 In sum, an instrument like
pollution allowances might appear to be simple on first
sight, but may not be effective in light of the numerous
uncertainties of an air pollution market. 68
Other observers believe that pollution allowances do
not offer overwhelming advantages compared to taxes or
regulatory instruments. 69 These critics consider eco-
nomic incentives more desirable because of their peculi-
arity in requiring more responsibility on the part of in-
dustry.7 0 Under a regulatory approach, source operators
remained rather passive about pollution control meas-
ures. They would follow the statutory standards when-
ever required to, but did not take the initiative to estab-
lish environmental policy by themselves. A trading
scheme, on the other hand, will force the source owners
to develop their own management policies. They will
have to decide whether they prefer to employ reduction
technology or buy additional credits. This responsibility
is considered worthwhile when making the choice be-
tween a regulatory and an economic incentive approach.
A third group of commentators is in strong support of
economic incentives, 71 including the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA"). The EPA has stated in its fi-
nal rule for the Title V Operating Permit Program that it
67. See Money to Burn?, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 1997,
at 86.
68. See CAUSATION PRINCIPLE, supra note 65, at 135.
69. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 39-40.
70. See id.
71. See authorities cited supra note 5.
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is committed to using market-based principles to
achieve the greatest level of environmental protection at
the least cost.72 The EPA's commitment to market-based
programs is also apparent in its proposed rule on Eco-
nomic Incentive Programs ("EIPs"), in which the Agency
declares that flexible approaches allow for less costly
control strategies and for the development and imple-
mentation of innovative emission reduction technology.73
Similarly, in its Interim Guidance on the Generation of
Mobile-Source Emission Reduction Credits ("MERCs"),
the EPA indicated that it favors trading programs, "be-
cause they offer the greatest environmental benefit for a
given level of cost to society (or conversely, the least
costly method for achieving a given level of environ-
mental benefit)."74
2. Historical Development
The Acid Rain Program is not the first economic in-
centive program for pollution control in the U.S. A brief
review of the development of market incentives for the
reduction of air pollution under the Clean Air Act is
useful as a background on the current Acid Rain Pro-
gram.
a. Precursors of the Acid Rain Program
Prior to the enactment of the 1990 Amendments to
the CAA, the EPA experimented with several approaches
that used economic incentives to regulate air pollution
and set out elements of an emissions trading program in
the EPA's 1986 Emissions Trading Policy Statement
72. See Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,250,
32,251-52 (1992)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
73. See Economic Incentive Program Rules, 58 Fed. Reg.
11,110 (1993)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51).
74. Interim Guidance on the Generation of Mobile
Source Emission Reduction Credits, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,134,
11,141 (1993).
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("ETPS").75  The ETPS outlined four market-based
mechanisms: offsets, bubbles, netting and emissions
banking.7 6 These mechanisms are united by a common
policy whereby an operator of an emitting source is
permitted to create reductions of emissions at certain
emission sources beyond the requirements applicable to
the source, and to use these reductions to meet re-
quirements applicable to other sources.7 7 The "common
currency" of all emissions trading activity is the Emis-
sion Reduction Credit ("ERC"). 78 States can establish
their own ERC programs including either stationary,
area, or mobile sources and have discretion concerning
the creation, banking, transfer, and use of ERCs7 9
While each method requires the creation of surplus
emissions reductions below the baseline of one source
and the compensatory use of emissions at another
source,8 0 they may be used in the following four ways.
(1) Bubble Policy: The bubble policy allows existing
plants to increase emissions at one source beyond the
emission limitations set forth in the applicable State
Implementation Plan ("SIP") in exchange for compen-
sating decreases of emissions at other sources within a
plant.81  The bubble concept considers the several
sources as one source ("bubble") and seeks to impose on
the group of sources an emission limitation, which is
equivalent to the aggregated emission limitations previ-
ously applicable to these single sources.8 2
75. Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Prin-
ciples for Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction
Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986) (final policy statement)
[hereinafter ETPS].
76. Id. at 43,830-31
77. See id. at 43,831.
78. See id. at 43,814, 43,831.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 43,830.
81. See ETPS, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43,830.
82. See id.
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(2) Netting Policy: Netting is when an existing source
expanding or modernizing will not be subject to re-
source-intensive and time-consuming administrative
procedures for new plants if the sources compensate for
added emissions by reducing the pollution from existing
emission sources in the same plant.8 3
(3) Offset Policy: The offset policy allows new major
stationary sources and modified existing sources to
comply with ambient requirements in nonattainment
areas if they secure sufficient surplus emission reduc-
tions from other sources that more than offsets their
new or additional emissions.8 4
(4) Banking Policy: Under the concept of emission re-
duction banking, a source that emits less than the
emission standard may deposit as a credit some fraction
of its excess emissions reductions in an emissions bank.
Deposited credits are stored in a legally-protected man-
ner for possible future expansion needs, used as a
hedge against future reductions in permissible emis-
sions, or sold to some other firm seeking additional
emission permits.8 5
The ETPS establishes common minimum legal re-
quirements for creating, using, and banking of ERCs,
which must be surplus, enforceable, permanent, and
quantifiable.86 Although the ETPS is still valid, it is now
encompassed by broader rules promulgated by the
EPA.87 The new Economic Incentive Program ("EIP") is
not limited to stationary sources, but also encompasses
additional mobile and area sources.8 8 The continued
viability of these programs demonstrates that the EPA
was highly interested in allowing firms greater flexibility
over their compliance options for meeting the standards
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 43,831.
86. See id. at 43,831-32.
87. See Goldschein, supra note 45, at 229.
88. See id.
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and goals of the CAA. This shift away from traditional
regulatory instruments and the subsequent adoption of
market-based programs laid the groundwork for Title
IV.89
b. Other Trading Systems
The Acid Rain Program is not the only emissions
trading program that has been used in the environ-
mental sector to achieve economically effective pollution
abatement. An example is the transferable permit ap-
proach for lead in gasoline developed by the EPA, which
led to an 89% reduction in airborne lead levels during
the period from 1980-87.90 Another example of an emis-
sions trading program is a state program in California,
called Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
("RECLAIM"), that seeks to abate nitrogen oxides (NO.)
in the greater Los Angeles area.91 Yet another example
is the U.S. program that implements the Montreal Pro-
tocol of 1987 and 1990 update, both of which control
89. While the four instruments described above are
called "emissions trading" mechanisms, this Article will refer
to them by their proper names. In this Article, the term
"emissions trading system" refers to the trading of pollution
allowances as in the Acid Rain Program of Title IV.
90. See Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern
Europe, supra note 5, at 23.
91. For a detailed analysis of this program, see Pascal
Bader & Fritz Rahmeyer, Das RECLAIM-Programm handel-
barer Umweltlizenzen - Konzeption und Erfahrungen [The
RECLAIM-Program for Tradeable Environmental Allowances -
Concept and Experiences], ZEITSCHRIFT FOR UMWELTPOLITIK
UND UMWELTRECHT 43 (1996) [hereinafter Bader & Rahmeyer,
RECLAIM-Program]; John P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incen-
tives in Controlling Air Pollution: California's Marketable Per-
mits Program, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103 (1993) [hereinafter
Dwyer, Market Incentives in California]; Polesetsky, supra
note 19, at 359. See also Alexander K. Wang, Southern Cali-
fornia's Quest for Clean Air: Is EPA's Dilemma Nearing an
End?, 24 ENVTL. L. 1137, 1151 (1994).
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ozone-depleting chemicals and allow for the transfer of
credits across national borders.92 Even if the other
country does not have a transferable permit system un-
der this program, producers and consumers of the con-
trolled substances may buy and sell allowances to each
other and across international borders.93 The European
Union ("EU") has also established a trading scheme for
ozone-depleting chemicals. 94
Trading systems have also been developed to fight
other forms of pollution besides air pollution. Allowance
systems have been created to reduce water pollution in
the Fox River, Wisconsin, 95 the Lake Dillon Reservoir,
Colorado, 96 the Cherry Creek Basin, Colorado, 97 and the
92. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, Misc. 1 (1988), Cmd. 283; 26
I.L.M. 1541 (1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989); Report of
the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Environment
Programme, U.N. Doc EP/OzL. Pro. 2/3 (1990).
93. The EPA regulations allowing producers, importers,
and other interested parties to trade chlorofluorocarbon
(CFC) allowances resulted in fast reductions at low costs.
See Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern Europe,
supra note 5, at 32.
94. See Council Regulation 594/91 Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, amended by Council Regulation
3952/92 Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and
Council Regulation 3093/94 Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, 1994 O.J. (L 333) 1-20.
95. However, only one transaction has taken place be-
cause of strict framework conditions. See Gick, Allowances,
supra note 43, at 14. The reasons for the failure of the pro-
gram may include its implementation without explicit legal
authority to use trading mechanisms and because pollution
rights were not freely tradeable. See Tripp & Dudek, supra
note 5, at 387-88. See Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollu-
tion on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant
Trading?, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 186-87 (1998), for a
more detailed description.
96. See Powers, supra note 95, at 191-92, for a more
detailed description.
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Tar-Pamlico River Basin in North Carolina.98 Individu-
ally transferable fishing quotas have been established in
New Zealand, Canada, Iceland, and Australia. 99
3. Legal Framework for the Acid Rain Program
On November 15, 1990, Title IV of the Clean Air Act
Amendments ("CAAA") was incorporated into the Clean
Air Act after a long political debate. 0 0 Under the CAA,
the EPA had previously established National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQSs"), which placed ceilings
on the allowable levels of certain six pollutants in the
air.10' Sulfur dioxide is one of the "criteria" pollutants
for which NAAQS have been developed. 0 2 Each state is
required to meet the NAAQSs through an approved
97. See Powers, supra note 95, at 193-94, for a more
detailed description.
98. See Powers, supra note 95, at 188-89, for a more
detailed description.
99. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 14.
100. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994)). See Nancy Kete, The U.S. Acid
Rain Control Allowance Trading System, in CLIMATE CHANGE,
DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 78,
for a detailed analysis of the political factors finally leading to
the enactment of the statute.
101. CAA §§ 108-109, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (1994).
102. The primary standard is 0.14 parts per million
(ppm) averaged over 24 hours, and 0.030 ppm averaged an-
nually. The secondary three-hour standard is 0.5 ppm aver-
aged over three hours. See National Primary and Secondary
Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Di-
oxide), 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4 - 50.5 (1998). On May 22, 1996,
the EPA published final rules in which it decided not to make
significant changes to the SO2 standards. National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Oxides (Sulfur Dioxide) -
Final Decision, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,566, 25,576 (1996) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
GERMAN EMISSIONS TRADING
State Implementation Plan ("SIP"). 103 This gives the
states the opportunity to establish their own trading
programs.
The final goal of Title IV of the CAAA is the reduction
of SO2 emissions by ten million tons and to reduce NO.
emissions by approximately two million tons from the
levels in 1980.104 While the reduction program for NO. is
designed with a traditional regulatory approach, 05 the
SO2 program neither sets uniform emissions limitations
for every source, nor mandates a particular method to
achieve regulatory compliance. Instead, an emissions
trading program is employed to reduce and control SO 2
emissions.
In order to achieve the required annual reductions,
Title IV places a cap on total SO2 emissions. Beginning
in 2000, utilities may emit only 8.90 million tons of SO2
annually. 106 In addition, the Act sets individual emis-
sion caps for existing sources - determined by the
plant's historical average fuel consumption rate 07 - and
for future sources. Future sources will have to offset
their emissions by obtaining emission reductions from
existing sources by January 1, 2000.108
As almost three-fourths of all SO2 emissions are emit-
ted by electric power plants, Title IV mainly deals with
electric utility emissions. Presently, however, the Acid
Rain Program only covers stationary sources while ex-
cluding mobile sources. Similar economic incentive
programs have been developed for the latter, for exam-
ple, the Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credit Pro-
103. See CAA § 110(a)(1).
104. See CAA § 40 1(b).
105. See CAA § 407.
106. See CAA § 403(a). The actual emissions cap for uti-
lities is slightly higher than 8.90 million tons, because cer-
tain Midwestern, eastern, and southern utilities will receive a
total of 50,000 additional allowances during Phase II. Id.
107. See CAA §§ 404(a), 405(a).
108. See id.
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gram ("MERC").109 This analysis is limited to the trading
program for stationary sources.
Electric power plants are expected to reduce their an-
nual emissions in two phases. Phase I began on Janu-
ary 1, 1995, and mandates that 110 of the highest-
emitting electric utility plants reduce their emissions by
3.5 million tons.110 These plants were singled out be-
cause they emit more than 2.5 pounds of SO2 per million
British Thermal Units (lbs/mmBTu) and are larger than
one hundred megawatts (MWe)."' After Phase I, a 3.5
million ton reduction should be attained.11 2 Phase II,
which began on January 1, 2000, requires all Phase I
plants, and most of the 700 remaining utilities, to re-
duce their annual emissions by another five million
tons. 113 It will apply to all Phase I plants and every other
utility plant that emits more than 1.2 Ibs/mmBtu and is
larger than 75 MWe." 4 Phase II also covers smaller and
cleaner plants that range between 25 MWe and 75
MWe.115
The real innovation of the emissions trading program
starts with the creation of allowances defined as an
authorization to emit, during or after a specified calen-
dar year, one ton of SO2 .116 The EPA Administrator
("Administrator") is authorized to allocate a specific
number of SO2 allowances to each utility based upon the
plant's generating capacity, historical level of emissions
between 1985 and 1987,1 v and ability to qualify for bo-
109. Interim Guidance on the Generation of Mobile
Source Emission Reduction Credits, 58 Fed. Reg. 11,134
(1993). See Goldschein, supra note 45, at 225, for an analy-
sis of this program.
110. See CAA § 404(e)(3), Table A.
111. See CAA § 404.
112. See id.
113. See CAA § 405.
114. See CAA § 405(b)(1).
115. See CAA § 405(c)-(), (h), (0).
116. See CAA § 402(3).
117. See CAA § 404(e).
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nus allowances. 118 Utilities may then buy, sell or bank
allowances for use in the future. Emissions limitations
for plants that commenced operation between 1986 and
1995 have their emissions limitations calculated ac-
cording to a specific formula. 1 9 Most plants established
after the year 2000 will not receive allowance allocations
from the EPA, but must obtain them from existing
units. 20 No matter how many allowances a utility ac-
cumulates, it is prohibited from emitting SO2 in excess
of any NAAQS or SIP.121 By the end of any given year,
each utility must hold emission allowances equal to or
in excess of its recorded emissions. 122 Utilities can use
the allowances to meet EPA compliance standards at
their own power plants, sell them to other utilities for
plants that emit beyond their allowed levels, or hold on
to them. The pollution allowance trading market is op-
erated by the EPA and the Chicago Board of Trade. 23
Although trading may occur at any time during the
year, Title IV requires the EPA to conduct an annual
auction of the allowances reserved by the EPA for that
year. 124 The Chicago Board of Trade has conducted the
annual auction for the EPA since March 1993.125 This
auction is intended to stimulate trading in the initial
phases of the program and to signal price information to
the allowance market. 126 Private sellers may also sell or
118. See CAA § 405(a)(2).
119. See CAA § 405(g).
120. See CAA § 403(e).
121. See CAA § 403(f).
122. See CAA § 403(g).
123. See Chicago Board of Trade, Emissions Allowance
Auctions and Direct Sales (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http://www.cbot.com/points-of interest/ecocenter/about.
html>.
124. See CAA § 416(d).
125. See Chicago Board of Trade, supra note 123.
126. See RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), AIR
POLLUTION - ALLOWANCE TRADING OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO
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purchase allowances at the EPA auction. 127 Unlike the
allowances that the EPA offers for sale, private sellers
may specify a minimum sale price. 128 Any person, in-
cluding brokers or environmental groups, may acquire
allowances and participate in the trading system,
thereby reducing the number of allowances available to
utilities. 129 Originally, the EPA examined each proposed
trade. Now, because of the steadily increasing amount
of proposed trades, the EPA allows states to adopt "ge-
neric trading rules" as part of a state implementation
plan ("SIP"). 130 These generic rules authorize states to
approve certain types of individual transactions without
case-by-case SIP revisions or federal review prior to ap-
proval.131
Each utility must install a continuous emissions
monitoring system ("CEMS") to sample, analyze, meas-
ure, and provide an accurate and permanent record of
emissions and flow on each affected unit of the
source. 8 2 A penalty of $2,000 per ton of excess SO2 will
automatically apply to any utility that does not possess
enougl allowances to cover its yearly emissions. 133 In
addition, the EPA will reduce allowance allocation for
the following year. 34
REDUCE EMISSIONS AT LESS COST (GAO/RCED-95-30) (Dec.
1994) 20 [hereinafter GAO-REPORT].
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACID RAIN PROGRAM:
ALLOWANCE AUCTIONS AND DIRECT SALES (EPA no. 430-F-92-
017) (Dec. 1992) 1 [hereinafter EPA-AucTIONS].
130. See ETPS, 51 Fed. Reg. at 43,831, 43,835-36
(1986).
131. See id.
132. See CAA § 412, 42 U.S.C. § 7651k (1994)
133. See CAA § 411(a).
134. See CAA § 411(b).
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B. Current Problems of the U.S. Pollution Trading System
The Acid Rain Program has been described as an im-
portant and extremely successful concept. 135 As a result
of this Program, costs have been reduced, levels of acid
rain have decreased drastically, 136 and air quality has
improved tremendously.13 7 The Program was considered
to have the best performance of any air quality program
in the United States because industry achieved a 100%
compliance with emission limits.1 38  Despite these
highly positive assessments, the trading program has
not been without problems during the first years of op-
eration. The market worked sluggishly and allowance
transactions mainly occurred around the time of the
EPA auction.1 39  Furthermore, the allowances were
traded at very low prices and several companies stopped
selling credits. 140 Probably the most serious effect of the
trading system is the pollution of the northeastern Adi-
rondacks by Midwestern facilities, which is caused by
large sales of New England utilities to the Midwest. 141
135. See Schmalensee et al., supra note 5, at 66.
136. See id.
137. See Goldschein, supra note 45, at 232; Christine
Sansevero, The Effect of the Clean Air Act on Environmental
Quality: Air Quality Trends Overview, 14 PACE ENvTL. L. REV.
31, 44 (1996).
138. See Center for Clean Air Policy, supra note 50.
Possible explanations for the dramatically high level of com-
pliance are: first, that allowances were expected to be more
expensive in Phase II than in Phase I; and second, the mar-
ket did not reflect that decreased rail rates would increase
the penetration of low-sulfur Powder River Basin coal, and
consequently, many over-invested in scrubbers and low-
sulfur coal. See Schmalansee et al., supra note 5, at 57.
139. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 29-30.
140. See id.
141. See id.
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1. Sluggish Market
Estimates for cost savings through allowances traded
before the implementation of the program reached up to
$10 billion. 142 Whether such immense savings actually
took place has not yet been proven. However, even if
individual firms saved a substantial amount through
trading, this did not stimulate a lively market in the first
years of the trading program. Since the trading pro-
gram began in 1992, there have been relatively few in-
terutility trades. According to the GAO-Report, only 3%
of Phase I utilities plan to include purchasing allow-
ances as part of their compliance strategies. 143 From
April 1992 to September 1994, only twelve utilities par-
ticipated in the twenty-one trades of 5,000 or more al-
lowances. 44 Illinois Power and Carolina Power & Light
alone accounted for 61% of the interutility allowances
traded.145 Carolina Power & Light is using its extra al-
lowances to postpone installation of scrubbers in Phase
11.146 Although other large utilities, such as Duke Power,
are starting to participate in the private interutility
market, the number of trades remained low. 147
Only during the last few years has the market seemed
to become more active. The number of private transfers
of emission allowances increased from almost zero in
1994 to more than 75 million in 1997.148 As submission
of allowance transfers to the EPA is voluntary, these
numbers represent only those transfers of allowances,
which are reported to the Allowance Tracking System
142. See Goldschein, supra note 45, at 231-32.
143. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 27.
144. See id. at 30.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 29.
147. See id.
148. See Environmental Protection Agency, Cumulative
Trading Activity Table (visited Oct. 17, 1998)
<http: //www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/cumtrans.html>.
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("ATS"). 149 While it appears that the "dry years" of the
U.S. allowance market have passed, it is useful to ana-
lyze the reasons for the initial problems. This analysis
not only helps to prevent another "dry period," but also
offers important lessons for the establishment of similar
trading programs. The following reasons might be
causes of the shortcomings of the trading program.
a. False Estimations ofActual Reduction Capacities
It has been suggested that either the EPA and indus-
try have simply exaggerated the projected cost of reduc-
tions when Congress debated the Amendments or that
companies can lower their costs when faced with an af-
firmative obligation to meet a numerical limit.150 The
reductions have generally involved an application of well
known and understood techniques rather than sub-
stantial innovation. These techniques chiefly utilize the
use of low-sulfur coal or scrubbers.15 1 Besides the
availability of these and other variances, easy enforce-
ment policies are typically blamed for the low demand
for allowances. 152 The State of Connecticut, for example,
tried to tackle these shortcomings by establishing a pro-
gram that eliminates variances. 153 This program re-
149. The ATS is an automated system used to track the
allowances held by utilities, other affected companies, and
other organizations or individuals. It provides the allowance
market with a record of who is holding allowances, the date
of allowance transfers, and the allowances transferred. See
Environmental Protection Agency, The Allowance Tracking
System: Accounting for SO2 Allowances Under the Acid Rain
Program (visited Oct. 17, 1998) <http://www.epa.
gov/acidrain/ats/atsintro .html>.
150. See David M. Driesen, Five Lessons from the Clean
Air Act Implementation, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 51, 58 (1996).
151. See id. at 58.
152. See Richard E. Ayres, The 1990 Clean Air Amend-
ments: Performance and Prospects, 13 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 379, 381 (1998).
153. See id.
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quires sources unable to comply with on-site emission
reduction requirements to purchase emission allow-
ances from other sources, which helps create a market
and significantly improves air quality.154
b. Uncertainty about the Market Price of an Allowance
To design a cost-effective emissions reductions pro-
gram, a utility must have accurate price information for
all available compliance options. Before a utility
chooses to purchase an allowance, it must believe that
the price paid will be less than the cost of removing one
ton of SO2 emissions by traditional methods. Although
it is easy to calculate the price of one ton of coal or the
cost of a new scrubber, the value of a SO2 allowance is
difficult to determine. Thus, buyers and sellers dis-
agreed widely on what the market price should be.155
Competition among the traditional compliance options
available under the CAA, such as low sulfur fuel and
smoke stack scrubbers has decreased prices: whereas in
1990 it was expected that a ton of low-sulfur coal would
cost $40, in 1995, prices went down to $25.156 Addi-
tionally, scrubber prices dropped sharply in response to
the low-sulfur coal offers and innovations such as larger
absorbers, new anticorrosive materials, and new proc-
esses to eliminate waste streams invaded the market. 57
c. Holding Allowances Without Intention to Use or Trade
Another reason for the sluggish market may be that
allowances are being held by those with no intention to
use or trade them. Although allowances are initially al-
located only to existing facilities, 158 non-utilities are also
154. See id.
155. See GAO-REPoRT, supra note 126, at 36.
156. See id. at 28.
157. See id. at 29.
158. See CAA § 403(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a)(1)(1994).
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permitted to participate in their trading.159 Congress's
intent behind including those provisions in the CAA and
granting broad deference to market forces was to ensure
liquidity in the allowance market. 160 There has been
deep concern that many utilities might refrain from fully
participating in the market and will hoard their allow-
ances instead. 16' In order to avoid this shortcoming, the
allowance market, auctions, and direct sales were
opened to everyone. The wide availability of allowances
to non-utilities has enticed into the market many in-
vestors unaffiliated with the utility industry. Their par-
ticipation contributed to stabilizing the price of the al-
lowances and to creating a balance between demand
and supply. 162
Besides bringing about the predicted advantages, this
system also brought unwanted effects. Unfortunately,
this was not the only consequence of the open market.
Quite a few purchasers, rather than using or trading the
allowances on the market, turned around and retired
them for different reasons. 163 Environmental interest
groups like the Natural Resource Defense Council
("NRDC"), the National Healthy Air License Exchange
("NHALE"), the World Charitable Trust, and C/O Re-
sources for the Future bought allowances during the
first auction held by the EPA in March 1993.164 Other
public interest organizations, like the Environmental
Law Coalition ("ELC"), have been. formed to purchase
159. See id.
160. See Hooper, supra note 20, at 577.
161. See id. at 577.
162. See id. at 578.
163. Further unwanted consequences of this policy
were a decrease in the overall level of emissions intended by
Congress, price inflation of the allowances and thereby an
increase of costs for utilities and consumers, misleading
price information to potential allowance bidders, and an un-
dermining of the legitimacy of market-based environmental
regulation. See id. at 578.
164. See id. at 579.
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(and finally retire) allowances. 165 Their strategy was to
reduce the amount of allowances on the market, thereby
creating a higher demand and an increase in price for
the credits. 166  These environmental interest groups
acted in hopes of creating incentives for utilities to curb
S02 emissions through technological improvements
rather than by buying credits. 67 The actual number of
allowances bought by environmental groups has, how-
ever, been quite low and has been more symbolic than
effective. 168
A greater impact on the number of retired allowances
has resulted from corporate activities. Corporations
started to be aware of the potential benefits of publicly
showing their dedication to environmental concerns.
Some donated excess allowances to non-profit organiza-
tions. New England's largest electric utility holding
company Northeast Utilities, for example, donated
10,000 SO2 allowances to the American Lung Associa-
tion ("ALA"). 169 In another precedent, Niagara Mohawk
Power Corporation donated 15,000 tons of credits to the
Environmental Resources Trust ("ERT"), which subse-
quently took them off the trading market in July
1997.170 These donations still did not contribute signifi-
cantly to the reduction of allowances available on the
market.
Other companies tried to attract publicity by retiring
allowances themselves. Minnesota Mining and Manu-
facturing ("3M") and Long Island Lighting Company
("LILCO") developed policies to retire their unused cred-
its instead of selling them. On April 29, 1998, LILCO
165. See id.
166. See Hooper, supra note 20, at 579.
167. See id. at 579.
168. See id. at 579-80.
169. See id. at 581.
170. See Mike Vogel, Retiring of Emission 'Credits' to
Speed Battle on Acid Rain, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at
C16, available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 6457302.
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signed an unprecedented agreement with the New York
Governor's office in which it promised not to sell its ex-
cess SO 2 credits to utilities, manufacturers and other
large-scale sources of SO 2 in fifteen states, most of them
upwind from New York.17' Although one might consider
this kind of agreement environmentally favorable, the
amount of credits cannot be considered sufficient to re-
duce SO 2 pollution significantly. Even spokesman
Samuel A. Thernstrom of the N.Y. Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation ("NYDEC") acknowledged that
the agreement with LILCO may raise the price of allow-
ances but is largely symbolic since Midwest utilities will
still be able to buy allowances from other sources. 172
Nevertheless, those companies in fact reduced the over-
all level of pollution and did not shift the pollution to
other sources. 173
While initially it may seem strange that companies
voluntarily retire or donate their allowances, it might
not be totally unreasonable if carefully thought-out.
One explanation for this behavior is the good publicity
such acts bring. According to Stefanie A. Gossin, a
LILCO spokeswoman, LILCO received a tremendous
amount of negative press for the credits they were sell-
ing. 7 4 By donating credits for retirement, companies
not only enjoy free publicity, but save potentially high
transaction costs. Donating companies may addition-
ally profit from a tax deduction under the Internal
Revenue Code.175 As these deductions can reach up to
millions of dollars, this can provide a good reason to
171. See LILCO to Stop Selling Pollution Credits In 15
States, Dow JONES TELERATE ENERGY SERVICE, Apr. 29, 1998,
available in Westlaw, 4/29/98 DJTES.
172. See Andi Esposito, N.Y. Knows Which Way Wind
Blows Agreement Aims to Cut Acid Rain from Midwest,
SUNDAY TELEGRAM WORCESTER, MA, June 14, 1998, at El,
available in Westlaw, 1998 WL 2737438.
173. See Hooper, supra note 20, at 580.
174. See Esposito, supra note 172, at E 1.
175. See I.R.C. § 170 (a)(1) (1995).
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donate instead of using allowances. 176 Although each of
these three reasons separately will not have a great im-
pact on the functioning of the allowance market, to-
gether they may have a significant influence on the
supply of credits.
The retirement of allowances leads to several conse-
quences. First, the major goal of environmental groups
of reducing the amount of SO2 emissions is clearly at-
tained by every retirement. The overall amount of SO2 in
the air will be even less than the maximum level of 8.90
million tons as set forth in the CAA. 177 However, the re-
duction of tradeable allowances on the market also in-
fluences the functioning of the market. Without a suffi-
cient amount of allowances, the market lacks liquidity
and will ultimately fail to allocate costs in the most effi-
cient manner. 178
d. Auction Design
Congress intended the EPA auction to stimulate the
allowance market and signal price information. 179 Ac-
cording to the GAO-Report, however, the EPA auction
only adds to the market. 180 The auction is designed to
be price-discriminating, which means that each suc-
cessful bidder pays what he bids.181 The GAO believes
that this is a reason for the slow participation of allow-
ance holders and buyers in the market. This practice
often results in more than one winning price for allow-
ances, which is a fungible commodity. Title IV also pre-
176. See Hooper, supra note 20, at 581.
177. Hooper finds that the emissions cap not only de-
termines a maximum but also a minimum of allowed emis-
sions and proposes to interpret Title IV to limit the use of al-
lowances to four situations: compliance, reserve, future need,
and speculation. See id. at 584.
178. See id. at 599.
179. See EPA-AuCTIONS, supra note 129, at 1.
180. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 53.
181. See CAA § 416(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7651o(d)(2)(1994).
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vents the EPA from setting a minimum price on the al-
lowances it sells.18 2 Therefore, bidders tend to set their
bids very low. The auction allowance prices have been
almost one-third less than the prices set by the few in-
terutility trades that have occurred at other times of the
year. 83 The GAO-Report notes that these pricing trends
have discouraged private firms from trading because
buyers wait until the EPA auction to buy, and sellers
are discouraged from participating because they feel
that the pricing is unrealistically low. 184 The GAO
therefore recommends changing the auction design into
a single price auction.
The GAO-Report suggests that redesigning the EPA
auction as a single price auction may help decrease
market uncertainty and raise total auction proceeds. 8 5
According to the GAO, the establishment of an orderly,
single price market would be consistent with the CAA's
statutory language.8 6 Such a market also would pro-
vide the accurate allowance price information required
to satisfy Congress's goal of developing cost-effective
compliance plans.187
The March 1995 auction continued to demonstrate the
ineffectiveness of the current auction design. The cost
of an allowance on the private market in early 1995 had
stabilized near $135 as professional brokers continued
to become increasingly involved in trades and obtaining
allowance pricing information.188 The allowance prices,
however, began to drop as the auction date approached,
and the average price of allowances purchased at the
182. See id.
183. See GAO-REPoRT, supra note 126, at 54.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 58.
186. See id. at 55.
187. See id.
188. See EPA Allowance Auction Prices Average $130,
UTILITY ENV'T REP., Mar. 31, 1995, at 1.
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1995 auction was only $132.00.189 Some market ana-
lysts complained that the current auction design causes
the auction to act as an artificial depressant on allow-
ance prices and undermines, rather than enhances, the
private interutility trading market. 190
e. Difficulties in Ratemaking Process
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
and state regulatory agencies' lack of regulatory guid-
ance over how allowance trading will be incorporated
into the utility-ratemaking process may help to explain
the utilities' restrained behavior towards trading. Thus,
it is suggested that the EPA should work together with
FERC and state commissions to determine how the pur-
chase and sale of allowances will be recognized in ra-
temaking on both the federal and state level because
utility rates are directly related to the expenses and po-
tential profits of a utility.
On the state level, state electric utility commissions
regulate ratemaking. Traditional ratemaking limits the
rates consumers pay for electricity by determining the
utility's costs and then calculating a "fair rate of return
or profit" for the utility.9 1 When assessing a utility's
costs for ratemaking purposes, the state utility commis-
sion may exclude any investment or expense that it de-
termines was imprudent or excessive in relation to any
consumer benefit.192 State utility commissions have
conditioned utilities to avoid activities, such as allow-
ance trading, that have not been proven to earn a high
rate of return and are not yet acceptable to state ra-
189. See id.
190. See Elements of Acid Rain Program Undermined by
Phased-In Implementation, Official Says, 26 ENV'T REP.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS (BNA), June 30, 1995, at 485.
191. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Doc. No. OTA-
E-561, ENERGY EFFICIENCY CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR ELECTRIC UTILITIES 36-38 (1993).
192. See GAO-REPoRT, supra note 126, at 46.
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temaking authorities. 193 This policy obviously does not
encourage utilities to take part in the allowance trading
market. Until state utility commissions indicate how
they will calculate allowance trading, including cost
savings or possible losses, into the ratemaking formula,
few utilities will participate extensively in the trading
program. 94 Although not every possible solution is
equally beneficial to the utility, each utility must be
aware of how the utility commissions will respond to the
risks or benefits of allowance trading.195
The same problem exists on the federal level: accord-
ing to GAO, FERC should offer utilities guidance as in-
terstate transactions are becoming more common.196
Although several utilities have asked FERC to address
ratemaking and allowances in wholesale electricity sales
and activities of multistate holding companies, FERC
has been reluctant to offer any sort or regulatory
framework. 97  After publication of the GAO-Report,
however, FERC reconsidered its position. On December
5, 1994, FERC issued a policy statement and interim
rule on ratemaking treatment of the cost of emissions
allowances in coordination transactions. 98 A coordina-
tion transaction is a sale or exchange of specialized
electricity services that allows buyers to realize cost
savings or reliability gains that are not attainable if they
rely solely on their own resources. 199 "Although coordi-
nation transactions are only a small fraction of interu-
193. See id. at 47.
194. See id.
195. See Eileen L. Kahaner, GAO's Analysis of Title IV's
Sutfur Dioxide Emissions Allowance Trading Program, 2
ENVTL. LAw. 239, 249-250 (1995).
196. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 50.
197. See id.
198. See Policy Statement and Interim Rule Regarding
Ratemaking Treatment of the Cost of Emissions Allowances
in Coordination Rates, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,930 (1994) (to be
codified at 19 C.F.R. pts. 2, 35).
199. See id.
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tility transactions, this rulemaking indicates a willing-
ness to increase regulatory guidance for allowing trad-
ing."200
f High Transaction Costs
A further explanation for reduced participation in the
trading market by a utility could be due to the high
transaction costs. Transaction costs arise when a firm
tries to identify a suitable trading partner, which may
take up to a year and a half. As they are likely to re-
duce the number of mutually beneficial 'transactions,
they reduce the number of trades that take place. 201 The
magnitude of transaction costs in many cases may even
exceed the market value of the credits exchanged, which
is unattractive for firms interested in trading.20 2
There are several devices for expediting the process of
identifying a suitable partner. First, a firm can trade
internally, thus avoiding the search process
completely.203 Second, it could approach an intermedi-
ary.204 This practice has been used to a great extent
when enacting the RECLAIM trading program in Cali-
fornia: 40% of all trades in California have been carried
out by one intermediary firm.2°5 A third way in which
high transaction costs are reduced is when an exchange
is made of a great volume of credits instead of a small
200. Kahaner, supra note 195, at 251.
201. See Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing
More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Con-
trol, 38 J.L. & EcON. 19, 33 (1995).
202. See id. at 42.
203. See id. at 33.
204. See Holger Bonus, Emissionsrechte als Mittel der
Privatisierung 6ffentlicher Ressourcen aus der Umwelt [Emis-
sion Rights as Means to Privatize Public Resources from the
Environment], in MARKTWIRTSCHAFT' UND UMWELT [MARKET
EcONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT] 54, 72 (Lothar Wegehenkel
ed., 1981).
205. See Foster & Hahn, supra note 201, at 33.
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number.206 This reduces' the relative transaction costs of
each trade, because a small volume of credits is likely to
be adversely affected by the fixed nature of the transac-
tion costs. 207 This presupposes that a firm has a large
number of credits to trade, which may not always be the
case. Firms might therefore have to make investment
plans for a longer period of time.
2. Trading Only Around Time of the EPA Auction
Unlike the New York Stock Exchange, where trading is
virtually constant, most allowance trading occurs
around the time of the annual EPA auction when prices
are expected to be lower. 208 During the period between
the auctions in March 1993 and August 1994, only one
interutility trade took place. 20 9 A reason for this practice
may be the expectation that allowance prices are lower
at times closer to the auction.210
3. Low Prices of Credits
At the first auction in 1993, 95% of all credits were
sold for less than $200.00.211 California Power & Light,
for example, bought 85,103 allowances for $135.00
each. 212 Recently, allowance prices have recovered. In
1998, the monthly average price of SO2 allowances in-
creased to approximately $190.213 One explanation for
the low initial prices is that the little trading that has
206. See id. at 35.
207. See id.
208. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 29-30.
209. See id. at 32.
210. See id.
211. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 20.
212. See id.
213. See Environmental Protection Agency, Monthly Av-
erage Price of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances Under the Acid Rain
Program (last modified Jan. 2000) <http://www.epa.
gov/acidrain/ats/prices.html>.
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occurred has lowered compliance costs for the purchas-
ers of credits. However, this reasoning is not convincing
because the volume of trades has been so low that
trading itself cannot explain the low costs.2 14 Another
possible explanation is that few suppliers and low de-
mand may lead to a situation where potential sellers sell
credits at a price that does not cover their own costs. 215
Other supporters of the allowance approach attribute
the low prices of allowances to the fact that compliance
decisions generally have to be made well before the start
of 1995.216 Most sources had to make their decisions to
build scrubbers as early as 1992-1993, when they did
not have sufficient information about allowance prices.
Thus, allowance prices were overestimated and deci-
sions were made in favor of scrubbers instead of trad-
ing.217
4. Upwind Pollution
Several New England states must have realized that
the pollution trading program was resulting in their re-
gion becoming more heavily polluted than before the
program was implemented, despite the lack of industry
growth. Surprisingly, the origin of the pollutants lies in
the Midwest. The wind has blown their pollutants
northeast, towards places like the Adirondack Park in
New York. Polluted air drifts with normal weather pat-
terns from sources in Midwestern and Southern states
over to the most populated areas of the East Coast,
compounding those cities' pollution problems. As Mid-
west sources were the most enthusiastic buyers of
Northwestern pollution allowances, they filled the wind
with more pollutants than they were allowed to emit
214. See Driesen, Five Lessons, supra note 150, at 58
n.34.
215. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 21.
216. See id.
217. See Schmalensee et al., supra note 5, at 65.
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under the former regulatory program. LILCO, for exam-
ple, apparently sold more than 67,000 tons of pollution
rights directly to Midwest companies, in addition to the
79,980 tons sold to brokers. 218 It is estimated that
about 16,700 tons of these pollutants have already been
emitted under the program and have gone upwind.219
As mentioned above, LILCO voluntarily stopped selling
some of their credits to Midwestern states. However,
the amount was rather small and such acts by compa-
nies is rare. Observers doubt that LILCO's move will
reduce pollution in New York State, since polluters in
the South and the Midwest could turn to other compa-
nies to buy credits. 220
While Midwestern sources may be forced to purchase
credits in smaller parcels from many different compa-
nies with a resulting increase in transaction costs, it is
doubtful that upwind pollution will decrease signifi-
cantly. How can trading be regulated in a way so that
selling companies will not be victims of subsequent
trading of these allowances to states that will blow their
discharges back to the original companies' state? A
possible solution is the enactment of state regulations
or the establishment of a requirement that an agency
oversees each trade. State regulations could provide for
prohibitions or even penalties when companies sell
credits to upwind states. Several proposals consistent
with these suggestions have already been put forth.
New York Assemblyman Richard Brodsky advanced
such a proposal in 1993.221 He introduced a Bill re-
quiring state administrative review of all emissions al-
lowance trades, giving New York the power to disallow
trades that would result in a negative environmental
impact on sensitive areas. This Bill would also author-
218. See Vogel, supra note 170, at C16.
219. See id.
220. See Raymond Hernandez, LILCO Is to Stop Selling
Credits to Upwind Polluters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at B 1.
221. See id.
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ize the New York Public Service Commission to "pre-
scribe guidelines, rules and-regulations regarding the
participation of utility companies in allowance trading..
to ensure sufficient review of the potential acid deposi-
tion of such actions in sensitive receptor areas of the
state . . . and to provide for the adjustment of the pro-
posed trade."222 Unfortunately, this Bill did not pass the
Senate in 1994. The same Bill was reintroduced during
the 1995/96 legislative sessiori, but again was rejected
by the Senate. 223
During the 1997/98 legislative session, both houses of
the New York State legislature drafted legislation that
would penalize upwind interstate transactions. 224 Under
this proposal, the NYDEC would review each credit sale
and determine if it was environmentally sound. If found
to be not environmentally sound, the company would be
fined three times the value of the trade. The intent of
the proposal was not to prevent such sales, but to make
companies pay for any resulting upwind transactions.
The penalty could also deny the utility revenue from
trades with upwind states. As before, the bills did not
pass the Senate.
Governor George Pataki later proposed an even stricter
bill that would actually prohibit sales that lead to in-
creases in acid rain levels in New York State. Under
this Bill, an environmental assessment of each transac-
tion must also be submitted to the NYDEC.225 However,
the Governor never introduced his proposal.
Another proposal that uses a completely different ap-
proach has been suggested by the Adirondack Council.
They propose that allowances be designated for use only
222. A. 3569, 216th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1993).
223. See A. 2075, 219th Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996).
224. See A. 4625 and S. 5629, 220th/221st Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 1997/1998).
225. See Emissions Trading, N.Y. Gov. Pataki Proposes
Legislation to Stop SO2 Trades that Harm State, UTILITY ENV'T
REP., Jul. 18, 1997, at 8.
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in a certain area.226 The most recent governmental pro-
posal, made in April 1999, is less stringent than former
proposals and fines participants in upwind trades only
for the value of the transaction. 227
Proposals for ways to restrict the allowance trading
activities will face different problems. With regards to
the effectiveness of these regulations, it has been sug-
gested that restrictions will not succeed in reducing S02
deposition in the Northeast. 228 Furthermore, restrictions
may also be problematic from an economic perspective.
If they result in an immense reduction of allowance ex-
changes, the goal of cost reduction might not be
achieved. Something else that needs to be considered is
whether a statute regionally limiting the sale of allow-
ances is compatible with federal law; specifically,
whether it violates the Supremacy Clause. Such a stat-
ute could limit the sale of allowances to the New Eng-
land states, a smaller number of states or even to com-
panies in the same state. Because the overwhelming
amount of sales is going to Midwestern states, the
analysis of the above issue shall not distinguish be-
tween these design options as long as sales to the Mid-
west are excluded in the state legislation.
A statute limiting the sale of allowances to a certain
region could be in violation of the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. The Supremacy Clause estab-
lishes that the Constitution and federal laws take
precedent over state laws. 229 State laws are invalid when
226. See id. at 9.
227. See New York: Lawmakers Prepare Bill to Stop
Emissions Trade, American Political Network Greenwire, Apr.
23, 1999, available in Westlaw, 4/23/99 APN-GR 21.
228. See Esposito, supra note 172, at E 1.
229. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 provides that "[t]his
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . .. shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
35320001
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they are in conflict with federal legislation.230 Such con-
flict may exist when Congress explicitly or implicitly
preempts state law, or when a state law interferes with
the fulfillment of the purpose of a federal law.231 Thus,
an analysis involving the Supremacy Clause requires a
balancing of state and federal interests.232 The CAA Acid
Rain Program does not explicitly express an intent to
preempt state law. While preemption could theoretically
occur by implication, the Supreme Court has been re-
luctant to find such an implication. There is no evi-
dence of an implied preemption under the CAA's pro-
gram.
It therefore remains to be determined whether state
law in this case is preempted because it actually con-
flicts with federal law. The Supreme Court defines this
conflict as a case where it is "impossible to comply with
both state and federal law, or where the state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."233 Thus, in ana-
lyzing the CAA, its full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress have to be determined. This determination re-
quires distinguishing between the objectives sought to
be advanced and the incidental effects of achieving
230. See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
209 (1824) (holding that a State regulation granting a steam
boat permit was in conflict with a federal enactment granting
a license on the same waters and was therefore held uncon-
stitutional).
231. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw § 6-25, at 481 n. 14 (2d ed. 1988).
232. See Julie Long, Ratcheting up Federalism: A Su-
premacy Clause Analysis of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, 80 MINN. L. REv. 231, 262 (1995).
233. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248
(1984) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. et al. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n et al., 461 U.S.
190, 204).
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those Congressional goals.2 4 If only the incidental ef-
fects are being affected by the state legislation, the latter
is not considered an obstacle to federal law and there-
fore not in violation of the Supremacy Clause. While it
may be difficult to identify the various goals of the CAA
because of its diverse features, and to distinguish them
from the merely incidental effects to the achievement of
those goals, it may be said with certainty that the main
objective of the Act is to protect and enhance air quality
and to promote public health and welfare. 235 However,
this analysis concerns a state law that would regionally
restrict allowance trading, which is federally regulated
under Title IV of the Act. Thus, the more specific pur-
pose of Title IV must be included in the examination.
The purpose of Title IV provides a numeric limitation of
S0 2 emissions requiring a reduction of ten million tons
from 1980 emission levels. 23 6 At the same time, it offers
affected sources an emission allocation and transfer
system as an alternative method to comply with this
goal. 237 A state law restricting the allowance trading
would, therefore, be an obstacle to federal law if it either
interferes with the overall goal of the Act or if it is in-
compatible with the methods prescribed by federal law
in Title IV. This question has to be solved by analyzing
the effects of such a state statute.
About 70% of LILCO's credits were sold to brokers
who in turn sold the credits to upwind states.23 8 LILCO
is not the only company in the Northeast which will not
be able to find a suitable buyer within New York State or
within the New England region. Regional restrictions
234. See Russell B. Korobkin, Sulfuir Dioxide and the
Constitution: Legal Doctrine and Responses to the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 349, 364
(1994).
235. See CAA § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1994).
236. See id.
237. See CAA § 40 1(b).
238. See Vogel, supra note 170, at C16.
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could lead to tremendous amounts of allowances that
cannot be sold to the Midwest. Not only would this
probably lead to a reduction in the total, nationwide
emissions of SO2 below the level provided for in the Acid
Rain Amendments, but it would also compel Northeast-
ern companies to leave their excess allowances unused
and retire or bank them because of the strict New York
state emission standards.23 9 On the other hand, com-
panies in Midwestern states will not be able to find
enough companies to offer them their required amount
of credits. Both sides of the allowance exchange, the
Northeast and the Midwest, would be deprived of one of
their main compliance options: the sale of emission
credits. The availability of this option has been one of
the major goals Congress wanted to achieve through the
Acid Rain legislation and it was probably the decisive
feature, without which the Amendments would probably
not have been enacted. 240 Hence, if one state could af-
fect the compliance choices of utilities in their own and
in other states wishing to sell or purchase emissions
allowances, it would alter the delicate political balance
struck by federal legislation. 241 Allowing regional choice
regarding compliance was not merely an incidental
benefit of the trading provisions, but the intended goal
of Congress. 242 Therefore, a statute restricting the sale
of allowances by a regional limit would violate the Su-
premacy Clause and consequently be unconstitutional.
C. Lessons From the United States Acid Rain Program
The crucial question in all the above programs is how
the market could be structured to be economically effi-
cient on the one hand and environmentally protective on
the other. The Acid Rain Program tried to achieve this
239. See Korobkin, supra note 234, at 373.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 373-74.
242. See id. at 374.
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two-fold goal with a compromise by restricting compa-
nies in some areas while giving them leeway in others.
The past nine years of experience with the Acid Rain
Program suggests that the compromise neither com-
pletely met the expectations of economists nor environ-
mentalists. The allowance market started off rather
sluggish with few trades taking place. Also, environ-
mental suppoiters of the trading program certainly did
not anticipate the increase in upwind pollution from the
Midwest to New England's Adirondacks that resulted
from trading. Over-regulation of the trading activities
has been suggested by some as the reason for the slug-
gish market.243 Excessive regulation and regulator atti-
tudes have substantially hampered the evolution of a
well-functioning permit market. 244 Most of the permit
market regulations have been based on suggestions that
an emissions trading program would work well when
coupled with strict rules and stringent monitoring. 245
This would, on the one hand, satisfy environmentalists
that are afraid of environmental damages if there is no
governmental controls of the trading program. On the
other hand, political resistance by industry to stringent
limitations could be overcome through the establish-
ment of a trading system.246 This latter expectation was
not completely met. Even if coupled with economic in-
struments, those strict rules and stringent monitoring
lead to the same opposition on the part of the industry.
One of the key industry concerns about the CAA is the
extensive requirements for monitoring, reporting, and
record keeping. 247 In sum, a trading program would only
work successfully if used in a true free market mecha-
243. See McGee & Block, supra note 26, at 52.
244. See id.
245. See Driesen, Five Lessons, supra note 150, at 58.
246. See id.
247. See Elizabeth M. Morss, Clean Air Act Implementa-
tion: An Industry Perspective, 14 PACE ENvTL. L. REv. 63
(1996).
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nism. The real advantages of economic efficiency -
minimizing marginal costs while maximizing technologi-
cal innovation - cannot be attained within a restricted
market. Whether this "perfect" free market would actu-
ally work for emission allowances is uncertain. On the
other hand, effective environmental protection can
hardly be ensured without some kind of regulation. 248
During the last couple of years, however, the situation
has changed significantly. Improvements could be ob-
served not only for the environment, but also for the de-
velopment of the allowance market. Regarding the
trading activity, the market seemed to have needed a
few years in order to develop an active participation.
The number of private transfers of emission allowances
increased steadily during the last years. 249 Even the al-
lowance prices have increased. 250
Moreover, the trading program has had positive effects
on the environment. The sulfur concentration in rain
decreased up to 25% in the Northeastern region of the
U.S., whereas a decrease of 30% could be found in dry
deposition between 1989 and 1995.251 Ambient concen-
trations of SO2 declined by 17% between 1994 and
1995.252 Allowance trading thus provides an incentive
for the utility industry to remain below the emission
targets. The sources emitted well under their collective
248. See Dwyer, Market Incentives in California, supra
note 91, at 103.
249. See Environmental Protection Agency, Cumulative
Trading Activity Table (visited Oct. 17, 1998) <http://www.
epa.gov/ardpublc/acidrain/ats/cumchart.html>.
250. See Environmental Protection Agency, Monthly Av-
erage Price of Sulfur Dioxide Allowances Under the Acid Rain
Program, supra note 213.
251. See Environmental Protection Agency, The Envi-
ronmental Impacts of SO2 Allowance Trading (last modified
Feb. 1998) <http: //www.epa.gov/acidrain/effects/
tradefx.html>. [hereinafter The Environmental Impacts of SO2
Allowance Trading].
252. See id.
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emissions limit in 1996. Phase I affected units were al-
located 8.3 million allowances for the 1996 compliance
year. 2 3 But they only emitted a total of 5.4 million tons
of SO2, approximately 35% below 1996 allowable
levels.254 Nearly every state containing Phase I affected
units enjoyed overall emissions reductions. Ohio units,
as one of the worst emitting states, emitted 410,714
fewer tons of S02 than allowed by their allocation, rep-
resenting 26% over-compliance. 255 In only two states,
Illinois and Mississippi, did utilities not emit less SO2
than originally provided for in their allowance
allocation. 256 There have been significant emission re-
ductions in some of the highest emitting areas of the
country. Electric utilities in Ohio and Indiana, for ex-
ample, reduced SO 2 emissions by 46% and 37%, re-
spectively, from 1990 levels. 257 This outcome is impor-
tant because emissions reductions in these high emit-
ting states support a fundamental premise of Title IV's
market-based approach. This premise suggests that the
highest-emitting plants have an incentive to make sub-
stantial reductions in emissions because they can
achieve these reductions at lower cost per ton than most
lower-emitting plants. Concerns that the biggest emit-
ters of SO2 would simply buy allowances and continue
to emit at their historical levels have thus far proven to
be unwarranted. 258
The Acid Rain Program achieved a 100% compliance
rate with the statutory emission caps on S02.259 This is
particularly astonishing as environmental targets are
often not reached or at best are achieved only with great
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See The Environmental Impacts of SO2 Allowance
Trading, supra note 251.
258. See id.
259. See id.
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delay. Therefore, it is worth considering the lessons to
be learned from the U.S. attempt to solve environmental
problems with this economic instrument. Even if some
of the experiences cannot be considered positive, they
may nevertheless provide important lessons for similar
programs in other countries. While the main lessons to
be learned from the U.S. program will be discussed at
this point, advice for the structural design of a trading
system in Germany will be discussed where appropriate.
First, Phase I of the Acid Rain Program only covered
110 electric utility plants with 263 affected units in-
stead of all 800 existing plants which would cover over
2,000 units. 260 Although this phase opened the market
to private participants and brokers, it did not lead to an
active exchange of allowances either on the open market
or at the auctions. Hopefully, Phase II's inclusion of all
800 electric utility plants will jump start the allowance
market. The lesson to be learned from the economic
shortcomings of Phase I is that a market for tradeable
allowances should include as many sources as possible,
even at the earliest stages of implementation. This idea
applies to any national trading system, but should es-
pecially be the focus on an international level. 261
Second, an auction used as a complementary instru-
ment for the sale of emission credits should not be de-
signed as a price-discriminating auction as this may
lead to a situation with multiple prices and no minimum
price. Such a situation is hardly appreciated by the
bidders in an auction. As the GAO suggested, the de-
sign of the auction should therefore preferably follow a
single-price structure in order to work efficiently and
encourage, rather than deter, bidding. 262
260. See Environmental Protection Agency, Program
Overview (last modified Sept. 1997) <http://www.epa.
gov/acidrain/overview.html>.
261. See infra Part III.D.2.
262. See GAO-REPORT, supra note 126, at 55.
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Third, federal or state agencies should provide guid-
ance to electric utilities that will alleviate some of their
anxiety over the rate-making process. Usually only the
electric utility industry involves a rate-making process,
so this lesson mainly applies to a potential German
trading system for SO2.
Fourth, high transaction costs frequently act as a de-
terrent for otherwise willing sellers and buyers. Trans-
action costs may be lowered by bringing in an interme-
diary firm. This practice has proven extremely suc-
cessful in the Californian RECLAIM program, where
40% of all exchanges went through the hands of an in-
termediary. 263
Fifth, the Acid Rain Program has resulted in the envi-
ronmentally negative effect of acid deposition in regions
that do not themselves emit SO2. This process is called
upwind pollution. A possible solution to this problem is
to enact legislation prohibiting the sale of allowances to
upwind utilities or penalizing upwind sales with high
fees. Regional restrictions by state laws have been held
to violate the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.264 This does not necessarily apply in the context of
any other national trading program (e.g., a German
statute). On one hand, not every country will have the
problem of upwind air pollution depending on different
geographical and climatic conditions. On the other
hand, the debate and history surrounding the enact-
ment of the U.S. Acid Rain Amendments and the viola-
tion of the Supremacy Clause are most likely limited to
the U.S. trading program and are not applicable to other
countries. Any other national trading mechanism will
therefore have to be analyzed according to its potential
for upwind pollution and possible legal solutions pursu-
ant to the laws of the nation governing the program.
263. See supra Part I.B. 1.f.
264. See supra note 230.
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II. INTRODUCING AN EMISSIONS TRADING PROGRAM INTO THE
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Current Economic Instruments
Currently, there is no pollution trading system within
the German legal system. Economic instruments have,
however, been used in other German air pollution regu-
lations. Even before the Acid Rain Program was incor-
porated into the Clean Air Act in the U.S. in 1990, the
Technical Instructions for Air Purification ('Technical
Instructions Air")265 allowed German utilities to use cer-
tain compensatory mechanisms in order to fulfill their
265. See Erste Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum
Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz - Technische Anleitung zur
Reinhaltung der Luft [First Administrative Regulation under
the Federal Immission Control Act - Technical Instructions for
Air Purification], amended by v. 27.2.1986 (GMBI. I S. 95,
202) [hereinafter Technical Instructions Air]. Technical in-
structions are administrative regulations, that were originally
binding only on administrative agencies. Today, however, it
is generally acknowledged that, at least under certain condi-
tions, they are also binding on courts and regulated facilities.
Initially, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwal-
tungsgericht) held that since the standards were based on
sound scientific evidence, they could be considered "antici-
patory expert testimony" and were binding in the absence of
new knowledge as to the harmful effects of the relevant pol-
lutants. BVerwGE 55, 255 (Voerde). Thus, the standards
had a "prima facie" effect. This decision was rendered under
the Technical Instructions Air 1974 that provided for uniform
standards with virtually no possibilities for case-by-case de-
terminations. More recent judicial decisions tend towards an
assessment of the technical instructions as so-called admin-
istrative provisions codifying norms. BVerwG, DVBL. 86,
190, 196. See also KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 49, § 7 n.36; JORGEN SALZWEDEL & WERNER PREUSKER,
THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 25 (2nd ed. 1982).
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pollution control duties.266 This set of regulations is a
particularly relevant technical guide to the control of air
pollution. The Technical Instructions Air define the
permitted maximum values for air emissions and im-
missions.267 Immissions are releases to the air of pollut-
ants that may lead to a harmful impact on the environ-
ment, in contrast to emissions, which are releases of
pollutants that may or may not necessarily cause any
negative effects on the environment. 268 German air pol-
lution control law is based on the regulation of immis-
sions instead of emissions. 69
The Technical Instructions Air may be compared to
American bubble policy. Under the Technical Instruc-
tions Air, several existing sources may be considered in
the aggregate, or "bubbled." Within a bubble, each
source may deviate from the regulatory provisions so
long as emissions exceeding their regulatory obligations
are compensated for by proportionately-reduced emis-
sions of one of the other units within the bubble. 270
That means that even new sources, immissions from
which would lead to an excess over the permitted stan-
dard in that region, 271 may get a permit and thereby be
admitted to the market, if the overall level of emissions
will nonetheless be met.
This mechanism, first established through regulations
(Technical Instructions Air), has been adopted by the
266. See Technical Instructions Air, supra note 265.
267. See SALZWEDEL & PREUSKER, supra note 265, at 25.
268. See Immissions Data (last modified May 11, 1998)
<http: //www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-datene/
datene/hid.html>.
269. That is why the German federal air pollution con-
trol law is called Federal Immission Control Act.
270. See MICHAEL KLOEPFER, ZUR GESCHICHTE DES DEU-
TSCHEN UMWELTRECHTS [THE HISTORY OF GERMAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAw] 113 (1994).
271. See Technical Instructions Air, supra note 265.
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Federal Immission Control Act (BImSchG 272 and repre-
sents the most important legislation for air quality in
Germany. 273 Under this statute, regulations provide that
a facility can exceed emission standards, 27 4 as long as
the overall goal of the statute will be achieved. 275 When
the Government promulgated the Regulations on Large
Combustion Plants (Thirteenth Regulation, 27 6 it made
use of this statutory authorization. The regulations
place special requirements on large-scale combustion
installations, which exceed a designated capacity.277
Both the Technical Instructions Air and the BImSchG
limit the scope of compensatory mechanisms to immis-
sions within the precautionary limits, i.e., to a situation
that probably does not present harm to the environ-
ment. As soon as the danger limits are reached, i.e., a
272. Gesetz zum Schutz vor schadlichen Umweltein-
wirkungen durch Luftverunreinigungen, Gerausche, Er-
schitterungen und Thnliche Vorgdnge (Bundesimmis-
sionsschutzgesetz) [Law for the Protection from Harmful Ef-
fects from Air Pollution, Noise, Vibrations and Similar Proc-
esses (Federal Immission Control Act)], v. 14.5.1990 (BGB1. I
S. 721, 1190), amended by v. 26.11.1986 (BGB1. I S. 2089)
[hereinafter BImSchG].
273. See SALZWEDEL & PREUSKER, supra note 265, at 24.
274. See § 7, paras. 1-3 BImSchG.
275. The purpose of this statute is to protect humans,
animals and plants, the soil, water, the atmosphere and
other goods from detrimental influences on the environment
and as far as sources necessitating a permit are concerned,
also from dangers, considerable disadvantages and consider-
able nuisances, that are being caused in another way, and to
prevent the emergence of detrimental influences on the envi-
ronment. See § 1 BImSchG.
276. Dreizehnte Verordnung zur Durchffuhrung des
Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes - Verordnung fiber
Groj6feuerungsanlagen [Thirteenth Regulation for the En-
forcement of the Federal Immission Control Act - Regulation
on Large Combustion Plants], v. 22.6.1998 (BGB1. I, S. 719)
[hereinafter Thirteenth Regulation].
277. See id.
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situation with high probability of harm, no deviation
from the statutory immission standards is possible.
Also, any compensatory measures carried out under the
Technical Instructions Air must seek an improvement of
the human environment. 278
Although these regulations are judged to have worked
very successfully, 279 they cannot be considered a com-
prehensive economic incentives program. 280  The
BImSchG is based on the traditional regulatory system
which sets an emissions standard with which every
source must comply. 281
B. Present Regulation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
1. Covered Source Categories
The BImSchG regulates the emission of SO 2 and other
pollutants by regulating their sources. The permit re-
quirement is applicable to facilities that, by reason of
278. See Gerhard Feldhaus et al., Die TA Luft 1986 [The
Technical Instructions Air 1986], DEUTSCHES
VERWALTUNGSBLATr[DVBL.] 641, 651 (1986).
279. See Deutscher Bundestag [German Federal Par-
liament], BTags-Drs. [Printed Matter of the Federal Parlia-
ment] 10/2965.
280. Further market mechanisms can be found in § 7d
Einkommenssteuergesetz [Income Tax Law] [EStG] (grants
tax reductions for investments in air pollution control tech-
niques and similar subsidies). See also Feldhaus, Market
Economy and Air Pollution Control, supra note 38, at 553.
281. See Rfidiger Breuer, Grundprobleme des Um-
weltschutzes aus juristischer Sicht [Basic Problems of Envi-
ronmental Protection from the Legal Point of View], in
OKOLOGIE, OKONOMIE UND JURISPRUDENZ [ECOLOGY, ECONOMY,
AND JURISPRUDENCE] 21, 27 (Edgar Michael Wenz et al. eds.,
1987) [hereinafter Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental
Protection], for an overview of German environmental regula-
tory instruments.
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their construction or operation, may cause harmful en-
vironmental effects. The Regulation on Plants Subject
to Permitting (Fourth Regulation)282 specifies nearly
hundreds of such facilities. Apart from new construc-
tion, significant modifications of major facilities are also
subject to the permit requirement.283
Plants not subject to this requirement have to be built
and operated in a way that harmful effects on the envi-
ronment are to be avoided, if this is possible using a
specified standard of technology. The standard of tech-
nology is defined in § 3, paragraph 6 BImSchG as state
of development of advanced processes, equipment, or
methods of operation that ensure the practicability of an
emission limitation measure. These general terms are
codified in the Regulation on Foundries (First Regula-
tion) 284
The regulations include permitting requirements and
allow the agency to impose additional orders subse-
quently, after being permitted. Permit requirements are
mostly laid down in the Thirteenth Regulation, which
applies to combustion plants with a heating capacity of
at least 50 MWe, and in the Technical Instructions Air
applying to combustion plants with less than 50 MWe,
and other kinds of sources. In addition, all sources
282. Vierte Verordnung zur Durchffihrung des Bundes-
Immissionsschutzgesetzes - Verordnung fiber genehmi-
gungsbedfirftige Anlagen [Fourth Regulation for the Imple-
mentation of the Federal Immission Control Act - Regulation
on Plants Subject to Permitting], v. 24.7.1985 (BGB1.1 S.
1586), amended by v. 15.7.1988 (BGB1. I S. 1059) [hereinaf-
ter Fourth Regulation].
283. See § 15 BImSchG.
284. Erste Verordnung zur Durchffihrung des Bundes-
Immissionsschutzgesetzes - Verordnung fiber Kleinfeuerung-
sanlagen [First Regulation for the Enforcement of the Federal
Immission Control Act - Regulation on Foundries], v.
15.7.1988 (BGBI.I S. 1059) [hereinafter First Regulation].
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have to comply with the emission standards as pre-
scribed in the Technical Instructions Air.
The permit requirement only applies to new sources
and not to existing facilities, but § 17 BImSchG author-
izes an agency to issue a "subsequent order." A subse-
quent order enables the agency to require existing
sources to comply with the Thirteenth Regulation and
the Technical Instructions Air.28 5 The duty of complying
with the principles in § 5 BImSchG may also be imposed
on existing facilities by a subsequent order.28 6
2. Requirements for Sources Subject to Permitting
The major requirements for sources subject to permit-
ting are laid down in § 5, paragraph 1 BImSchG which
puts two of the central principles of German environ-
mental la7w, the protection and the precautionary prin-
ciples, in concrete terms. 28 7 This requirement is the
central principle of the BImSchG and may be compared
to the CAA requirement forbidding the construction of a
major new facility that would cause a violation of the
ambient air quality standards. 28 8 Both principles will be
285. See§ 17 BImSchG.
286. See HANS D. JARASS, DIE ANWENDUNG NEUEN
UMWELTRECHTS AUF BESTEHENDE ANLANGEN: DIE
ALTANLAGENPROBLEMATIK IM DEUTSCHEN RECHT, IM RECHT
ANDERER EUROPAISCHER STAATEN UND IM EG-RECHT [THE
APPLICATION OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON EXISTING
SOURCES: THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF EXISTING SOURCES IN
GERMAN LAW, IN THE LAW OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND
IN EC-LAW] 27-28 (1987) [hereinafter APPLICATION OF NEW
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
287. § 5, para. 1, no. 1 BImSchG contains the protec-
tion principle. § 5, para. 1, no. 2 BImSchG describes the pre-
cautionary principle.
288. See ECKARD REHBINDER & ROLF-ULRICH SPRENGER,
THE EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: AN EVALUATION OF ITS ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES AND ANALYSIS OF ITS APPLICABILITY IN THE
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explained in detail when analyzing the introduction of a
trading system.
Section 5 of the BImSchG applies to any pollutant.
However, in order to avoid case-by-case determination
of whether a proposed facility meets the requirement,
the Federal Government is empowered to adopt admin-
istrative guidelines that set forth ambient air quality
standards. 289 Pursuant to this authority, the govern-
ment promulgated in the Technical Instructions Air both
long-term and short-term ambient standards for a
number of pollutants considered to be most important
from the point of view of air pollution control, including
SO2.
The ambient air quality standards are intended to
specify the duty not to cause environmental harm im-
posed by § 5 BImSchG. In contrast to U.S. standards,
the ambient air quality standards normally do not have
the force of law; they are administrative guidelines and
are only binding upon the administration in principle.
However, they may be considered to have the force of
law if certain requirements for their promulgation have
been met. 290
C. Why Should Germany Introduce an Emissions Trading
System in the BImSchG?
The Third Immission Control Report of the German
Federal Parliament in 1984 referred to the "model-
inherent problems" and "ecological risks" a trading pro-
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 227 (1994) [hereinafter
EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY].
289. Under § 48 BImSchG with the agreement of the
Federal Council (Bundesrat). The Federal Council is one of
the two organs of the federal legislative power and is the body
through which the states (Ldnder) participate in the Federa-
tion.
290. See supra note 268.
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gram might create. 291 Politically the introduction of a
trading scheme would greatly benefit industry. Plants
have been demanding deregulation through free market
instruments for a long time. While energy-intensive
companies take a fairly negative view of environmental
taxes, trading and voluntary commitments are widely
favored.292
Today, after more than nine years of experience with
the U.S. Clean Air Act and several other trading pro-
grams, the German legislators' view of the situation
might look different, since potential risks may be as-
sessed more accurately. Although the Acid Rain Pro-
gram has not been a complete success and still suffers
from several shortcomings and flaws, it nevertheless has
provided an effective tool for emission reductions. If
used intelligently, a similar program may also be suc-
cessful in Germany.
Although the German emission standard concerning
SO2 is already three times as stringent as that. of the
U.S.,293 introducing a trading program into the BImSchG
may still be useful. Reduction standards alone are not
indicators of the effectiveness of either traditional regu-
latory programs or economic mechanisms. The relative
amount of reductions that are 'actually made within
each of the two systems is the crucial factor which must
be examined.
Certainly, the U.S. examples are based on American
geographic, political and other peculiarities, which can-
not simply be transferred into Germany. The question
291. See Deutscher Bundestag [German Federal Par-
liament], BTags-Drs. [Printed Matter of the Federal Parlia-
ment] 10/1354, 10/1356-57.
292. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 7.
293. The Thirteenth Regulation sets targets far below
the Clean Air Act standards. Whereas the U.S. standard al-
lows up to 1400 mg/m3 under 40 C.F.R. § 50.4, German
standards permit no more than 400 mg/m3 for SO2 emis-
sions under § 6, para. 1 of the Thirteenth Regulation.
20001 369
370 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
therefore is how to most efficiently set up a trading sys-
tem suited to the situation in Germany and include it in
the BImSchG. Similarly, it must be determined whether
and how the BImSchG would have to be changed. This
analysis assumes that the constitutional provisions of
the German Constitution, the Grundgesetz ("GG")294 will
be maintained. The issue of the legality of a pollution
trading system within German law will be explored be-
low. The results of the legal scrutiny may considerably
differ, depending on the concrete design of the trading
scheme. Therefore, several models for different aspects
of a trading system shall be described beforehand, so
that the legal analysis can refer to these models.
D. Models
Amongst a whole range of different models depending
on various conditions to be included, the following four
basic types can be distinguished. 295 While some allow a
completely unrestricted use of the credits, others are
regionally limited. Models may also be based on emis-
sions or on immissions. In all of these, issues arise re-
garding the duration of the credits, and their initial allo-
cation. The design of these two elements shall be pre-
sented subsequently.
1.. Unrestricted Emission Credit System
The basic model of a trading system would allow an
unrestricted exchange of pollution credits after their al-
294. Grundgesetz fiir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland
vom 23, Mai 1949 [Basic Law of the Federal Republic of
Germany of 23 May 1949], v. 23.5.1949 (BGBI. I S. 1) [here-
inafter Grundgesetz or GG].
295. See Erik Gawel, Die Emissionsrechtel6sung und
ihre Praxisvarianten - eine Neubewertung [Emissions Trading
and its Applied Variations], ZEITSCHRIF FOR UMWELTPOLITIK
UND UMWELTRECHT 31 (1993), for economic classifications of
the different variations.
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location. This exchange may take place without regard
to the effects immissions ,may have on a certain area.
The advantage of this model is its simplicity: the free
market may develop without any impediments. 296 On
the other hand, this model may lead to severe environ-
mental hazards, such as regional hot spots, for example,
when a small area with a high density of utilities ac-
quires a great amount of credits and emits an excessive
amount of pollutants. As a consequence, this region
will suffer from the augmented emissions, which would
not occur under a system that sets regulatory emission
caps.
2. Regionally Limited Emission Credit System
A solution for those unwanted side effects of a com-
pletely unrestricted model would be a system with re-
gionally limited emission credits. Every region as a
whole would be limited to a certain amount of emis-
sions. The smaller the region, the more effective the cap
would be, and thus, the smaller the probability of pollu-
tion hot spots. Unfortunately, the smaller the region,
the smaller the market for credits. An increase of eco-
logical effectiveness appears to go hand in hand with a
decrease in economic efficiency. 297
3. Basic Immission-based Credit System
Besides the two aforementioned models of emission-
oriented credits, a trading scheme may also be based on
296. See ALFRED ENDRES ET AL., UMWELTZERTIFIKATE UND
KOMPENSATIONSLOSUNGEN AUS OKONOMISCHER UND
JURISTISCHER SICHT [EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMPENSATORY
INSTRUMENTS FROM THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL POINT OF VIEW]
93, 95 (1994) [hereinafter ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING
AND COMPENSATORY INSTRUMENTS].
297. See Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra note
29, at 946; ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND
COMPENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 95-96.
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the amount of immissions in a certain area. There are
two different methods of establishing immission-based
credits. First, the permitted maximum value for emis-
sions is determined by the amount of immissions that
can be tolerated in a single or a few designated areas. 298
For example, if a prevailing Southwest wind carries
pollutants to the Northeast, a location in the Northeast
would be used in determining the immissions cap, that
again would represent the basis for determining the
permitted value of emissions. The negative effect of this
model is the fact that only one of a few areas is being
protected, whereas others could still be' harmed.
4. Comprehensive Immission-based Credit System
Therefore, a much more complicated system can pro-
vide a second alternative. This comprehensive system of
measuring instruments would determine which emis-
sions at which location will cause which immissions at
which location. For each immissions location the ad-
missible amount of pollution will be determined and an
individual allowance market will be established. The
allowances can be exchanged between the different
markets, but their prices differ. The closer the emis-
sions source is to the immission location, the more ex-
pensive the allowance. While this basic idea would
probably be feasible, it gets much more complicated as
every source will affect several immission locations.
Consequently, every allowance price will be influenced
by the distance to more than one immission location.
298. See Michael Bothe, Rechtliche VoraussetzungenfLr
den Einsatz von handelbaren Emissionszertifikaten am
Beispiel von SO2 [Legal Requirements for the Use of Tradeable
Emission Allowances, For Example for SO2], NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT
FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 937, 938 (1995) [hereinafter Bothe,
Legal Requirements for the Use of Tradeable Emission Allow-
ances]; Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra note 29, at
946; ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMPENSATORY
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 96.
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The determination of the allowance price can therefore
become highly complex and difficult. Although this
model may at best consider the environmental effects
the trade of allowances can cause, its structure is
probably too complex to implement.
5. Duration of Credits
In any of the models, there are two different possibili-
ties in establishing the duration of the credits. First,
they could be valid for a limited period of time, for ex-
ample one year. If the permits are limited for a certain
time period, the agency could reduce the amount of to-
tal emissions each period and thereby adapt to any new
ecological standards. While the state would gain flexi-
bility in matters of environmental policy, the individual
source would lack any kind of security. Sources could
not foresee at what price credits will be available in the
next period of time and future planning is difficult. 299
Accordingly, short-term credits have been rejected in
most trading programs. 300
Second, credits could be of unlimited duration. This
would eliminate the former problem of insecurity in
planning. On the other hand, the state must retain the
possibility of reducing the overall amount of emissions
in order to meet ecological needs. This could be done in
two ways. 301 First, the state could retain the authority
to devalue the allowances. Second, the state could pur-
chase them. If the state had the power of devaluation, it
would be necessary to announce its plans in sufficient
time so that industry can adjust its planning (otherwise
the devaluation policy could lead to the same results as
with limited credits).30 2 In the case of devaluation, utili-
299. See Bader & Rahmeyer, RECLAIM-Program, supra
note 91, at 46.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.
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ties could purchase additional credits, if necessary, or
reduce emissions, if possible, in order to avoid illegal
emissions and a violation of the trading program. The
distribution of credits without time limitations is gener-
ally favored by analysts of trading systems. 303
6. Allocation
The third question to be solved by trading program
modelists is how to allocate the credits initially. Three
options are presented.
a. Auction
The first option is a state auction that sells allowances
to the highest bidder. The main problem resulting from
an initial auction is the impact on existing sources.
Although old sources already acquired permits for the
operation of their plants and therefore were allowed to
emit a certain amount of pollutants, this right is taken
away if they have to purchase allowances at an
auction. 04 This might conflict with the requirement in
German law to protect the continuing existence of old
sources, which will be discussed below.305 In addition,
this policy leads to similar uncertainties in planning,
like the allocation of credits limited in time, because
sources cannot be sure that they will be able to acquire
a sufficient amount of credits at the next auction. No
long-term planning of operations is possible. 06
303. See id.
304. See Environmental Protection Agency, Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Trading: A Country's - and Company's - Eye
View (visited May 13, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/oppe-
oee 1 /globalwarming/publications/actions/cop5/ghgjtrading
.html>.
305. See infra Part II.F.2.
306. See Bader & Rahmeyer, RECLAIM-Program, supra
note 91, at 47; Bonus & Hdder, supra note 47, at 38. For a
strong pledge for auction markets instead of direct sales ar-
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Another legal aspect affected by the allocation of the
allowances through an auction is the qualification and
destination of the payment the state receives from the
bidders. It can probably not be considered 'a "special
fee" (Sonderabgabe), but must be qualified as an "envi-
ronmental utilization fee" (Umweltnutzungsabgabe) or
"renting charge" (Verleihungsgebdhr). It is still unre-
solved whether environmental utilization fees or renting
charges are permissible instruments for the utilization
of public goods.30 7
b. Sale
An initial sale of credits by the state leads to the same
problems with the protection of existing sources.3 08
Furthermore, the state or the agency in charge of the
allocation will face the task of setting an initial price for
the credits, which might cause major difficulties. While
an auction will lead to a market (scarcity) price based on
supply and demand, the agency has no comparable
value which could guide it in determining the price. The
agency would have to know the costs to the plants of
reducing or avoiding emissions, information' which it
does not normally have and which may be difficult to
obtain. Therefore, most commentators reject this ap-
proach as not feasible. 309
guing they are much more efficient because of a lower risk of
hoarding and lower transaction costs. See Brennan Van
Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE
L.J. 2707, 2715 (1991); Tripp & Dudek, supra note 5, at 376-
77 (1989).
307. See ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMP-
ENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 118-19.
308. See discussion infra Part II.F.2.
309. See, e.g., Bader & Rahmeyer, RECLAIM-Program,
supra note 91, at 47.
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c. Free allocation
A third option for allocating emission allowances is to
distribute them free of charge to previous holders of op-
erating permits. The amount of pollutants that a source
was allowed to emit until now is established and
equivalent emission credits are assigned. This concept
- also called grandfathering - seems to be the most
promising as its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.
Admittedly, the free allocation gives preferential treat-
ment to those utilities that have polluted the environ-
ment in the worst manner: the more a facility emitted in
the past, the more credits it will receive for the future.
As such, it would seem that they would be awarded for
their lack of investments in emission-reducing technolo-
gies.310 Especially discriminated against are new
sources, which will have to purchase credits for every
emission they want to make. Some critics have pointed
out that existing sources may hoard credits, so that new
sources would not even get the chance to purchase
them.Snl On the other hand, free allocation is the only
way to avoid the legal conflict with the continuing exis-
tence of old sources. Another advantage of this way of
distribution is the planning flexibility for existing
sources. They would not have to change all their op-
eration policies. In addition, they would not be bur-
dened with the extra costs for the allowances.
In conclusion, free allocation appears to present the
fewest problems and can therefore be recommended as
the best option.31 2
310. See id. at 48; Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at
19.
311. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 19.
312. See Bader & Rahmeyer, RECLAIM-Program, supra
note 91, at 48; Michael Grubb & James K. Sebenius, Partici-
pation, Allocation and Adaptability in International Tradeable
Emission Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Control, in
CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM, SU-
pra note 29, at 185, 191.
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E. Legal Issues
Legal issues that arise when an emissions trading
program is introduced into the German legal system can
be both formal and substantive in nature. The formal
scrutiny includes procedural aspects such as the
authority of the legislature and administrative agencies
over the subject matter at issue, the legislative proce-
dure, and the form of the statute. A trading system
must be enacted on the federal level. Depending on their
particular nature, administrative functions should be
divided between state and federal authorities. The sub-
stantive scrutiny analyzes the substantive compatibility
of a proposed emissions trading program with existing
legislation. A statute introducing a trading scheme into
the German law system will have to fulfill certain
structural requirements in order to be consistent with
existing law.
1. Formal Issues
From among the formal issues to be observed when
enacting an emissions trading statute, only the author-
ity over the subject matter needs to be examined in par-
ticular. Procedural and form requirements need not be
addressed since these are governed by general rules of
Articles 76-78 of the Grundgesetz.313 According to the
structure of the Federal Republic of Germany, Articles
70 to 75 of the Grundgesetz divide the legislative and
administrative powers between the Federation (Bund)
and the states (Lnder). Whereas the main responsibil-
ity for administrative matters lies with the states, the
Federation plays a predominant role in making legisla-
tion.31 4
313. Arts. 76 - 78 GG.
314. See WERNER F. EBKE & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, INTRO-
DUCTION TO GERMAN LAw 86 (1996).
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a. Legislative Authority
The first question regarding authority is whether the
Federation or the states have the authority to enact leg-
islation covering the enactment of and functioning of an
emissions trading system. The power to legislate be-
longs to the states unless the Constitution specifies that
it comes under the authority of the Federal
Government. 15 The Federal Government may legislate
either exclusively, concurrently with the states (so-
called competing legislative authority), or enact frame-
work laws to be implemented by the states.3 16 If the
Federation is granted a framework legislative authority,
it then must create a system of rules which is complete.
However, framework statutes should also leave sub-
stantial possibilities for regulation up to the states.317
The determination of the legislative authority depends
on the subject matter. The federal government was not
given comprehensive authority in the field of environ-
mental protection legislation. Due to its two-fold char-
acter, an emissions trading system can be considered
an environmental issue as well as an economic matter.
The Federation does not have exclusive authority over
the enactment of environmental statutes. The greater
part of environmental law including the preservation of
clean air under Article 74, paragraph 1, no. 24 GG falls
within the competing legislative authorities of the Fed-
eration and the federal states. Competing legislative
authorities allow the states to pass laws only to the ex-
tent that the Federation itself has not enacted conclu-
sive legal provisions.31 8 As the Federation exercised its
right to enact clean air laws by passing the BImSchG, it
has explicitly exhausted the legislative authorities con-
ferred upon it. A trading system can be considered part
315. See art. 70, para. 1 GG.
316. See id. arts. 70-75.
317. See id. art. 75.
318. See id. art. 72, para. 1.
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of the control regime, providing the Federation with ad-
ditional authority to enact a trading statute. Article 74,
paragraph 1, no. 24 GG may provide the Federation
with authority to enact an emissions trading statute.319
If the trading system is considered an economic issue,
it may be considered "law relating to economic matters"
under Article 74, paragraph 1, no. 11 GG, which allows
for regulation of industry, supply of power, trades and
others. This provision is part of the catalog for com-
peting legislative authority and provides authority for a
federal statute. The Federation could, therefore, also
support its authority with this provision.3 20
However, a constitutional basis in one of the two pro-
visions cited above is not sufficient in order to acquire
federal legislative authority. The Grundgesetz imposes a
second requirement: federal regulation must be neces-
sary in order to assure equal living conditions in the
federal territory or the preservation of legal and eco-
nomic unity.321 In the present case, the establishment of
an emissions trading program in every single state
would lead to several different regimes. Each regime
would consist of different trading mechanisms, different
market regulations and different competition features.
Consequently, interstate trading would be confronted
with a wide range of obstacles. Since such a system
could hardly be implemented in a reasonable manner, a
national program seems necessary to protect state in-
terests.3 22 Therefore, the requirements of legal and eco-
nomic unity will be met. Thus, a trading scheme could
be enacted as a federal statute regulating an environ-
mental issue323 or an economic issue.324
319. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 39-40.
320. See id. at 40.
321. See art. 72, para. 2 GG.
322. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 41.
323. See art. 74, para. 1, no. 24 GG.
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b. Administrative Authority
The second question regarding state or federal
authority concerns the administration of a trading
scheme. The enforcement of federal law relating to the
environment forms the focus of the environmental
authority of the states. Unless otherwise specified,
states may determine for themselves how to execute
federal statutes. 325 Consequently, the states would be
responsible for the implementation and administration
of a trading system.
However, this does not necessarily mean that states
also have the authority to establish an administrative
agency in charge of allocating the permits and control-
ling the trading activities. Under Article 87, paragraph
3, sentence 1 GG, the federal legislature is authorized to
establish independent federal higher authorities for
matters on which the Federation has the power to leg-
islate. The Federation has done so by establishing the
Federal Environmental Agency ("Umweltbundesamt" or
"UBA"). The UBA has no statutory powers to enforce
laws and is thus limited to preparing and assisting
functions, research, documentation, and publicity. 326
A trading program would require the agency to carry
out several different functions including: determination
of the emissions cap, allocation of emissions allowances,
organization of the market and the auction (in case
there will be an auction), providing information to par-
ticipating sources, and emissions control of the sources.
Since the first four tasks involve overseeing all emis-
sions and sources, they require a central agency to be in
charge of the decision-making. Thus, it seems most ap-
propriate to either expand the UBA's authority and ca-
pacities in order to organize the emissions trading, or to
324. See id. art. 74, para. 1, no. 11.
325. See id. arts. 30, 83-87.
326. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 89; SALZWEDEL & PREUSKER, supra note
265, at 8.
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establish a new agency. The control of emissions at the
individual sources, however, does not require a central
decision. A federal agency would be overburdened with
controlling all sources within the country. As the con-
trols themselves may, depending on the particular ar-
rangement 3 27 involve several other state agencies, it is
best to defer authority to state agencies. 328 In conclu-
sion, federal and state agencies will have to share differ-
ent tasks.
2. Substantive Issues
Every German statute has to be in accordance with
German, European, and public international law.
Therefore, substantive issues can arise in all of these
three areas of law. A discussion of the various sub-
stantive issues in these areas of law follows.
a. German Law
An emissions trading statute may violate specific envi-
ronmental laws including: the BImSchG, certain regu-
lations under the BImSchG, the Technical Instructions
Air, general principles of environmental law, and the
Grundgesetz. The most important source of environ-
mental legislation on the federal level is the BImSchG.
The federal government can issue regulations to sup-
plement the formal laws 329 and did so in numerous
regulations to the BImSchG. The Third, Thirteenth and
Seventeenth Regulation will be of particular relevance
for a trading program for SO2 . Additionally, the gov-
ernment is authorized to issue administrative instruc-
tions to help enforce the law. Of these, the Technical
Instructions Air is a particularly relevant guide in which
327. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 222 (discussing a proposal on how to ar-
range the controls specifically).
328. See id. at 226.
329. See art. 80, para. 1 GG.
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the permitted maximum values for emissions and im-
missions are defined.
(1) BImSchG
The BImSchG does not contain any provision that ex-
pressly prohibits the introduction of an emissions trad-
ing mechanism. A violation of the statute could never-
theless occur if one of the environmental principles ex-
pressly laid down in the BImSchG were violated. Sec-
tion 5, paragraph 1 BImSchG contains two principles of
German environmental law: the protection principle
found in no. 1 and the precautionary principle found in
no. 2. The latter, together with the causation and the
cooperation principle of fundamental importance, form
the so-called "principle trinity."3 3 0
(i) Precautionary Principle
The intent of the precautionary principle is to prevent
damage or dangers before they occur and to avoid or at
least minimize pollution. The precautionary principle
therefore goes much further than merely reacting to the
pollution once it arises. The precautionary principle is
based on the idea that harm to the environment may be
avoided through preventive measures taken in
advance. 33' Precaution does not, however, mean the ex-
clusion of all risk; the uncertain nature of scientific
knowledge in any case prevents an absolute exclusion of
all risks.332
The precautionary principle is established by section
5, paragraph 1, no. 2 BImSchG and in this context is
considered indisputably binding on all facilities regu-
330. See HORST SCHLEMMINGER & HOLGER WISSEL, GER-
MAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR PRACTITIONERS 39-40 (1996).
331. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.4-7.
332. See SCHLEMMINGER & WISSEL, supra note 330, at
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lated under the Act.3 3 3 According to this provision, pre-
caution must be taken to prevent harmful effects on the
environment. In particular, emission control measures
must be employed as appropriate according to best
available technology. Otherwise, a source will be denied
the requested permit. While details concerning the ex-
act application of the principle are still contentious, it is
generally acknowledged that emissions, even if they re-
main below the standards of the Technical Instructions
Air, have to be reduced as long as it is feasible under
current technology. 334 The BimSchG defines the best
available technology as the state of development of ad-
vanced processes of facilities or of modes of operation
which is deemed to indicate the practical suitability of a
particular technique for restricting emission levels.3 3 5
When determining the best available technology, special
consideration shall be given to comparable processes,
facilities, or modes of operation that have proven suc-
cessful in practical operation. 336
Although there might be differences between an un-
limited trading scheme and restricted (regionalized)
models, the introduction of any kind of emissions trad-
ing system could lead to a violation of the precautionary
principle. This principle might be violated in two re-
spects: its dynamic character and its technology ap-
proach. The principle has a dynamic aspect requiring
sources to adjust their emission reductions dynamically,
i.e., as current developments suggest. 337 If the regula-
333. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.2.
334. See id. § 7-55; JORGEN SALZWEDEL, GRUNDZfJGE DES
UMWELTRECHTS [ESSENTIALS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw] 87 (1982)
[hereinafter SALZWEDEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
335. See § 3, para. 6 BImSchG.
336. See id.
337. See, e.g., Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, su-
pra note 38, at 79; HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, supra note 29, at 204.
20001 383
384 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
tion of air pollutants is left to a market mechanism like
emission credits, this constant adaptation to recent sci-
entific and technological developments may be jeopard-
ized.3 3 8 Some authors suggest that one could deviate
from this important obligation as long as the new strat-
egy (i.e., the trading scheme) shows substantial promise
of reaching the goal of best available technology.33 9
Other authors do not interpret the precautionary prin-
ciple as requiring an automatic adoption of better tech-
nology as soon as it has developed.3 40 As long as emis-
sions are constantly being reduced, the precautionary
principle would allow a trading program. 341 However,
under either of these interpretation approaches, the dy-
namic features of the precautionary principle as laid
down in § 5, paragraph 1, no. 2 BImSchG would have to
be changed or abandoned.
Another manner in which the principle may be met is
by the constant devaluation of emission allowances. 42
Such constant devaluation of the credits would not lead
338. See Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, supra
note 38, at 80; Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 939.
339. See, e.g., Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 939.
340. See, e.g., Joel A. Tickner, Rethinking Decision-
Making in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty: Operationalizing
the Precautionary Principle (visited Apr. 3, 2000)
<http: / /es. epa.gov/ncerqa abstracts/fellow/99/ticknerjo.ht
ml>.
341. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 204; Burkhard Huckestein, Umweltlizenzen
- Anwendungsbedingungen einer 6konomisch effizienten Um-
weltpolitik durch Mengensteuerung [Emission Credits - Re-
quirements For An Economically Efficient Environmental Policy
Through the Control by Quantities], ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
UMWELTPOLITIK UND UMWELTRECHT 1, 11 (1993) [hereinafter
Huckestein, Emission Credits].
342. See ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMP-
ENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 112.
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to the same results as a "natural" adjustment through
application of the best available technology. However, it
is arguable that regulation using standards of technol-
ogy is not necessarily superior to a constant devaluation
within a trading system. Since the regulatory approach
has no means to encourage technological innovations, it
is considered to be one of the economic idea's advan-
tages. Theoretically, the trading system provides a
strong incentive for industry to develop better technol-
ogy, so that no emission allowances would have to be
purchased. Within a regulatory system, the legislature
can prescribe the use of best available technology, but it
cannot force industry to invent more efficient and less
pollutant-producing technology.3 43  However, the dy-
namics conflict might be alleviated, but never com-
pletely solved.
The second feature of the precautionary principle is its
reliance on best available technologies. If sources under
a trading system are free to decide whether they mod-
ernize their plants by applying the most recent techno-
logical innovation or whether they buy emission credits
from other utilities (which preferred the former alterna-
tive), they might choose the former alternative. A regu-
lation allowing this choice would violate the precaution-
ary principle, which requires utilities to reduce the
amount of emissions as long as it is technically feasible.
Therefore, several authors believe that the precaution-
ary principle as standardized in section 5, paragraph 1,
no. 2 BImSchG would have to be changed by the legis-
lature.344 One possibility to avoid a conflict with the
343. See id. at 112-13.
344. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 43, at 36; Eckard
Rehbinder, Ubertragbare Umweltgenehmigungen (Lizenzen)
aus juristischer Sicht [Transferable Environmental Allowances
(Licenses) from a Legal Point of View], in UMWELTZERTIFIKATE -
DER STEINIGE WEG ZUR MARKTWIRTSCHAFr [EMISSIONS TRADING -
THE STONY PATH TO MARKET ECONOMY], supra note 5, at 73
[hereinafter Rehbinder, Transferable Environmental Allow-
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precautionary principle. could be a combination of tech-
nology with trading provision. 345 For example, the U.S.
Clean Air Act provides that credits may only be traded if
a certain standard of technology is being applied by the
source. However, this might undercut market effi-
ciency.
(ii) Protection Principle
The protection principle requires sources to avoid
dangers to the environment. 46 This principle is less
comprehensive than the precautionary principle, as it
only applies to actual rather than threatened dangers.
However, it is stricter than the precautionary principle
as it prohibits dangers without paying attention to any
other factors, such as the standard of technology.
The protection principle is specifically reflected at a
statutory level in section 5, paragraph 1, no. 1 BImSchG
and requires each source to be operated in such a way
that it does not produce harmful effects on the envi-
ronment nor other hazards, significant disadvantages or
significant nuisance to the general public and the
neighborhood. Moreover, a source will not receive a
permit if it does not comply with these requirements.
This requirement is the central principle of the
BImSchG and may be compared to the CAA requirement
prohibiting the construction of a major new facility that
ances]. According to Endres et al., unrestricted trading
would definitely violate the principle, whereas the violation
would be potentially less severe with regionalized models. It
is doubtful whether violation can be measured in terms of
"severe" and "less severe." ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING
AND COMPENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 109-10.
345. See Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, supra
note 38, at 80-81.
346. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.23.
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would cause a violation of the ambient air quality stan-
dards.347
Emissions trading could lead to high concentrations of
a pollutant in a small area, thereby creating a hot spot.
This would violate not only the protection principle,3 48
but also the Grundgesetz as it requires a minimum of
protection against hot spots. 49 A trading system would
therefore have to be designed to prevent any kind of hot
spots. This means that allocation and purchase of
credits may never lead to a situation exceeding the pre-
scribed immission caps. 50 Consequently, a trading sys-
tem compatible with the protection principle would re-
quire immission-based corrections, so that all sources,
even sources using trading mechanisms, are bound by
the immission limit values.3 51 This would correspond to
the U.S. Clean Air Act model.3 52 A pure emissions trad-
347. See REHBINDER & SPRENGER, EMISSIONS TRADING
POLICY, supra note 288, at 227.
348. See Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, supra
note 38, at 79; Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 938;
KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 49, § 5, n.305;
Rehbinder, Transferable Environmental Allowances, supra
note 344, at 70, 72; Martin Wasmeier, Marktfdhige Emission-
slizenzen - Das Zertifikatsmodell und seine Umsetzung in den
USA [Marketable Emission Credits - The Allowance Model and
its Implementation in the USA], NATUR UND RECHT [NATURE AND
LAw] 219, 223 (1992) [hereinafter Wasmeier, Marketable
Emission Credits].
349. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 49,
§ 5-305.
350. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of Trade-
able Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 938; Gick, Al-
lowances, supra note 34, at 37.
351. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 938;
ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMPENSATORY
INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 110.
352. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 938.
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ing system would not be compatible with the protection
principle. 3 3 .
In setting up the immission-based corrections, two
different cases have to be distinguished in order to com-
ply with the protection principle. In the first case, it is
highly probable that at the moment the credit is trans-
ferred, the emissions will exceed the designated limit.
In this case, the protection principle would require the
agency to forbid the transfer of the credit.3 54 In the sec-
ond case, immissions in a certain area may exceed the
standard unexpectedly. A similar problem may arise if,
during the term of a credit, new scientific findings or
discoveries suggest a violation of the protection princi-
ple. In order to avoid violations in those cases, an ad-
ministrative "subsequent order" pursuant to section 17
BImSchG might have to be issued.355 This provision al-
lows the competent authorities to issue subsequent or-
ders to fulfill the duties arising from and regulations
made by the Act, including compliance with the ambient
air quality standards.3 5 6 Two important conditions limit
the availability of subsequent orders: the order must be
economically feasible and achievable by applying state
of the art technology. Economic feasibility refers to the
feasibility for the individual source operator. However,
subsequent orders may also be issued if the measure is
economically feasible at least for the operator of an av-
353. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 204.
354. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 938.
355. See id.
356. Where the public or the neighborhood is not ade-
quately protected from harmful environmental effects, that is,
in particular, where the ambient quality standards are ex-
ceeded, the normal discretion the authorities enjoy in deter-
mining whether or not to issue such orders is reduced. Un-
less there are paramount countervailing interests, the
authorities must issue a subsequent order. See REHBINDER &
SPRENGER, EMISSIONS TRADING POLICY, supra note 288, at 232.
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erage (standard) facility of the same kind. Under the
prevailing view, the operator of the facility, or an average
facility, makes a reasonable profit after installing the
required technology.3 57 Since it is difficult to demon-
strate economic feasibility for a fictitious average
source, in practice, individual circumstances are con-
trolling. The interference of such subsequent orders
with the credit market could represent a serious im-
pediment to free trade. Not only would the market be
deprived of those "unusable" credits, but also sources
would refrain from acquiring credits whose use might
potentially be forbidden at a later time by the regulating
agency. Such uncertainty about the potential value of
the credit would seriously erode the source's faith in the
credit's usefulness. Thus, the issuance of subsequent
orders might cause several difficulties and is, therefore,
a rather unfavorable remedy.
Finally, there is the question of whether the protection
principle may be derogated or changed by the legislature
or whether its existence is guaranteed by the Grundge-
setz. The necessity for a protection principle could be
derived from the constitutional right to life and physical
integrity358 or from the constitutional right to property. 35 9
However, neither right on its face provides for a clearly
defined protection principle. The effects and exact
meaning of the principle are case-specific and cannot be
described in general. Consequently, there is no unam-
biguous, unique way to interpret the protection princi-
ple, but there are different possibilities for implementing
it. 360 Nevertheless, since the system may not be allowed
to cause any disproportional harm to life, health or
357. See id.
358. Everyone has the right to life and to physical integ-
rity. See art. 2, para 2 GG.
359. Property and the right of inheritance are guaran-
teed. See art. 14, para. 1 GG.
360. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 939.
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property, it would be unconstitutional to completely ig-
nore the protection principle completely when setting up
a trading system. An unrestricted, purely emissions-
based model would be incompatible with the Constitu-
tion, whereas an immissions-based scheme can be set
up in a way reconcilable with the protection principle.
(iii) Participation of Third Parties
The BImSchG allows third parties to make objections
when a source applies for a permit.3 61 Even if a market
system is introduced for the allocation of emission cred-
its, utilities will still have to apply for operating permits.
These operating permits, however, will no longer limit
the amount of emissions as the latter will be part of the
traded allowances. Most objections raised by third par-
ties during the permitting process assert violations of
the protection and the precautionary principles as laid
down in section 5, paragraph 1, no. 1, 2 BImSchG.
Since violations of these principles would no longer be
considered valid by the permitting agency, third parties
will be deprived of their basis for objections.362 Also,
potential lawsuits by third parties will suffer from the
same. The introduction of an emissions trading system
consequently leads to a serious reduction of third party
participation.
(2) Non-Statutory Law
The introduction of a trading mechanism might violate
not only the BImSchG, but also non-statutory law com-
prising the general principles of environmental law,
chiefly the principle of continuing existence, regulations
under the BImSchG and the Technical Instructions Air.
361. See § 10, paras. 3, 6 BImSchG.
362. See Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, supra
note 38, at 82; Rehbinder, Transferable Environmental Allow-
ances, supra note 344, at 78.
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The environmental principle of continuing existence is
not codified within the BImSchG. Several other impor-
tant environmental principles exist.363 They do not de-
velop binding force unless they are expressly incorpo-
rated into a standard or statute.3 64 Nevertheless, they
can cause legal effects if combined with statutory provi-
sions. Their importance has recently been shown by the
decision of the Federal Constitutional Court in the
packaging and waste taxes case, where the taxes were
overturned for violating the co-operation principle. 365
The principle of continuing existence is intended to
maintain the status quo by preventing any deterioration
or degradation of the environment.366 The principle as
an environmental principle guaranteeing people the
right to maintain air quality may well be distinguished
from the principle of continuing existence in connection
with the Constitutional right of old sources to stay in
business.3 67 In its environmental sense, the principle is
derived from the state's obligation to protect human
health and integrity under Article 2, paragraph 2 GG,
and the principle of a social state as laid down in Article
20, paragraph 1 GG.368 The principle of continuing ex-
istence may be regarded as a part of the precautionary
363. Other environmental principles include: the pro-
tection principle, the principle of continuing existence, the
caution principle, the cradle-to-grave principle, the
sustainability principle, the principle of ecological balancing.
364. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.2.
365. See BVerfGE 98,83; BVerfGE 98,106.
366. It is also called the principle prohibiting deteriora-
tion. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 49, § 4,
n.26. According to another opinion, the principle prohibiting
deterioration represents an independent principle. See
SALZWEDEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 334, at 91.
367. See infra Part II.H.
368. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 45. See infra Part II.F. 1., for a discussion
on the principle of a social state.
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principle, which seeks to improve the environment. The
former in this respect creates the lower limit for envi-
ronmental protection. It may not, however, be applied
in individual cases to prohibit a source from operating
solely because it causes further emissions. The princi-
ple may only be understood in a general sense to pro-
hibit the deterioration of the environment as a whole. 69
It is not expressly standardized in the BImSchG, but the
compensatory regulations in the BImSchG370 and the
Technical Instructions Air 71 may be considered an ex-
pression of the principle's idea. 72 The principle applies
in particular to SO2 emissions. 373 With an emissions-
based trading system, regional deterioration cannot be
ruled out and therefore the present air quality can not
be guaranteed. Consequently, this would violate the
principle of continuing existence.3 74 An immissions-
based system with sufficiently strict limitations, on the
other hand, should be forearmed against regional dete-
rioration of the existing air quality and consequently be
reconcilable with the principle of continuing existence.
A trading system will have to be designed observing
the emission standards set forth in the regulations un-
der the BImSchG. Relevant for the trading of SO2 allow-
ances are the Regulation on the Sulfur Content of Light
Heating-Oil and Diesel Fuel (Third Regulation),375 the
369. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.26.
370. § 7, para. 3; See infra Part II.A. 1.
371. See Technical Instructions Air, supra note 265.
372. See KLOEPFER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 49,
§ 4, n.27; SALZWEDEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 334,
at 91.
373. See SALZWEDEL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note
334, at 91.
374. See ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMP-
ENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 110.
375. See Dritte Verordnung zur Durchffihrung des
Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes - Verordnung fiber
Schwefelgehalt von leichtem Heiz61 und Dieselkraftstoff
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Thirteenth Regulation, 376 and the Regulation on Incin-
eration Plants for Wastes and Similar Combustible Ma-
terial (Seventeenth Regulation).377 The Third Regulation
prescribes emission standards for the sulfur content of
certain fuels. The provisions of the Thirteenth Regula-
tion set specific emission standards for SO2 and thereby
put the precautionary principle in concrete terms.378
The Seventeenth Regulation contains standards to be
observed when burning solid, liquid substances or com-
bustible materials that are not normal fuels.3 79 These
emission limits might be exceeded if a source acquires
more emission rights than it would be allowed according
to these provisions. Furthermore, the provisions and
emission standards of the Technical Instructions Air
have to be met. As explained in more detail above, the
Technical Instruction Air is considered a legal provision
of environmental law with a somewhat restricted bind-
ing force. 380 In sum, a trading system would have to
have emission standards stringent enough to meet the
standards set forth in the above regulations and the
Technical Instructions Air. If the trading system cannot
[Third Regulation for the Enforcement of the Federal Immis-
sion Control Act - Regulation on the Sulfur Content of Light
Heating-Oil and Diesel Fuel], v. 15.1.1975 (BGBI, I, S. 264),
amended by v. 14.12.1987 (BGBI. I S. 2671) [hereinafter
Third Regulation].
376. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
377. See Siebzehnte Verordnung zur Durchfuihrung des
Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetzes - Verordnung fiber Ver-
brennungsanlagen ffir Abfdlle und dhnliche brennbare Stoffe
[Seventeenth Regulation for the Enforcement of the Federal
Immission Control Act - Regulation on Incineration Plants for
Wastes and Similar Combustible Material] v. 23.11.1990
(BGBI. I S. 2545, 2832, 1999, 186) [hereinafter Seventeenth
Regulation].
378. See §§ 6, 11, 16 of the Thirteenth Regulation.
379. See § 5 of the Seventeenth Regulation.
380. See supra note 265.
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meet the standards, the concerned provisions must be
changed. ,
F. The German Constitution
An emissions trading system also has to remain
within constitutional limits. The relevant provisions of
the Grundgesetz are those regarding fundamental rights
and constitutional principles. Before analyzing any par-
ticular provision, this Article will examine how the
Grundgesetz treats the use of regulatory and economic
instruments in general.
1. Duty of the State to Regulate Air Pollution Control
A trading scheme would, at least partially, replace
regulatory provisions. Of course, this is the goal of the
introduction of economic instruments. This replace-
ment might, however, interfere with the state's obliga-
tion to protect the environment, if such an obligation
exists. Environmental protection is one of the tasks of
the government, which is charged with preserving the
natural resources and basic elements for living. 81 The
government's mandate is to protect society from both
selfish decisions and the development by industry of an
exclusively self-interested economy.38 2 This "task," how-
ever, only means that the government may regulate, and
does not mean that it is obligated to do so. On the one
hand, this task cannot be completely handed over to in-
dustry.383 On the other hand, a legal "duty" to regulate
could only be imposed by an explicit authorization by
381. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 29-30; MICHAEL KLOEPFER ET AL.,
UMWELTGESETZBUCH [AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STATUTE] 6-7 (2d
ed. 1991) [hereinafter KLOEPFER ETAL., UGB].
382. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 30.
383. See Feldhaus, Market Economy and Air Pollution
Control, supra note 38, at 553.
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the Constitution. In the absence of a provision author-
izing environmental legislation, such authority could be
based on a combination of other principles and rights
found in the Constitution, specifically the principle of
social justice, the rule of law, and fundamental rights.84
The principle of a social state, as laid down in Article
20, paragraph 1 GG seeks to ensure general social jus-
tice, and shall be guaranteed by intervention by the
state. 38 5 Although the principle functions as a normative
directive to legislation, it has never served as the basis
for a successful challenge to an action. Therefore, it can
only require the preservation of an "ecological minimum
level of existence."38 6 Consequently, the requirement of
a completely regulatory approach to environmental
protection cannot be derived from the principle of a so-
cial state by itself.
The provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights, how-
ever, could help in determining whether the state is ob-
ligated to regulate SO2 emissions or whether it is al-
lowed, or maybe even required, to leave some of it to the
private sector. A strong argument for the latter could be
made if fundamental rights provide a footing for a trad-
ing program. While the fundamental rights in German
law not only guarantee the individual freedom from the
state, they also impose certain duties on the govern-
ment. The rights and freedoms of the individual from
the state are based on the so-called status negativus of
the fundamental rights, whereas the governmental du-
ties stem from status positivus.3 8 7 This status positivus
function of the GG could serve as a basis for environ-
384. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 30.
385. See EBKE & FINKIN, supra note 314, at 55; MICHAEL
KLOEPFER ETAL., UGB, supra note 381, at 7.
386. See Feldhaus, Market Economy and Air Pollution
Control, supra note 38, at 553; MICHAEL KLOEPFER ET AL.,
UGB, supra note 381, at 7-8.
387. See EBKE& FINKIN, supra note 314, at 67.
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mental protection. Certain rights, such as Article 2,
paragraph 2, 14 GG bind the state to protect individuals
from suffering substantial harm to their health, life or
property. 388 Of course, this does not mean that the state
is compelled to do so by means of a statute. A statute is
only necessary when the "theory of the essential" (We-
sentlichkeitstheorie) requires one. Under this theory,
the state has to regulate a subject matter by statute, if it
appears to be essential. Thus, the threshold question
deals with determining what is essential. In an early
case, the Federal Constitutional Court ("Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht" or "BverfG") did not squarely address this
question, but stated that the use of land as a scarce
good may not be left to the market because of its non-
reproducability and because man cannot do without
it.389 The next decision relevant to this matter was the
Nal3auskiesungsbeschluJ3, where the Court held that the
use of ground water may not be entirely up to the dis-
cretion of the individual. 390
The question of what is essential has been addressed
by the Federal Constitutional Court in the famous Kal-
kar Case.3 91 This case defined the theory of the essential
regarding the obligation of the state to enact statutes in
order to protect fundamental rights. Although this
opinion is based on a nuclear energy case, it has been
applied to the entire field of environmental law.392 In the
case, the Court states that the question whether to
make peaceful use of nuclear energy is a fundamental
and essential decision because of its far-reaching con-
388. See Feldhaus, Market Economy and Air Pollution
Control, supra note 38, at 553; MICHAEL KLOEPFER ET AL.,
UGB, supra note 381, at 8; Development of Environmental
Law, supra note 25, at 416.
389. See BVerfGE 21, 73, 82-83.
* 390. See BVerfGE 58, 300, 344.
391. See BVerfGE 49, 89 (Kalkar).
392. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 31.
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sequences for people, in particular to their rights to
freedom and equality, and on their general living condi-
tions.393 Thus, the legislature alone is authorized to
make that decision. Its authority includes the regula-
tion of environmental harms and dangers and precau-
tionary measures, thus standardizing the protection and
precautionary principles. However, the legislature is not
capable of comprehensively excluding all risks. There-
fore, unavoidable remaining risks cannot be subject to
governmental regulation. 394
If the initial question - whether the legislature is obli-
gated to regulate air pollution by statute or whether it is
authorized to leave part of the decision-making to the
industry through emissions trading - is considered in
light of these conditions, a trading system seems to be
permissible. This depends, however, on the particular
model selected for emission reductions. A "pure" model
of emissions trading is not capable of protecting the en-
vironment from potential harms. Without any kind of
regional or immissions-based restrictions, this might
lead to a violation of the precautionary or even the pro-
tection principles. Thus, it is not reconcilable with the
state's obligation to protect the environment, as set
forth above. 395 A regulatory approach is imperative to
control actual dangers to the environment. 396 However,
according to one commentator, the regulation of clean
air may be left to a market without violating the Con-
stitution as long as an appropriate transition period is
guaranteed.397
393. See BVerfGE 49, 89.
394. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 30.
395. See Breuer, Basic Problems of Environmental Pro-
tection, supra note 281, at 53; Development of Environmental
Law, supra note 25, at 416.
396. See Development of Environmental Law, supra note
25, at 416.
397. See Blankenagel, Environmental Credits, supra
note 38, at 87.
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In conclusion, there is no overall duty of the govern-
ment to achieve environmental protection by using
regulatory mechanisms. Economic instruments can be
employed as long as actual harm to the environment is
avoided. Since these instruments cannot guarantee
that they will avoid actual harm, they can never replace
regulatory instruments completely, but only comple-
ment them.3 98  Besides, the intervention by the state
seems to be required politically. 399
398. See STEFAN SCHUPPERT, NEUE STEUERUNG-
SINSTRUMENTE IM UMWELTVOLKERRECHT AM BEISPIEL DES
MONTREALER PROTOKOLLS UND DES KLIMARAH-
MENOBEREINKOMMENS: KOSTENEFFEKTIVITAT UND INNOVAT-
IONSWIRKUNGEN ALS GRUNDSATZE IN INTERNATIONALEN
VERTRAGEN [NEW REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, FOR EXAMPLE IN THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL
AND THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: COST
EFFECTIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE EFFECTS AS PRINCIPLES IN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS] 20 (1998) [hereinafter
SCHUPPERT, NEW REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS]. How the side by
side existence of regulatory and economic instruments could
be carried out was analyzed by Rfidiger Breuer, Zunehmende
Vielgestaltigkeit der Instrumente im deutschen und europdis-
chen Umweltrecht - Probleme der Stimmigkeit und des
Zusammenwirkens [Increasing Diversity of the Instruments in
German and European Environmental Law - Problems of Har-
mony and Cumulation], 9 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
VERWALTUNGSRECHT 833, 845 (1997) [hereinafter Breuer, Di-
versity of Instruments], where he warns about an uncoordi-
nated cumulation of instruments; see also Wasmeier, Mar-
ketable Emission Credits, supra note 348, at 223.
399. See Karl-Heinrich Hansmeyer, Okonomische Anfor-
derungen an die staatliche Datensetzung Jiir die Umweltpolitik
und ihre Realisierung [Economic Requirements for Establishing
Data for Environmental Policy by the Government and their
Implementation], in MARKTWIRTSCHAFT UND UMWELT [MARKET
ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT], supra note 204, at 6, 9.
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2. Fundamental Rights
The intrdduction of an eniissions trading system could
affect the fundamental rights as laid down in Arts. 1 to
20 of the'Grundegesetz. Article 12 GG, guaranteeing
choice and exercise of an occupation, and Article 14 GG,
which grants the right to maintain a commercial enter-
prise, are of particular interest in the case of trading.
These rights may be violated, depending on how the al-
lowances are initially allocated among new and old
sources and how their future, or duration, is designed.
Regarding the initial allocation, two main options may
be distinguished: free distribution to existing sources
according to their historic emissions, and purchase,
which may be in the form of an auction or a sale. At
either auction or sale, new and old sources have the
same chances to obtain allowances.400 Whereas free
distribution could possibly conflict with the right to
choose an occupation on the part of new sources, the
purchase system could interfere with a potential right to
property of existing sources.
Determining whether violation of a fundamental right
of the Grundgesetz occurs is generally an exercise con-
sisting of three steps. In the first step, the "scope of
protection" of the fundamental right is examined. At the
same time, it must be determined whether or not the
proposed governmental action (here: the statute intro-
ducing an emissions trading program and its relevant
provisions in particular) interferes with the scope of
protection. Next, one must determine whether the fun-
damental right may be restricted through certain "limi-
tations." Limitations, consisting mostly of statutes, are
usually allowed by the constitutional provision itself.
The mere fact that the Constitution allows a funda-
mental right to be restricted by a limiting statute does
400. As a third option, the distribution of free allow-
ances to new sources has been proposed. See ENDRES ETAL.,
EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMPENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 296, at 124.
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not mean, however, that the statute is constitutional. It
is always subject to the "principle of proportionality."
Therefore, the last part of the three-part-inquiry re-
quires scrutiny of the proportionality of the statute. In
other words, the limitation of the fundamental right
must be proportional to the purpose of the statute.
Only if this final requirement is also fulfilled will the
governmental action considered not to be in violation of
the fundamental right.401
G. Article 12 of the German Constitution
Free allocation of allowances to existing sources ac-
cording to their former emissions (based on a fairly long
reference period) could interfere with the right of poten-
tial new sources to choose an occupation or profession
as guaranteed in Article 12 GG.
According to this provision, all Germans "have the
right to freely choose their occupation, their place of
work, and their place of study or training." Although
"the exercise of an occupation can be regulated by or
pursuant to a statute," the fundamental right is consid-
ered a uniform right dealing in the same manner with
both the choice of one's occupation and its practice. 402
Thus, the right to choose one's occupation is protected,
as is the right to exercise it. Under a trading program, a
potential new source will need to acquire allowances
from existing sources in order to operate. This may im-
plicate Article 12 GG. Yet it is not sufficient to establish
that Article 12 is implicated. It is enough, however, to
determine which aspect of the right and to what extent
it has been interfered with. This determination affects
additional inquiries, because the limitations imposed by
401. The scrutiny of a fundamental right may slightly
vary depending on the particular right.
402. THEODOR MAUNZ ET AL., 2 GG-KOMMENTAR [ANNO-
TATIONS TO THE GG] art. 12 n.295 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter
MAUNZ ET AL., ANNOTATIONS TO THE GG].
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the intervening regulation depend on the particular kind
of intervention. This differentiation was developed by
the Federal Constitutional Court in the so-called "three-
step-rule 403 in the Pharmacy Case.404 The Court distin-
guished between regulations affecting the exercise of the
occupation (step one), those affecting the choice by es-
tablishing subjective criteria (step two), and those af-
fecting the choice through objective criteria (step three).
Subjective criteria are those that require the applicant
to fulfill certain conditions that depend on the appli-
cant's individual abilities and characteristics, 405 whereas
objective criteria are those that are oriented toward ex-
ternal circumstances, that is, independent from the in-
dividual applicant.406 Depending on which step is impli-
cated, the regulation needs to meet certain require-
ments in order to be constitutional. The freedom to ex-
ercise an occupation in step one may be regulated to the
extent that reasonable consideration of public interest
dictates. 407 If the freedom to choose a profession is be-
ing restricted by subjective conditions (step two), the
principle of proportionality applies so that the condi-
tions may not be out of proportion to the purpose of
achieving an orderly conduct of the profession.408 A re-
striction on the choice of profession using objective cri-
teria is only allowed under exceptionally strict prerequi-
sites. Generally, only in defense against ascertained
and highly probable dangers for a public good of para-
403. Drei-Stufen-Regelung.
404. BVerfGE 7, 377.
405. For example, before being allowed to open a prac-
tice, a doctor has to successfully complete and graduate from
medical school (subjective requirement).
406. The doctor might nevertheless be denied permis-
sion to open a practice in a certain area, if there are already
a certain amount of practices and their number is limited
(objective limitation).
407. See BVerfGE 7, 377 (378).
408. See id.
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mount importance will justify such a measure. 4 9 A
regulation distributing allowances free of charge to ex-
isting sources, but requiring new sources to have such
allowances in order to operate their plants, would be an
interference with the new sources' right to exercise their
occupation. Therefore, it would fall under step one.
If, however, the initial allowance allocation leads to a
situation in which new sources do not have any possi-
bilities to obtain emission credits, they might not be
able to operate their plants at all and would be excluded
from the market. They would be practically deprived of
their right to freely choose their occupation. The ques-
tion is whether this deprivation is based on subjective or
objective criteria. A regulation distributing allowances
to existing, but not new, sources is not affected by the
applicant's individual abilities. It would therefore be
considered an objective restriction on the choice of oc-
cupation, which requires meeting the strictest prerequi-
sites.
Although a statute providing for free allocation to ex-
isting, but not new, sources affects the scope of protec-
tion of Article 12 GG, it can still be constitutional. Arti-
cle 12, paragraph 1, sentence 2 GG allows the regula-
tion of the right to an occupation by or pursuant to a
statute. Because Article 12 GG treats choice and exer-
cise of one's profession equally, this limitation applies
not only to the right to choose, but also to the right to
exercise one's occupation. 410 The statute introducing
the emissions trading system would meet this require-
ment.
Even if the statute is a permissible limitation under
Article 12, paragraph 1, sentence 2 GG, the limitation of
a constitutional right must be proportional to the pur-
pose of the statute. Proportionality is determined by
using a three step test: the interference of the statute
409. See id.
410. See MAUNZ ET AL., ANNOTATIONS TO THE GG, supra
note 402, art. 12 n.318.
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with fundamental rights must be appropriate, necessary
and reasonable, i.e., proportional in the narrow sense.
While proportionality in the broad sense entails all three
requirements, proportionality in the narrow sense is
synonymous with reasonableness as the third require-
ment. The reasonableness test has been specified by
the German Constitutional Court in the "three-step-
rule" as established above in the Pharmacy Case.
Interference is "appropriate" if it promotes the objec-
tive of the regulation in any way, although it does not
have to be the best means of doing so. The objective of
introducing a trading system is to establish an economi-
cally efficient market for pollution rights, eventually
leading to cost-effective and environmentally efficient air
pollution control. An allowance trading scheme appears
to be suitable to achieve this objective and is therefore
"appropriate." "Necessary" means that there is no way
of achieving this objective that would be less injurious
to the rights of the citizen.
In principle, the least invasive means must always be
chosen. With respect to trading, two alternatives shall
be analyzed as potentially less invasive means for
achieving environmental protection. First, the tradi-
tional regulatory approach may be less burdensome for
new sources. Usually, the regulation of emission stan-
dards determines a cap of how much emissions are
overall admissible. If all old sources already emit this
admitted amount of emissions, even a regulatory ap-
proach would not allow new sources to start operation
of their plants, because the cap may not be exceeded.
They would not receive an operating permit from the
permitting agency, so that the same result were ob-
tained in a regulatory model.411 The regulatory system
consequently cannot necessarily provide a less burden-
some model. It may therefore not be considered less in-
vasive than a trading system. Second, a less invasive
411. See ENDRES ET AL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMP-
ENSATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 121.
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means for new sources for achieving the objective could
be a regulation providing that as soon as sources no
longer need their allowances, they would automatically
revert to the state.412 This would guarantee that there
would always be a supply of allowances for new sources.
However, such regulation would probably pose an im-
pediment to the free functioning of the market. If
sources cannot expect to sell their surplus credits for
high prices on the market, there is no incentive at all for
them to reduce emissions. It is highly doubtful that any
surplus credits would be produced at all, or if they were,
that the sources would report having additional allow-
ances. This proposal can therefore not be considered to
be a reasonable alternative to a trading scheme. Thus,
no less burdensome means are apparent, so that the
trading scheme is "necessary."
The third element of the proportionality principle is
reasonableness or proportionality in the narrow sense.
Reasonableness means that the interference must be
commensurate with the object sought to be achieved,
which is a means-purpose-relationship test. This test
underlies the special limitations of the "three-step-rule"
as established above. For the two different kinds of in-
terference with Article 12 GG it means that two different
criteria of assessment have to be applied.
1. Interference on Step One
If the allocation method only interferes with Article 12
GG on step one, it is proportional in the narrow sense
as long as reasonable consideration of public interest
requires the regulation.413 The public interest in such
regulation is the interest in effectively providing for
clean air, cost-efficient control of pollution and compli-
ance with the regulatory standards. If new sources will
have to acquire emission allowances in order to operate
412. See id.
413. See BVerfGE 7, 377 (378).
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their plants, this does not seem unduly burdensome or
intolerable. Reasonable consideration of public interest
therefore justifies the interference with Article 12 GG for
new sources, and such a consideration is proportional
in the narrow sense. Hence, a regulation interfering in
the rights of new sources of Article 12 GG, without
completely depriving them of the possibility of acquiring
allowances, does not lead to a violation of Article 12 GG.
2. Interference on Step Three
If, however, the initial allowance allocation leads to a
situation in which new sources do not have any possi-
bility of obtaining emission credits, they might not be
able to operate their plants at all and would be excluded
from the market. They are deprived of their right to
freely choose their occupation, and step three is impli-
cated. However, this interference with step three can
only be proportional and can therefore be justified if the
defense against ascertained and highly probable dan-
gers to a public good of paramount importance requires
such a measure. 414 It must therefore be determined
whether an allocation program would pose probable
dangers to a public good of paramount importance, and
thus require the free allocation to existing sources.
There are several arguments why free allocation to old
sources is necessary. First, existing plants might have
a constitutional guarantee of the protection of their
continuing existence. 415 If they do have such rights,
they might conflict with and be restricted by the rights
of new sources inherent in Article 12 GG. The right to
protection of their continuing existence therefore cannot
be considered a public good of paramount importance.
If no other allocation method appears to be available,
then one might have to give up the whole trading ap-
414. See id.
415. See ENDRES ETAL., EMISSIONS TRADING AND COMPEN-
SATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra note 296, at 121.
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proach. A second argument for free allocation is that it
is necessary for the preservation of the existence of a
strong and properly functioning economy and the stabi-
lization of the utility industry. 416 Third, the labor market
must be safeguarded. 417 While this is certainly a strong
argument, it is doubtful whether the economy will re-
main strong and stable if no new sources will be able to
enter the market. It might lead to a situation without
competition. New sources bring new ideas, new tech-
nology, new jobs, and contribute to a constant change
in composition in the utility industry and the stock
market. They provide for a flourishing labor market. If
the entrance of new sources to the market is impeded,
the economy will much more likely become unstable
than if the allowances are allocated to existing and new
sources in the same manner. Consequently, a public
good of paramount importance does not seem to be in
sufficient danger so as to require a trading program to
employ a free allocation system. A regulation that does
not ensure the entrance of new sources to the market
would thus not be proportional and would violate the
new sources' right to choose an occupation as guaran-
teed in Article 12 GG. 418
Allocating free emission credits to existing sources
while forcing new sources to purchase their needed al-
lowances may hence interfere with the rights of new
sources under Article 12 GG and is therefore unconsti-
tutional.
H. Article 14 of the German Constitution
A violation of the property right guaranteed in Article
14 GG may arise from three kinds of regulations: a
416. See id.
417. See id.
418. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 48.
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trading system in general, the design of credit alloca-
tion, and the devaluation of credits.
1. Trading System in General
The introduction of a trading system in itself could
violate the fundamental right of property as guaranteed
in Article 14 GG. First, it must be determined whether
a trading system interferes with the scope of protection
of the Constitutional provision. All vested rights and
goods fall under the concept of property in Article 14.
GG.419 Even the right to carry on a commercial enter-
prise has been held by the Federal Constitutional Court
to fall under the scope of this fundamental right.420
However, Article 14 GG protects the existence but not
the acquisition of property rights; rather, acquisition is
protected by the provisions of Article 12 GG. Expro-
priation of these rights is only possible by a legislative
act of parliament for the good of the general public and
only when compensated. 421 If a trading mechanism is
being introduced, this could affect all sources that are
involved in the production of the traded pollutant. If a
trading market is functioning well, every source will try
to take part in order to stay competitive. The sources
will either have to purchase allowances or invest in
emission reduction technology. Both reactions to the
trading scheme, at least in the beginning, require addi-
tional costs for the source, although it originally had a
valid permit to operate its plants. These investments
are triggered by the market system, but they are inde-
pendent from the statute allowing the sources to trade
with their pollution rights. The scope of protection of
Article 14 GG is thus not implicated by these market
effects. The introduction of a trading system into the air
419. See BVERFGE 58, 300 (335-36); INGO VON MflNCH &
PHILIP KUNIG, 1 GG-KoMMENTAR art. 14 n. 11 (4th ed. 1992).
420. See EBKE & FINKIN, supra note 314, at 72.
42 1. See id.
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pollution control law of Germany would consequently
not violate the property right as guaranteed in Article 14
GG.42
2. Allocation Method
A violation might occur through the method of allo-
cating the emission allowances to the individual
sources. The first possibility of distributing allowances
to existing sources for free while requiring new sources
to buy needed allowances has been analyzed above. 423
An alternative to this method is the creation of a com-
pletely new situation for all former and new participants
by making a clean sweep of all emission rights (tabula
rasa): every source would have to buy its emission al-
lowances either at auction or directly from the state
agency. However, this model could lead to a violation of
the property right of Article 14 GG.
As already presented above, Article 14 GG protects all
property rights including the right to a commercial en-
terprise ("Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeubten
Gewerbebetrieb" or "ReaG"). If every source is now re-
quired to buy allowances in order to operate its plants,
existing sources are clearly affected in their commercial
enterprise. This interference results from the regulation
of the allocation method and is therefore within the
scope of protection of Article 14 GG.424
The interference on the part of the state may be justi-
fied if it is carried out by a congressional statute deter-
mining content and limits of the restriction of the prop-
erty right under Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 2 GG.
422. Authors Johannes Heister & Peter Michaelis come
to the same conclusion, although they assume the scope of
protection affected. The interference of the latter with GG
art. 14 is acknowledged to be reasonable. See HEISTER &
MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 29, at 47.
423. See supra Part II.F.2.
424. See HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY,
supra note 29, at 46-47.
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The introduction of the trading scheme will most likely
occur through the enactment of a statute. Thus, the
requirement of a statute will be fulfilled.
Although the legislature has broad discretion in en-
acting statutes limiting property rights, it is not com-
pletely free in doing so. Its discretion is certainly bound
by the principle of proportionality. Thus, the restriction
of the property right is only permissible if, and as long
as, public interest under consideration of the propor-
tionality principle requires it.425 Under this principle,
the proposed regulation has to be appropriate, neces-
sary and proportional in a narrow sense in order to
achieve the envisioned objective. This objective consists
in the establishment of a system that is capable of the
most cost-effective and most environmentally efficient
abatement of air pollution. The described allocation
method is a part of the whole concept of emissions
trading and contributes from the very beginning of the
program to a market system. The initial sale of allow-
ances means that all sources are in the same way forced
to participate in the trading system. A faster and more
effective balance between demand and supply will be
established with the greater number of sources that are
included in the market mechanism. The allocation
method is therefore an "appropriate" means of reaching
the above purpose.
The method must also be necessary. In other words,
the legislature must choose the least injurious means
appropriate to achieve the objective. A less injurious
means, which would be in the interest of the source
owners, seems to be a method allocating permits for free
to existing sources while new sources would be obli-
gated to purchase their needed allowances. As seen
above, this method could lead to a violation of the right
to choose a profession as guaranteed under Article 12
GG, if new sources are deprived of their right to start
425. See APPLICATION OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 286, at 83-84.
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operating their plants. Thus, no less invasive means
appears to be suitable to reach the goal in, the game
way. The allocation method is therefore "necessary."
It remains to be discussed whether the method is also
reasonable, i.e., proportional in the narrow sense.
Therefore, public interests on the one hand have to be
weighed against the interests of the owner on the other
hand. The business of the owner will most likely be in-
terfered with because he will have to acquire permits in
order to keep his plants in operation. A regulatory sys-
tem, however, can trigger similar effects. In general, law
protects the confidence of the owner of the source in the
validity of his permit. Once a facility has received a
permit, it is allowed to operate its plant as long as it is
in compliance with the permit. In case a statute pro-
vides for stricter standards than before, the source can
be subject to a subsequent order under § 17 BImSchG
requiring compliance with the new standard. 426 The
authorization to issue subsequent orders is restricted
only by the principle of proportionality.427 This authori-
zation granted by statute means that the protection of
vested rights granted by the operation permit is consid-
erably qualified and minimized.4 28 This is not the only
case in which the confidence of the source owner in the
further developments is not fully protected. The permit
must have been issued under air pollution control laws
in order to provide certainty in the permit conditions. If
it was issued, for example, under construction law, the
confidence of the holder in its permit is not protected
from a change in the emission standards. In this case,
he may only rely upon the requirements imposed on
him by the construction law.429 Another instance in
426. See supra Part II.E.2.a.(1)(ii).
427. See § 17, para. 2 BImSchG.
428. See SCHLEMMINGER & WISSEL, supra note 330, at
79.
429. See APPLICATION OF NEW ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 286, at 85.
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which the confidence of the owner in his permit is re-
duced is when he operates his plant with an illegal per-
mit. If the permit should not have been issued in its
condition at that time, the holder has no right to rely
upon it.430 If the owner of the plant never received an
actual permit, but only gave notice of his
construction, 43' his confidence will also lack protection.
All of these examples show that the confidence of the
permit holder is not absolute.
On the other side stands the public interest in the
most cost-effective and environmentally efficient way of
controlling and reducing air pollution. The initial allo-
cation of the permits can be of great importance for
achieving this purpose, because it would involve a much
greater number of market participants right from the
outset. The expected advantages from a functioning
market might happen much faster than if only new
sources were required to buy credits. Whether these
effects will indeed be the result of the allocation method
cannot be determined with certainty. In contrast, it
seems highly probable that a number of old sources will
be forced to shut down if they cannot afford to buy
enough allowances or to install new technology. Even if
they do not have to shut down completely, they might
have to take other cost-reducing measures. The utility
market will certainly not remain as stable as it is now.432
Negative effects on the labor market similarly cannot be
ignored. Whether the proposed allocation method will
contribute to a flourishing market may not be predicted
with high certainty. An unstable economic situation for
the utility industry including variations on the labor and
430. See id.
431. Under § 19 BImSchG.
432. See Hans Christoph Binswanger, Emissionsrechte
als Erweiterung der Eigentumsordnung [Emissions Rights as
Extension of Property Rights], in MARKTWIRTSCHAFT UND
UMWELT [MARKET ECONOMY AND THE ENVIRONMENT], supra note
204, at 87, 91.
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stock market could outweigh the envisioned advantages
of the allocation method. The purpose of the method
can therefore not clearly justify the interference with the
sources' ReaG. This means that source owners, at a
minimum, cannot be deprived of their right to a con-
tinuing existence of their property from one day to the
next.43 3 A transitional period to adjust to the new sys-
tem is necessary. In the beginning, the sources would
have to receive the allowances for free; after a certain
time period, they would have to pay a part of the allow-
ance price, and in a third phase, they would have to be
treated in the same way new sources are. This seems to
be the only way the proposed allocation method is rec-
oncilable with Article 14 GG. The Federal Constitu-
tional Court ruled in NaI3auskiesungsbeschluss43 4 that
the status quo of the business enterprise is not absolute
or immune to limitations, as long as appropriate transi-
tional periods are met.
In conclusion, an allocation system treating old
sources like new sources and requiring every source to
purchase allowances is only compatible with Article 14
GG if existing sources are allowed a transitional period
for adjustment to this new system.
433. Both finds that the ReaG is not violated if the al-
lowance prices are not "strangling." He considers them to be
taxes, so that only tremendously high, so-called "strangling"
taxes are inadmissible under art. 14 GG. See Bothe, Legal
Requirements for the Use of Tradeable Emission Allowances,
supra note 298, at 940. Cansier suggests that old sources
had to receive indemnities under art. 14 GG. See generally
Cansier, Environmental Allowance, supra note 29, at 946.
This seems to deprive the system of its purpose: if they are
"paid" for buying allowances, they might as well receive them
for free.
434. BVerfGE 58, 300.
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3. Devaluation of the Credits
Irrespective of whether the credits are initially sold or
distributed for free, they will have to be devaluated over
time or their design must at least allow for devaluation.
Otherwise, the government would not be able to meet its
obligation to protect the environment. 435 Two kinds of
devaluation alternatives are conceivable: on the one
hand, a time limit could be incorporated into the allow-
ance (for example, the credit can be used from the year
2000 until 2005); on the other hand, the legislature
could reduce the amount of pollutants that the holder is
allowed to emit per credit (for example, it could deter-
mine that the amount of pollutants allowed to be emit-
ted per credit will be reduced from one ton to 0.75 tons).
Both devaluation practices might interfere with the
source owner's property right.
Article 14 GG protects any source owner from viola-
tion of his property rights including the ReaG. The first
possibility for devaluing the emission credits is to incor-
porate a time limit of, for example, five years into the
permit. This means that the holder cannot use the
permit after the time period is expired. But because the
holder knows in advance that his permits will be invalid
after that period, he cannot develop confidence in the
continuation of his right to emit. Thus, he cannot claim
that his ReaG is being interfered with. Certainly, he will
have to make management plans a long time in advance
and it is difficult to deviate from these plans, as the
credits will only be valid for the assigned period. The
source owner would lose the money invested in the
credits if he suddenly decided to change his operation
technology instead of using his credits. Nevertheless,
he is assured of the validity of the credits and thus will
not be disappointed in his confidence. Therefore, this
devaluation method does not interfere with the scope of
protection of Article 14 GG.
435. See supra Part II.F. 1.
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In a second alternative for devaluating the emission
allowances, the legislature determines a few years after
allocating the first permits that they cover a smaller
amount of SO2 emissions than before. This would mean
a subsequent withdrawal of already granted rights.
Thus, every source owner would be affected in his right
to a commercial enterprise guaranteed by Article 14 GG.
This right may be restricted by a legislative statute ac-
cording to Article 14, paragraph 1, sentence 2 GG.
Thus, the devaluation method has to be regulated by
statute.
Even if a statute provides for the devaluation mecha-
nism, it has to be in accordance with the principle of
proportionality. This means that the devaluation has to
be appropriate, necessary and reasonable in order to
achieve the overall purpose. Devaluation of the credits
term is intended to enable the legislature to reduce
emissions gradually. It retains the authority to lower
the standards when and to the amount it deems neces-
sary. Devaluation through a statutory provision is
therefore an "appropriate" means to reduce emission
standards and adjust them to environmental needs.
It also has to be the "necessary" method in order to
reach that goal. The proposal to set a time limit and in-
corporate it into the permit appears to be less invasive.
This method would make it impossible for the legisla-
ture to adapt the emission standards to current envi-
ronmental needs before the time limit is expired. How-
ever, it is not flexible enough to react to new environ-
mental or technological developments. Due to this in-
flexibility, it is not a suitable means to achieve the envi-
sioned goal of the devaluation mechanism, and it cannot
be considered a less injurious but as effective measure.
The proposed method is consequently "necessary."
Furthermore, the method must also be reasonable,
i.e., its means must be proportional compared to its ob-
jective. The objective of the proposed devaluation
method is to have a flexible instrument for the legisla-
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ture to adjust emission standards to current develop-
ments in environmental protection. It should be able to
act promptly if recent scientific findings suggest the re-
duction of the old standards. This must not only be
possible in order to prevent acute dangers, but is also
required under the precautionary principle, which de-
mands the adjustment to the state of the art technology.
The property right of the source owners, on the other
hand, is an important constitutionally guaranteed right
and deserves attention. Again, allowances cannot be
partially withdrawn, which would be the factual effect of
this devaluation method, without any kind of mitigation
measure. In order to avoid a violation of Article 14 GG,
the devaluation method also requires a transition pe-
riod. In this case, the legislature must notify all sources
in advance of its devaluation plans, so that the sources
can adjust their investment and management practices,
even if they do not yet know how much the devaluation
will be. Such regulation will prevent the devaluation
method from being unproportional in the narrow sense.
With an appropriate notification of future devaluation
plans, the proposed devaluation method would not vio-
late the right to a commercial enterprise, as guaranteed
by Article 14 GG.
The following conclusions concerning the violation of
fundamental rights can be drawn. An allocation method
distributing allowances for free to existing sources while
requiring new sources to pay for them can lead to a
violation of the right to choose a profession under Arti-
cle 12 GG. In contrast, requiring all existing and new
sources to buy allowances in the same manner does not
violate the property right of Article 14 GG, as long as a
transition period for old sources is granted. A devalua-
tion method enabling the legislature to subsequently
reduce the amount of emissions allowed per permit is
similarly only possible with a fair transition period. The
trading system in itself does not violate Article 14 GG.
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In order to be reconcilable with German law, the in-
troduction of a trading mechanism has to fulfill certain
requirements. First, the precautionary principle as laid
down in the BImSchG436 will have to be changed, so that
neither its dynamic nor its technology aspects will be
violated. The protection principle of the BImSchG437 and
the principle of continuing existence require the intro-
duction of an immissions-based model, because any
emission-based scheme cannot guarantee that pollution
hot spots will be avoided or that air quality will be
maintained. The rights of third parties to object during
the process of issuing operation permits will be reduced,
as will the grounds for a claim by a third party. How-
ever, this does not violate existing law. The trading
system will have to be designed to meet emission stan-
dards of the affected regulations under the BImSchG
and the Technical Instructions Air, if these are not
changed. An allocation method distributing allowances
for free to existing sources and requiring new sources to
purchase their needed credits would violate the funda-
mental right to an occupation under Article 12 GG,
whereas a system treating old and new sources alike re-
quires a transitional period in order to be compatible
with the property right guaranteed by Article 14 GG.
Emission credits may only be devaluated if the sources
are notified within an appropriate period of time.
I. Law of the European Union
By reason of the Federal Republic of Germany's
membership in the European Union ("EU"), German en-
vironmental law cannot be viewed in isolation. .The
"precedence of Community law" means that goals that
the European Communities set for national legislation
must always be taken into consideration. Although the
EU was a relative latecomer to the issue of air pollution,
436. § 5, para. 1, no. 2 BImSchG.
437. § 5, para. 1, no. 1 BImSchG.
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it has achieved great progress in reducing SO2 emis-
sions. International pressures have certainly been im-
portant goals for these developments.438
European Union law consists of so-called primary
and secondary law. The treaties of the three European
communities - the Treaty establishing the European
Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"),439 the Treaty es-
tablishing the European Community ("EC") and the
Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity ("Euratom"),440 as amended, and the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union 441 - are the primary sources
of Union law. The Maastricht Treaty on European Un-
ion renamed the original Treaty Establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community ("EEC Treaty")442 as the EC
Treaty. The institutions of the EU treaties, the Council
of Ministers, the Commission, the Parliament and the
Court of Justice, to which the Court of First Instance
was attached, have generated a complex body of "secon-
dary" European Union law.
438. See, e.g., CHARLES LISTER, EUROPEAN UNION,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 203 (1996).
439. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL
COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140. The original six
member states were Belgium, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Italy, and Luxembourg.
440. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY
COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter
Euratom Treaty].
441. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573
(1992) [hereinafter EC Treaty].
442. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter
EEC Treaty].
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1. Primary Law: The EC Treaty
The three foundation treaties of the European Com-
munities do not provide a comprehensive basis of
authority for enacting legislation in the sphere of envi-
ronmental protection; in fact, they do not even mention
the subject.443 Thus, an express authorization of the
European Community to issue regulations that enabled
comprehensive environmental legislation was created
within the framework of the Single European Act 444 by
including Article 130 r-t in the EEC Treaty.445 In that
443. As a result of the growing political significance
of environmental protection, the European Communities
have, however, increasingly come to disregard the lack of
an express basis of competence, and have attempted -
with the aid of various legal constructions (in particular
relying on Arts. 2, 3 in conjunction with Art. 235 EEC
Treaty or by way of a so-called implied power) - to found
corresponding legislative competencies of the EC, and to
give the appropriate normative bases to a comprehensive
EC environmental policy through Community-wide regu-
lations. Given the lack of authority of the EEC to legislate
in this manner, this form of legislative implementation of
European environmental policy was ultimately dependent
upon the goodwill of the member states.
SCHLEMMINGER & WISSEL, supra note 330, at 19-20.
444. Single European Act, Luxembourg, Feb. 17, 1986,
and The Hague, Feb. 28, 1986, in force July 1, 1987 O.J. (L
169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 506 (1986); U.K.T.S. 31 (1988), Cmd. 372
[hereinafter SEA].
445. In addition, the introduction of art. 100 (a) and (b)
into the EEC Treaty means that environmental protection is
now also taken into consideration in the sphere of harmoni-
zation of the national legal systems in the member states.
Through the Treaty on the European Union (Maastricht
Treaty), the structure of European Community law regarding
the environment has undergone further development. Envi-
ronmental protection has now been established as an objec-
tive in both art. 2 and art. 3k of the EEC Treaty. However, by
reason of the imprecision of these objectives, they do not im-
pose a direct obligation on the Community to act. Yet, ac-
cording to art. 5, para. 2 EEC Treaty, Member States are un-
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Article, the precedence given to combating harmful ef-
fects on the environment at their source, and the doc-
trine of causation, are codified as principles of environ-
mental policy along with the principles of precaution
and prevention. 446
Article 30 of the EC Treaty prohibits member states
from imposing "quantitative restrictions on imports" or
"measures having an equivalent effect" unless justified
as consistent with the Treaty. This prohibition is un-
derstood to encompass any measure likely directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, to hinder trade within
the Community. This encompasses "not only measures
which discriminate facially against foreign producers,
but also measures that, although formally equally appli-
cable to domestic and foreign producers, in fact erect
barriers to interstate trade. 447 This provision could pre-
sent a problem if the credits were imposed on certain
products. Emission reduction allowances, however,
only affect plants as a whole, not their products. A
trading system for SO2 emission credits thus would not
violate Article 30 of the EC Treaty. But even if such a
system were considered a "measure having an equiva-
lent effect," it could be justified by a separate provision,
Article 36 EC Treaty, on grounds of the protection of
health and life of humans, animals or plants. In the ju-
risdiction of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"), the
protection of the environment is usually considered to
der an obligation to refrain from any action which could pose
a threat to the realization of these objectives. See
SCHLEMMINGER & WISSEL, supra note 330, at 20. For an over-
view of the development of environmental law in the Euro-
pean Community, see generally PHILIPPE SANDS & RICHARD G.
TARASOFSKY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw
III, DOCUMENTS IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(1995).
446. See EEC Treaty, supra note 442, art. 130 r, para.
2, S. 1,2.
447. See ECKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD B. STEWART,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION POLICY 28-29 (1988).
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be a compelling reason to impose a restriction on Article
30 of the EC Treaty.448 Thus, there is no violation of
primary European law.
2. Secondary Law: Directives
A violation of European law could, however, occur
through a violation of secondary European law includ-
ing directives and regulations, the two primary types of
legislative acts. EC regulations are directly applicable in
the Member States and, in this respect, are similar in
form to administrative regulations commonly found in
the U.S.449 A directive establishes Union policy and
leaves it to the Member States to implement the direc-
tive in a manner appropriate to their national legal sys-
tems. As Article 189 of the EC Treaty indicates, a di-
rective is "binding as to the result to be achieved" but
"leave[s] to the national authorities the choice of form
and methods." The following directives could affect the
introduction of an emissions trading system into the
German air pollution control law. This discussion fol-
lows the chronological order of adoption of the direc-
tives.
a. Directive on Sulfur Dioxide and Suspended Particulates
(80/779/EEC)
The Council Directive on Sulfur Dioxide and Sus-
pended Particulates (80/779/EEC)450 was adopted in
1980 in order to control and reduce concentrations of
the two pollutants in the ambient air. The directive cre-
ates two sets of "limit" values for ambient concentra-
448. See Huckestein, Emission Credits, supra note 341,
at 13-14.
449. See RALPH FOLSOM ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW
AFTER MAASTRICHT 5 (1996).
450. Council Directive 80/779 Sulfur Dioxide and Sus-
pended Particulates, 1980 O.J. (L 229) 30 [hereinafter Coun-
cil Directive 80/779/EEC].
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tions of SO2 and particulates in the atmosphere. In An-
nex I, it establishes both EU-wide mandatory limit val-
ues, and in Annex II, it specifies more stringent "guide"
values. The latter are intended to be long-term refer-
ence values, toward which the member states are ex-
pected gradually to move, and to provide a basis for es-
tablishing zones of special protection. Both annual and
winter values are established, as well as higher short-
term values that may not be exceeded for more than
three consecutive days. The values all apply to ambient
air levels, but they are intended to be measured at
ground level. Annexes III and IV introduce require-
ments for the application of the guidelines. They re-
quire member states to establish monitoring and re-
porting systems. The amended directive aims to estab-
lish comparable sampling and analytical protocols for
limit values.
Section 12 of the Directive implements the protection
principle. This provision requires that in developing ref-
erence methods of sampling and analysis there must
not be any direct or indirect modification of effective
concentration values. 451 Since the directive is binding
on all the member states, it has the following conse-
quences for a German trading system: first, a trading
scheme must guarantee that the emission standards
prescribed by the Directive are not exceeded. Second,
the trading system must be established in such a man-
ner as to be reconcilable with the protection principle. 452
As demonstrated above, the design of the trading system
would have to follow an immissions-based approach in
order to be consistent with the protection principle.
Hence, even if German law would allow a deviation from
the principle, Section 12 would prohibit the introduction
of an emissions-based trading system.
451. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 940.
452. See id.
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b. Directive on Air Pollution from Industrial Plants
(84/360/EEC)
The 1984 Council Directive on Air Pollution from In-
dustrial Plants 453 requires the permitting of industrial
facilities listed in Annex I of the Directive454 before they
can commence operating or undertake any significant
alteration in their operations. Permits are to be issued
only if certain requirements are fulfilled. Under Article
4, no. 1 of the Directive, facilities must employ all ap-
propriate measures to prevent air pollution, including
the application of the best available technology not en-
tailing excessive cost ("BATNEEC"). Any new source
may only deviate from the BATNEEC if the new technol-
ogy is disproportionately costly. Yet, the Directive pro-
vides no guidance on how to determine when a technol-
ogy is "disproportionately costly." This provision is con-
sidered to embody the precautionary principle. 455 Addi-
tionally, Article 8 of the Directive requires the Council to
set emission standards under the precautionary princi-
ple. Furthermore, the permit must require that the use
of the plant will not cause "significant" air pollution by
SO2 9 NO. and other compounds listed in Annex II. How-
ever, this "standard" is left without any quantitative or
other definition. Third, the Directive requires that none
of the expressly specified emission limits will be ex-
ceeded, and fourth, that all applicable air quality limits
will be taken into consideration. 456
453. See Council Directive 84/360 Combatting Air Pol-
lution from Industrial Plants, 1984 O.J. (L 188) 20 [herein-
after Council Directive 84/360/EEC].
454. Targeted industries include plants in the energy
industries, the production and processing of metals, the
manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products, chemical
plants, large pulp mills, and waste disposal facilities.
455. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 941.
456. See Council Directive 84/360/EEC, supra note
453, art. 4, nos. 3-4.
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As the Directive only requires the member states to
observe the precautionary principle, it means that they
are free to choose which mechanisms they employ to
implement the directive. At a minimum, they must en-
sure that the best available technology is installed.
However, as previously discussed, this is generally not
feasible in a trading system. Although some commen-
tators suggest that a trading system would be possible if
it included certain reduction limits, 4 7 it is doubtful that
the constant adaptation of new technology would be
guaranteed under such a system. As a result, such a
system would violate the Directive unless the Directive
is modified or at least interpreted differently. For exam-
ple, because the purpose of the dynamic feature is to
tighten the emission standards, this goal could be better
attained by an emissions trading system than by a
regulatory system if the distribution of emission credits
is strictly limited. This would encourage the develop-
ment of new technology through a strong demand on
the part of industry. A regulatory system could not pro-
vide this incentive. The goal of the dynamics provisions
would thus be achieved through a trading mechanism.
However, to achieve this result, the exact language of
the dynamics provision would have to be changed.458
c. Directive on the Limitation of Emissions of Certain
Pollutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants
(88/609/EEC)
In 1988, the Community adopted the Council Directive
on the Limitation of Emissions of Pollutants into the Air
from Large Combustion Plants in order to reduce SO2
and nitrogen dioxide emissions from large energy plants
457. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 941.
458. See Gick, Allowances, supra note 34, at 36;
HEISTER & MICHAELIS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 29,
at 255.
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with thermal inputs of 50 MWe or more. 4 9 The Directive
was based in large part on Article 8 of the 1984 Direc-
tive, which had authorized the Council to adopt specific
emission standards for industrial plants. It was also
stimulated in part by the Geneva Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution ("Geneva Conven-
tion").460 The 1988 Directive was in turn supplemented
in 1994 by Council Directive 94/66/EC, which provides
supplemental rules covering combustion plants with
rated thermal inputs between 50 and 100 MWe. 461
The Directive establishes emission limit values for new
plants with respect to SO2 , oxides of nitrogen, and
dust.462 All applications for the construction of new
plants, which were defined as those coming into opera-
tion after June 1987, were required to satisfy those val-
ues.463 The 1994 Directive establishes an emission limit
value of 2,000 milligrams per cubic meter of SO2 for new
combustion plants, but also permits the member states
to grant grace periods to achieve this level. They must,
459. Council Directive 88/609 Limitation of Emissions
of Certain Pollutants Into the Air from Large Combustion
Plants, 1988 O.J. (L 336) 1 [hereinafter Council Directive
88/609/EEC].
460. Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution, U.K.T.S. 57 (1983), Cmd. 9034; T.I.A.S. No.
10541; 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1997) [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
tion].
461. See Council Directive 94/66 Amending Directive
88/609/EEC on the Limitation of Emissions of Certain Pol-
lutants into the Air from Large Combustion Plants, 1994 O.J.
(L 337) 83 [hereinafter Council Directive 94/66/EC].
462. See Council Directive 88/609/EEC, supra note
459, art. 4, para. 1.
463. Derogations from certain of these limitations were,
however, permitted for plants which operate for no more than
a specified number of hours annually, or which use indige-
nous solid fuel. Plants using indigenous solid fuel must,
however, achieve a rate of desulfurisation prescribed in an-
other annex.
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however, ensure that new plants decrease SO2 emis-
sions by 80% by the year 2003. Existing plants built
before 1987 must reduce SO2 emissions by 25% by the
year 1993, 43% by 1998, and 60% by 2003. All the tar-
gets are based on 1980 emission levels.
The emission standards prescribed by the two Direc-
tives and the reduction requirements are binding on
Germany, so that the introduction of an emissions
trading system must not lead to a violation of the stan-
dards or to an exceedance of the above time frames.
d. Directive on Municipal Waste Incineration Plants
(89/369/EEC)
In 1989, the EU adopted rules to control air pollution
from new and existing municipal waste incineration
plants. This was done through two directives: one for
existing plants and another for new plants. Both direc-
tives are specific applications of the very general princi-
ples established by the 1984 Directive regarding atmos-
pheric emissions from industrial facilities. Only the
Council Directive on the Prevention of Air Pollution from
New Municipal Waste Incineration Plants (89/369/EEC)
for new plants contains emission limits for S02.464 New
plants are defined as all those plants first authorized to
operate in or after December 1990. These standards,
again, have to be observed when setting up a trading
scheme .465
To summarize, the Directive on Sulfur Dioxide and
Suspended Particulates (80/779/EEC) standardizes the
464. Council Directive 89/369 Reduction of Air Pollu-
tion from New Municipal Waste Incineration Plants, 1989
O.J. (L 163) 32 [hereinafter Council Directive 89/369/EEC].
Rules for existing plants are contained in the Council Direc-
tive 89/429, Reduction of Air Pollution. from Existing Munici-
pal Waste Incineration Plants, 1989 O.J. (L 203) 50 [herein-
after Council Directive 89/429/EEC].
465. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of
Tradeable Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 941.
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protection principle and therefore requires an immis-
sions-based trading scheme. The precautionary princi-
ple is embodied in the Directive on Air Pollution from
Industrial Plants (84/360/EEC) and requires constant
adaptation to new technology. This could also be
achieved by a trading system, but the language of the
Directive would have to be changed. The Directive on
the Limitation of Emissions of Pollutants into the Air
from Large Combustion Plants (88/609/EEC) sets sev-
eral emission standards and deadlines for their
achievement, which must be met by all member states,
including Germany, so that a trading system will have
to ensure compliance with this Directive and its succes-
sor Directive 94/66/EC. Additionally, the standards of
the Directive on Municipal Waste Incineration Plants
(89/369/EEC) have to be met.
J. Public International Law
German legislation has to follow not only European
law, but also public international law. Among the tra-
ditional sources of the latter are, according to the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice ("ICJ-Statute"),
general or specialized international conventions, inter-
national custom as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law, general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and, as subsidiary means, interna-
tional judicial decisions and doctrine.46 6 New sources of
international law comprise texts issuing from interna-
tional organizations and diverse activities that can con-
tribute to the development of a new rule of law.467 The
introduction of a trading system could violate some of
these laws discussed in the following sections.
466. See art. 38, para. I ICJ-Statute.
467. See ALEXANDRE CHARLES KIss & DINAH SHELTON,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 95 (1991).
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1. Oslo Protocol
The Oslo Protocol to the Geneva Convention 468 imposes
certain standards for the content of SO2 in the air that
may have to be attained by German law. Germany is
bound by the Geneva Convention not only by its own
signature, but also by its membership in the EU. The
European Community adopted a "Council Decision on
the Conclusion of the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution,"469 implementing the Ge-
neva Convention. 470 The Convention aims to protect
human health and the environment from air pollution
by requiring signatories to monitor and reduce air pol-
lution, in particular trans-frontier pollution by SO2. Be-
cause long-range air pollution is extremely difficult to
regulate on an international level, the Geneva Conven-
tion only contains an action program and leaves it to
additional protocols to define more precise obligations.471
The 1979 Geneva Convention has been supplemented
by four protocols that establish further requirements for
468. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulfur
Emissions, Oslo, June 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1540 (1994)
[hereinafter Oslo Protocol].
469. Council Decision 81/462 Conclusion of the Con-
vention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1981
O.J. (L 171) 11.
470. This decision was superseded by Council Decision
86/277 Protocol to the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long
Distance Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Fund-
ing of a Long Term Programme of Cooperation for the Con-
stant Monitoring and Evaluation of Long Distance Atmos-
pheric Transfer of Pollutants in Europe (EMEP), 1986 O.J. (L
181) 1 [hereinafter Council Decision 86/277/EEC].
471. The Convention calls for the sponsorship of re-
search, exchanges of information between states, the adap-
tion of management programmes, and other steps designed
to limit and reduce transboundary air pollution.
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the conduct of its state parties, 472 the last one of which
is the Oslo Protocol. 473
Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Protocol provides that
certain levels of sulfur precipitation, so-called critical
loads, shall not be exceeded in certain areas. In a
trading system, these critical loads could define the up-
per limit for the admissible accumulation of emission
credits and thereby form the basis for their allocation. 474
The allocation must, of course, make sure that the Pro-
tocol's maximum standards are not exceeded. Another
provision that must be taken into consideration when
determining the initial cap for emissions is Article 2,
paragraph 2 of the Protocol. It requires a step-by-step
reduction of total national emissions. However, there is
no obligation to use specific technologies or BATNEEC,
which is merely mentioned in Article 2, paragraph 4 of
the Protocol as an example. Third, Article 2, paragraph
5, in conjunction with Annex V of the Protocol, pre-
scribes certain emission standards which might cause
legal problems. The standards are immediately binding
for new sources, and take effect in 2004 for old sources.
An emissions trading system must therefore obey these
limits. If it encourages even more reductions of emis-
sions, it is certainly feasible under the Protocol.
2. Rule of International Law Forbidding Transfrontier
Pollution
Unlike the United States, which borders only three
foreign countries, 475 Germany shares borders with no
less than ten other European states. Additionally, be-
472. The Protocols were adopted in Geneva on Sept. 28,
1984, in Helsinki on July 8, 1985, in Sofia on Oct. 31, 1988,
and in Oslo on June 14, 1994.
473. See Oslo Protocol, supra note 468.
474. See Bothe, Legal Requirements for the Use of Trade-
able Emission Allowances, supra note 298, at 942.
475. Including the Alaskan border with Russia.
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cause of the concentration of highly industrialized na-
tions in a comparably small territory, transfrontier pol-
lution problems are much more likely to arise in Europe
than on the North American continent. They might not
even be limited to conflicts with adjacent states.
If extensive amounts of SO2 travel to another country
after being emitted on German territory, this could vio-
late the rule of international law forbidding transfrontier
pollution. The customary law character of this rule was
first affirmed in the Trail Smelter Case before an Arbitral
Tribunal. 476 Although the original conflict mainly deals
with questions of damages, the Arbitral Tribunal was
challenged to make a statement on general international
customary environmental law. The Tribunal ruled in
this case, first, that a state was responsible for acts of
pollution having their origin on its territory and causing
damage on the territory of other states, even if the pol-
luting acts are not imputable to the state itself or its or-
gans. Second, the case transcends international re-
sponsibility to solve the problem before it, aiming to-
wards a common regulation of the issue. It affirmed the
existence of a rule of international law forbidding trans-
frontier pollution. 477 Consequently, the German trading
system would have to make sure, that bordering states
would not suffer from SO 2 emissions.
In conclusion, it appears that German trading system
would have to follow the emission limits of the Oslo
Protocol to the Geneva Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution in order to be in compli-
ance with public international law. Additionally, it may
not lead to acid deposition in adjoining states as pro-
hibited by the Rule of International Law Forbidding
Transfrontier Pollution.
476. 1931 - 1941, 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905.
477. See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW I, FRAMEWORKS, STANDARDS AND
IMPLEMENTATION 194 (1995); ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH
SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 125 (1991).
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III. AN INTERNATIONAL POLLUTION TRADING SYSTEM
Even though, in 1996, the introduction of tradeable
permits for greenhouse gas emissions was still consid-
ered largely hypothetical, if not utopian, 478 the negotia-
tors of the third Conference of the Parties ("COP3") did
in fact agree on the introduction of an emissions trading
scheme at the Kyoto and the Buenos Aires Conferences.
Supporters of international pollution trading not only
enthusiastically support the proposal, 479 but also predict
that trading could reduce costs to the industrialized
(referred to as Annex I) countries by over 80% (or over
one trillion U.S. dollars) per year. 480 Whether the ac-
cords can really be considered successful, and how the
details would have to be designed to achieve the desired
results, is analyzed in the following section.
A. Differences between the U.S. and the International
Trading Systems
Where the U.S. trading system deals with allowances
covering SO2, the international trading scheme focuses
on the emission of greenhouse gases.481 Greenhouse
478. See Peter H. Sand, International Economic Instru-
ments for Sustainable Development: Sticks, Carrots, and
Games, 36 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 8 (1996).
479. See generally Lars-Erik Nelson, Cutting Through
Fog Surrounding Global Warming, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12,
1997, at 65.
480. See Center for Clean Air Policy, supra note 50.
481. Greenhouse gases include: carbon dioxide (C02),
primarily produced by the burning of fossil fuels, mainly
coal, oil and gas; methane (CH4) from agricultural processes,
energy production and distribution; nitrous oxide (N20) from
agricultural and industrial processes; and the three "syn-
thetic" or "exotic" GHGs, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), per-
fluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), that
originate from a various industrial and consumer uses. The
loss of so-called sinks, such as forests that sequester carbon,
is also a source of GHGs. See Clare Breidenich et al., The
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gases, which are produced by burning fossil fuels such
as coal, oil and natural gas, are assumed to be respon-
sible for the global warming of the last decades. Sulfur
dioxide, on the other hand, originates from the combus-
tion of heavy fuel oils and gas oils, and its primary ad-
verse effect is acidic deposition (so-called acid rain).
The peculiarity of an international trading system for
greenhouse gases, in contrast to the U.S. Acid Rain Pro-
gram, and its special prospect of success results from
the fact that greenhouse gas emissions do not impact
locally, but globally: no matter where the gases are
emitted, they contribute to global warming at any place
on Earth. In contrast, the emission of SO 2 and NO x has,
if not local, at least regional consequences, since the
effects are "carried" to another place by the wind, as in
the case with Midwestern utilities contributing to the
pollution in the Adirondacks. 482 'Greenhouse gases do
not result in harmful deposits, but cause problems sim-
ply by being emitted. These ecological differences have
important consequences for the legal issues evolving
when emission allowances are being traded. For exam-
ple, the problems of upwind sales, inter-regional sales,
emissions from small/big sources, and different kinds of
sources do not arise. Hence, an emissions trading sys-
tem for CO2 will work most efficiently if set up on an in-
ternational basis .483
Another difference between the two systems is that,
within the U.S. system, the companies themselves trade
their emissions. Within the international model, the
transactions are in the first place effected by the nations
that are parties to the Convention and the Protocol.
They may allocate their allowances to companies, but
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 315, 317 (1998).
482. See supra Part I.B.4.
483. See Marchant, supra note 29, at 626, for a pro-
posal on establishing a national U.S. carbon dioxide emis-
sions trading program.
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essentially they are free to decide how they want to
comply with their national targets.
B. Development of an International Trading Scheme
within the Climate Agreements
In 1992, the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change ("UNFCCC") was adopted in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil. 4 4 Economic instruments are extolled in
the Preamble. 48 5 The commitments of the parties con-
cerning the reduction of greenhouse gases were only
voluntary,46 and were in fact followed by an increase in
the discharge of CO2 .487
484. The adoption of the Convention was the culmina-
tion of a thirteen-year process involving two World Climate
Conferences in 1979 and 1990. See Charlotte Booncharoen
& John Gase, International Commitment Toward Curbing
Global Warming: The Kyoto Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAW 917, 919
(1998). The UNFCCC did not enter into force until March 21,
1994. See Glenn M. Wiser, The Clean Development Mecha-
nism Versus the World Trade Organization: Can Free-Market
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?,
11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 531, 534 (1999).
485. See U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev.: Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Be-
sides emissions trading, two more economic instruments are
regulated in the climate change conventions: Joint Imple-
mentation (JI) in art. 6 of the UNFCCC and the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM) for emissions trading between
Annex I and developing countries, regulated under art. 12 of
the Kyoto Protocol. See infra note 494, art. 12.
486. Art. 4 (2)(a) UNFCCC provides that the Annex I
parties "shall adopt national policies and take corresponding
measures" to protect the atmosphere from greenhouse gases.
487. See William C. Bums, Global Warming - the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Future of Small Island States, 6 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
147 (1997); Greenpeace, Information Paper 4 to the Climate
Conference in Kyoto, 11/97 (visited Oct. 15, 1998)
<http: //www.greenpeace.de/gp-system/cwhk43wk.htm>.
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The first Conference of the Parties ("COP"), COP1, took
place in Berlin, Germany, in 1995 and adopted the
"Berlin Mandate," 488 urging the parties to agree on
binding obligations concerning the reduction of green-
house gases during one of the next two conferences. No
progress was made at COP2 in Geneva, Switzerland, in
1996, but the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol at COP3 in
Kyoto, Japan, resulted in the first legally binding docu-
ment setting target reductions, as well as a timetable to
achieve these reductions. In this document, the Annex-
I parties, i.e., the industrialized countries, committed
themselves to cut emissions of six greenhouse gases by
an average of 5% below 1990 levels by the period 2008-
2012.489 The Kyoto Protocol also allows for flexibility in
the international context by providing for the use of
emissions trading and other market-based
mechanisms. 490 The new idea of the Kyoto Protocol was
the introduction of an international trading regime for
emission credits in Article 17.491 However, an agreement
on the details for this trading system was postponed to
the next conferences, which were supposed to define the
relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in
particular for verification, reporting and accountability.
During the last conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
in November 1998, the parties could not yet agree on
specific rules governing an emissions trading system,
488. UNFCCC Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., UN
Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, Decision 1/CP.1, at 4-6
(June 6, 1995) [hereinafter Berlin Mandate].
489. See art. 3.1 Kyoto Protocol. UNFCCC, supra note
488, 3rd Sess., art. 3. 1(Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Kyoto Proto-
col].
490. See arts. 4, 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol
authorize the use of such mechanisms to reduce GHG emis-
sions under certain circumstances.
491. The system is accounted for in art. 3 (10) and 3
(11) Kyoto Protocol.
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but set a deadline of two years (late 2000) in the final
document. 492
Since the Kyoto Protocol opened for signature on
March 16, 1998, nearly 60 countries have signed the
pact, including nearly all "developed" countries except
the United States and Iceland. 493 However, by signing a
treaty, a state only indicates that it recognizes the
authentic text, intends to complete the procedures for
becoming legally bound by it, and is committed not to
act against the treaty's objectives before being so bound.
Signature is not the key political act; it is ratification, or
its alternatives of acceptance, approval, or accession,
whereby a State binds itself to observe the treaty. De-
pending on a country's system of governance, signature
may be simply an executive decision, while ratification
may require legislative approval.494 The Kyoto Protocol
will not enter into force until ninety days after it has
been ratified by at least 55 parties to the Convention.
These parties must include developed countries repre-
senting at least 55% of this group's total 1990 CO 2
emissions. 495
492. According to the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the
"technical workplan agreed in Buenos Aires does move things
forward," but provides "no assurance that any of the Kyoto
loopholes will be closed." WWF, Ministers Agree Process But
Fail To Give Guidance, Press Release, Nov. 14, 1998. The
Buenos Aires Conference obviously was not even intended to
bring great progress for the development of market-based
mechanisms but only a plan of action. See Milo Mason, In-
terview with Stuart E. Eizenstat, NR&E Fall 1998, 430, 433
(1998).
493. See generally Joby Warrick, Administration Signs
Global Warming Pact, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 13, 1998, at
A26.
494. See Third Conference of the Parties, Press Release
(visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.cop3.de>.
495. See art. 25 Kyoto Protocol.
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C. Legal Issues of an International Emissions Trading
System
An international emissions trading system within the
climate change conventions provokes several legal
problems. They include the question whether industri-
alized countries may fulfill their reduction targets
mainly by trading activities instead of domestic reduc-
tions, and whether such policy would violate the climate
change conventions or international environmental
principles. Furthermore, the so-called net approach of
including CO 2 sinks into calculations of reduction tar-
gets will be discussed.
1. Trading Allowances - Current Regulation
Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol provides that allow-
ance trading "shall be supplemental to domestic ac-
tions" for the purpose of meeting reduction commit-
ments. The definition of the term "supplemental" was
postponed to the following conferences of the parties.
The recent fourth Conference of the Parties, COP4, in
Buenos Aires could not agree on further details con-
cerning the emissions trading program, but decided that
emissions reductions should be made "partially"
through trading mechanisms. The parties set the next
conference in the year 2000 as final deadline for defin-
ing the terms "supplemental" or "partial."
2. Trading Allowances - The Conflict
The size of domestic contribution of emission reduc-
tions is under active discussion amongst the different
nations. On the one hand, the U.S. and other industri-
alized countries do not want to put any restrictions on
the methods for achieving the Kyoto targets. 496 The
496. Countries in favor of this approach include Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Canada, Russia, Ukraine, and Japan.
See Edward A. Smeloff, Utility Deregulation and Global
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Clinton Administration's economic analysis of the Kyoto
Protocol, for example, assumes that it will achieve 75%
of its emissions reductions through international emis-
sions trading. The analysis does not consider domestic
emissions reduction potential at all. 497 The European
Union, on the other hand, is in favor of a solution plac-
ing specific limits on the amount of a country's reduc-
tions that can be achieved through emissions trading.498
This conflict involves several environmental, economic
and legal aspects.
The public debate mainly revokes around economic
arguments: the U.S. argues that restrictions on the
quantity of the units would rob the free-market mecha-
nism of its effectiveness. 499 The ability to trade without
quantitative restrictions would "encourage earlier emis-
sion reductions and minimize the overall cost of
achieving the collective Annex B environmental objec-
tive."500 The crucial question then is whether the free
market would in fact be impaired by imposing limits on
the trading option and would therefore require a trading
system without any kind of restrictions. If the free mar-
ket would not be impaired by any limits, the argument
of the U.S. remains purely political: trying to please the
Warming: The Coming Collision, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
280, 282 (1998).
497. See WWF, Press Release, July 31, 1998 (visited
Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.panda.org/climate/ccc/news/
news_6.htm>.
498. See generally No Consensus on Global Warming
Policy (visited April 13, 2000) <http://www.cnn.com/
SPECIALS/ 1997/global.warniing/disagreements/html>.
499. See William K. Stevens, Deadline is Set for Rules to
Cut Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at 11.
500. National Environmental Trust, Climate Bulletin,
June 6, 1998 (visited Oct. 14, 1998) <http://data.enviro
trust.com/envirotrust/pressrelease/pressarchive/qry?functi
on=detail&tbl-pressreleaseuid 1=39>.
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opposing industry. 501 Additionally, it will have to be de-
termined how the trading system should be set up in
order to work most effectively. However, this analysis
will focus on the legal, rather than economic, aspects of
the issue. The legal question that must be addressed is
whether a restriction on the contribution of trading to
achieve the national reduction targets would violate in-
ternational law, or whether international law actually
requires some kinds of limits.
3. Violation of International Law
International environmental law as a part of public
international law has the same sources as the latter,
that is, general or specialized international conventions,
international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations, and, as subsidiary means, interna-
tional judicial decisions and doctrine. 02 New sources of
international law comprise not only texts issued by in-
ternational organizations, but also diverse activities,
which can contribute to the development of a new rule
of law.503 Following the order of this enumeration, is an
examination of whether a violation of the subsequent
agreements or principles could occur by the introduc-
tion of a trading system.
a. International Agreements
First, an international trading system without any
kind of numerical restriction of the reductions through
trading could violate the existing international agree-
ments on climate change, i.e., the UNFCCC and the
Kyoto Protocol, if they required such numerical restric-
tion. In order to resolve this question, the overall objec-
501. The American Petroleum Industry and other com-
panies are strong opponents to the Kyoto Protocol.
502. See supra Part II.E.2.
503. See Kiss & SHELTON, supra note 467, at 95.
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tive of both agreements must be determined. The ulti-
mate objective of the UNFCCC, as noted in the Preamble
of the Kyoto Protocol, is the "stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system." 504 Concerning the implemen-
tation of this goal, the UNFCCC realizes that the steps
to address this objective will be "environmentally, so-
cially and economically most effective if they are based
on relevant scientific, technical and economic consid-
erations."505 But even though economic mechanisms are
considered to be helpful and parties are encouraged to
use them to address the overall objective, it remains a
purely environmental goal: the stabilization of green-
house gases. Thus, how can the objective of achieving a
stabilization of greenhouse gases be most effectively
met? As explained above, the U.S. and other industrial-
ized nations claim that a 50% limit is not acceptable
and would harm the free market.
The legal question is, therefore, whether a 50% limit
would impair the objective of achieving a greenhouse
gas ("GHG") stabilization. Without any limit, the parties
would still have to achieve their reduction limits, but
could also do so completely through the purchase of
emission allowances. Theoretically, the limit does not
impair the stabilization objective.
The member states could argue though that the ob-
jective may not be achieved in any way and by any
means, but by the "economically most effective" way as
laid down in Principle 16 of the Preamble of the
UNFCCC. If this limitation is deemed to be part of the
objective, it could in fact undercut efforts to achieve the
objective. Assuming that a free market would most ef-
fectively contribute to the objective of economically most
cost effective reductions, the 50% limit would impair
this objective if it harmed the free market. The restric-
504. Art. 2 UNFCCC.
505. Principle 16 of the preamble of the UNFCCC.
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tion of 50%, however, does not concern any factors
within the market, but restricts the amount of reduc-
tions made by trading, in contrast to domestic actions.
Thus, only an individual party's amount of potential
transactions is being restricted by the 50% limit. A free
market does not mean that all existing goods of that
kind must be at disposal to the participants; thus, the
market itself would not necessarily be directly affected.
However, the effectiveness of the market could still be
indirectly impaired if the number of tradeable goods is
small, which could be the case if, for example, there are
only few participants or if only a few transactions are
actually being affected. In that case, the market would
actually be impaired. Such a situation could lead to ef-
fects similar to those which occurred in the U.S.: fewer
market participants result in a functionally disordered
market. It consequently remains to be determined
whether in the case of GHG allowance trading, the re-
duction of potential transactions would lead to a func-
tionally disordered market. This depends on the
amount of potentially circulating allowances under the
50% limit. As will be proven below, the amount of al-
lowances potentially for sale from Russia and the
Ukraine is so immense that, if bought by the U.S., the
U.S. could even increase its actual emissions. This
shows that the amount of credits available in the mar-
ket offers no reason for concern about a lack of demand
and supply. The number of potentially tradeable goods
will still be substantial, so that the market would not be
impaired by the restriction. Hence, there is no con-
vincing legal reason to object to a 50% limit on the
amount of reductions made through emissions trading.
The group of parties to the conventions that favors the
50% limit asserts not only that a 50% limit would not
harm the market, but also that international law actu-
ally requires such restriction. Two of those parties,
Russia and the Ukraine, have been in serious economic
trouble for some time, resulting in a collapse of their
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economies. Most of their worst emitting facilities were
closed, resulting in a dramatic reduction of pollution,
including GHG emissions. Because this happened after
the Kyoto Protocol base year 1990, they will be left with
an unexpectedly high amount of pollution credits at
their disposal. Russia presently remains 30% below the
reduction targets established at Kyoto, and could annu-
ally sell emission credits representing about 800 million
tons of greenhouse gases. 506 The Ukraine could sell
credits for approximately 230 million tons. The two
countries will not be able to rebuild their economies fast
enough to be able to use the credits themselves.
If only the Russian allowances were sold to the U.S.,
which, as the worst CO 2 emitter 507 the U.S. committed
itself to reduce emissions by 7%, it would increase its
CO 2 emissions by 9% for fifteen years and still fulfill its
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 508 The U.S. has
already announced its intention to buy those credits.
Thus, the Kyoto Protocol represents an opportunity for
the U.S., as well as other Annex I parties, to increase
their emissions instead of reducing them, but still fulfill
their convention targets. Since greenhouse gases would
not be reduced through an active climate policy, these
potential trades are being called "hot air."509  Such
trades would not improve the present state of the envi-
ronment, because the buyer could emit more gases us-
ing its allowances, instead of reducing its emissions.
This practice seems to be environmentally unsound.
506. See WWF, Press Release, Dec. 11, 1997 (visited
Sept. 28, 1998) <http://www.wwf.de//cbibliothek/
c_presse/... archiv/cpm_9712/cpresse-pm_971211 .html>.
507. See generally WWF, Report on the Results of the
December 1997 Kyoto, Japan International Climate Change
Negotiations (visited Sept. 28, 1998) <http://panda.
org/climate/kyoto /report.htm>.
508. See WWF, Press Release, Dec. 12, 1997.
509. See, e.g., WWF, Daily Diary Archives, Dec. 8, 1997
(visited April 13, 2000) <http://www.panda.org/climate/
kyoto/diaries /entry8. html>.
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However, as long as the trade of allowances is provided
by the international agreements, which it expressly is,
and the targets are being achieved by the parties, i.e., in
2012 the level of 1990 is being achieved, one could ar-
gue that global emissions are still being reduced. 510
There is consequently no violation of the international
agreements. In sum, neither would a restricted emis-
sions trading program violate the UNFCCC or the Kyoto
Protocol, nor would a 50% limit be required by these
international agreements.
b. International Principles
An unrestricted trading model could nevertheless vio-
late international law if international environmental
principles prohibited it. General principles of interna-
tional environmental law may refer to rules of custom-
ary international law, to rules derived from treaties, to
general principles of law as stated in Article 38(i)(c) of
the ICJ-Statute, or to logical propositions resulting from
judicial decisions. 511 The following international princi-
ples of environmental law, the precautionary, the pol-
luter pays, and the proximity principles might possibly
be violated by an international emissions trading sys-
tem.512
510. For more information, see generally Money to
Burn?, supra note 67, at 86.
511. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945
I.C.J. Acts & Docs., art. 38.
512. Other international environmental principles in-
clude, but are not limited to: the principle of sovereignty and
responsibility, the principle of good neighborliness and inter-
national cooperation, the principle of preventive action, the
duty to compensate for harm, the principle of common but
,differentiated responsibility, and the principle of sustainable
development. See generally Max Valverde Soto, General Prin-
ciples of International Environmental Law, 3 ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 193, 208-09 (1996).
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The precautionary principle occupies a prominent po-
sition in various international treaties including the EC
Treaty, 513 other European Union documents, 514 the Rio
513. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (EC Treaty) was signed in 1957, amended in
1986 by the Single European Act, again in 1992 by the
Treaty Establishing the European Community (Maastricht
Treaty), and in 1997 by the Amsterdam Treaty. See Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11; Single European Act, Feb. 17, 28,
1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986); Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C
224) 1 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992), Treaty of
Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Cer-
tain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997 (Amsterdam Treaty). The EC
Treaty deals with the common policy of the member states
regarding economic affairs and other subjects, including en-
vironmental measures. With the passage of the Maastricht
Treaty of Feb.. 7, 1992, the European Union (EU) was
founded. The EU is based on the European Communities,
which still continue to exist, and is supplemented by a com-
mon policy regarding foreign affairs, defense, and a common
currency. The EC Treaty forms the basic constitutional law
for the entire European Community and has a direct legal
effect in all of the member states of the European Union. It
can therefore be considered to be supranational law. The en-
vironmental policy is dealt with in Title XVI of the EC Treaty.
Amended EC Treaty, arts. 130 r - 130 t.
514. Council Decision 95/308 Conclusion, on Behalf of
the Community, of the Convention on the Protection and Use
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
1995 O.J. (L 186) 42 [hereinafter Council Decision
95/308/EEC]; Council Decision 94/911 Adopting a Specific
Programme of Research and Technological Development, In-
cluding Demonstration, in the Field of Environment and Cli-
mate (1994-1998), 1994 O.J. (L 361) 1 [hereinafter Council
Decision 94/911/EC]; Council Directive 83/129 Concerning
the Importation into Member States of Skins of Certain Seal
Pups and Products Derived Therefrom, 1983 O.J. (L 91) 30
[hereinafter Council Directive 83/129/EEC].
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Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio
Declaration),515 the Convention on Biological Diversity, 516
the UNFCCC, and other international legal
documents. 517 Although divergent meanings are attrib-
uted to the precautionary principle as a principle of in-
ternational law, they all have a common element: meas-
ures to prevent damage to the environment may not be
deferred solely because insufficient scientific evidence
exists about the environmental effects of a particular
activity. It is assumed that science does not always
provide the insights needed to protect the environment
effectively, and that undesirable effects may result if
measures are delayed until science does provide such
515. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 151/5/Rev. 1, June 13, 1992, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 814 (1992).
516. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,
June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc.No. 20 (1993), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 818 (1992).
517. Art. 2, para. 5-5(a) of the Convention on the Pro-
tection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and Inter-
national Lakes, March 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312, 1316; Para.
3 (iii), at 5 of the Ministerial Declaration of the Sixth Trilat-
eral Governmental Conference on the Protection of the Wad-
den Sea, Nov. 13, 1991, Den.-Ger.-Neth.; Ministerial Decla-
ration of the International Conference on the Protection of
the North Sea, Bremen, Nov. 1, 1984; Ministerial Declaration
of the Second North Sea Conference, London, Nov. 25, 1987;
Third North Sea Conference, The Hague, Mar. 8, 1990; Min-
isterial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the Euro-
pean Economic Community Region, Bergen, May 15, 1990;
art. 4 (3)(f) of the Bamako Convention on the Ban of Import
into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and
Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 773; art. 2, para. 2 of the Convention for the
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East At-
lantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 1069, 1076; art. 3, sec. 2 of
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area, April 9, 1992, 30 I.L.M. (1992) (not in
force).
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insights.5 18 Furthermore, in a number of situations a
planned activity may be allowed only when there is sci-
entific certainty that this activity has no detrimental ef-
fect on the environment. 51 9
The exact meaning of the Principle varies within the
different agreements. As incorporated explicitly into Ar-
ticle 130r of the EC Treaty, the Principle requires Com-
munity policy to "be based on the precautionary princi-
ple." 520 Some of the literature interprets this to require
not only that environmental damage shall be remedi-
ated, but also that it should be avoided to the maximum
extent possible. 52' This means that auditing and envi-
ronmental management systems have to be used to find
and correct environmental problems before the damage
is done, which has led to global efforts to establish
standards for environmental management systems.522
Furthermore, read in combination with the next para-
graph of Article 130r, the Community should take into
account "available scientific and technical data."523 Arti-
cle 15 of the Rio Declaration states that the "precau-
tionary approach shall be widely applied by States ac-
cording to their capabilities. Where there are threats of
serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation."524 So when it is known beforehand that an ac-
518. See Bums, supra note 487, at 147.
519. See Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M. Verschuuren,
The Precautionary Principle in International, European, and
Dutch Wildlife Law, 9 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 43, 44
(1998); SCHUPPERT, NEW REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS, supra
note 398, at 47.
520. EC Treaty, supra note 441, art. 130 r, para. 2.
521. See Michael J. Quinn, International Environmental
Law, SB04 ALI-ABA 371, 374 (1996).
522. See id.
523. EC Treaty, supra note 441, art. 130 r, para. 3.
524. Rio Declaration, supra note 515, agenda 21, prin-
ciple 15.
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tivity will be harmful to ecological values, advantages (in
economic terms) and costs (damage to ecological fea-
tures) will always have to be weighed. 525 The crucial
question will then be whether under either the EC
Treaty or the Rio Declaration an activity can or must be
prohibited, or whether possibly expensive measures can
or need to be imposed for the protection of the environ-
ment, despite the lack of scientific data about the effects
on the environment. 26  This element of cost-
effectiveness as a characteristic of the precautionary
principle, required by the EC Treaty and the Rio Decla-
ration, is rarely found in international agreements.
It is notable, however, that the precautionary principle
in the Rio Declaration is only relevant to cases where
there is a danger of "serious or irreversible" damage,
which incorporates an element of proportionality into
the principle. In fact, "if the threat of damage to the en-
vironment is limited and the advantages of the detri-
mental activity (or the costs of the protective measures
to be taken) are considerable, then the precautionary
principle" does not apply.5 27 Yet the seriousness of the
environmental damage is not the only factor remaining
to be included in the weighing process; as explained
above, only "cost-effective" measures need to be utilized
in an effort to protect the environment. In sum, if sci-
entific certainty about the presumed detrimental effect
of a measure is not available, it must be proportional in
view of the costs involved, the degree of scientific un-
certainty, and the environmental benefit to be obtained
through those measures. 528
The relation between scientific uncertainty about po-
tential environmental effects of an activity and environ-
mental protection under the precautionary principle and
its cost-effectiveness standard may also be relevant to
525. See Backes & Verschuuren, supra note 519, at 50.
526. See id.
527. See id.
528. See id.
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the Framework Convention on Climate Change.52 9 The
relationship between CO2 and its effects on climatic
change are still not conclusively proven, although a
causal link is almost certain. The Convention therefore
provides that where "there are threats of serious or irre-
versible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing such [precau-
tionary] measures, taking into account that policies and
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-
effective."53 0 Most other international agreements do not
involve any kind of cost factors and may even exclude
them from the balancing process.53 1 Thus, the Rio Dec-
laration and the UNFCCC have a more restricted version
of the precautionary principle, since if full scientific evi-
dence is lacking, only cost-effective measures must be
taken.
If an emissions trading program is judged by the pre-
cautionary principle as an international principle, it
must be judged by the precautionary principle as inter-
preted in its specific context, i.e., the climate change
conventions. In other words, when analyzing whether
the emissions trading program can be incorporated into
the climate change conventions, their restricted inter-
pretation of the precautionary principle has to be used
as the standard. The question is, therefore, whether a
CO 2 emissions trading program without any minimum
requirement for domestic reductions would meet the re-
quirements of cost-effectiveness, scientific certainty and
environmental protection as required by the precaution-
ary principle in this context. As mentioned above, the
causal relationship between the release of CO2 by hu-
529. See Bums, supra note 487, at 147 n.89 (discuss-
ing conceptual weaknesses of the precautionary principle as
articulated in the UNFCCC).
530. Rio Declaration, supra note 515, agenda 21, prin-
ciple 15.
531. See Backes & Verschuuren, supra note 519, at 52,
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man fuel combustion and global warming through the
destruction of the ozone, layer is almost proven with
certainty. But even if there is not full scientific support,
both the trading mechanism and domestic reductions
are intended to reduce CO 2 emissions on a global scale.
Hence, the fact that there is insufficient scientific cer-
tainty can be ignored when weighing the factors.
It remains to compare the environmental damage
through the introduction of an unlimited trading
scheme with its cost-effectiveness. If the threat of dam-
age to the environment is "serious or irreversible," the
requirement for cost-effectiveness of the precautionary
measure is less strict. The proposed trading program
has been designed to provide a much more cost-effective
tool for reducing CO2 emissions by the Convention's
parties. It is projected to save a tremendous amount of
money and is arguably significantly more cost-effective
than the traditional approach of relying on domestic CO 2
reductions. For example, in the U.S., measures to sta-
bilize CO2 at 1990 levels have been estimated to amount
to 2.5% of the annual gross domestic product by the
year 2030.532 Consequently, the threat of damage to the
environment has to be serious or irreversible in order to
outweigh the benefits of the unrestricted trading pro-
gram. If the trading program is completely unlimited
regarding the amount of reductions through trading or
through domestic reductions, it is most likely that in-
dustrialized nations like the U.S. will attempt to comply
with their international targets, mainly by buying emis-
sion allowances from countries like Russia and the
Ukraine, as they previously announced. Although these
"hot air" emissions would never have actually occurred
in Russia or the Ukraine, they will occur in the U.S.,
thereby resulting in two adverse effects: further global
warming and an additional destruction of the ozone
532. See Smeloff, supra note 496, at 280.
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layer. 33 Whether these effects will cause serious dam-
age to the environment is unknown. If damage to the
ozone layer occurs, it is certainly irreversible, as no
remedy has yet been developed for restoring the ozone
shield. In case of an "irreversible" damage to the envi-
ronment, as seen above, cost-effectiveness is given less
weight in the balancing test. Thus, even if the costs for
domestic reductions will be much higher than through
the purchase of emission credits, a totally unrestricted
trading market would violate the precautionary princi-
ple.
The threshold question of when a preventive action is
legally required has been answered differently by differ-
ent conventions. The Bamako Convention 34 states in its
Article 4 (3)(0 that the parties have to adopt and imple-
ment the "precautionary approach to pollution which
entails, inter-alia, preventing the release into the envi-
ronment of substances which may cause harm to hu-
mans or the environment without waiting for scientific
proof regarding such harm."535 Hence, it does not re-
quire the possibility of damage to be serious, thus low-
ering the level at which the lack of scientific evidence
triggers action. 53 6 The Convention for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 53 7 on
the other hand, increases the threshold needed to im-
533. See supra Part III.A. (explaining that greenhouse
gases covered by the climate change conventions not only
include carbon dioxide, but also hydrofluorocarbons and
perfluorocarbons, as well as others, that are at the same time
ozone-depleting substances).
534. Organization of African Unity: Bamako Convention
on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-
boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes
Within Africa, Jan. 29, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
535. See id. at 781.
536. See Soto, supra note 512, at 202.
537. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment for the North-East Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 1069.
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plement preventive measures, requiring more than a
mere possibility of damage. Under Article 2 (2)(a) of the
convention, preventive measures are to be taken, when
there are "reasonable grounds for concern . . . even
when there is no conclusive evidence of a causal rela-
tionship between the inputs and the effects." 538 Thus,
the precautionary principle does not clearly give an an-
swer to the question of exactly where the line for non-
domestic emission reductions has to be drawn, and
whether the expected damage must be serious or not.
Under the polluter pays principle, the generator of en-
vironmental pollution is held liable for that pollution.
When this principle was first announced by the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) in 1972, it imposed liability on generators of
hazardous substances in European countries. In case
"the actual generator is not available or is incapable of
performing a clean up, the principle has been stretched
to justify imposing liability on entire industrial sectors,
the owner of the property, or taxpayers at large."539
Further extensions of this principle can be observed,
from mere liability to the obligation to take back pack-
aging waste, used automobiles, electronic equipment,
and other products. 540 The principle may be difficult to
implement and may have significant implications for
trade issues.541 Nevertheless, it has been incorporated
into Article 130 r of the EC Treaty.
The polluter pays principle might be violated if emis-
sion rights can be bought without restriction from other
countries, which emit less than their international obli-
538. 1992 Ospar Convention: Convention for the Protec-
tion of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (last
modified Oct. 1998) <http: //www.ospar.org/eng/
html/convention/osparconvl.htm>.
539. Quinn, supra note 521, at 373-74.
540. See id. at 374.
541. See id. at 373.
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gations allow. 542  At first glance, emissions trading
seems to implement just this, principle, as the carbon
dioxide-emitting country - the "polluter" - prefers to
purchase allowances - "pay" - rather than reduce emis-
sions through technological improvements. However,
the actual effects of such regulations have to be consid-
ered. First, a tremendous amount of "hot air" allow-
ances would be acquired by developed nations, so that
CO 2 will be emitted although it would never have been
emitted without the trading system. Second, the pol-
luter pays principle should not be interpreted too liter-
ally. The principle can also be described as a causation
principle. In this sense, it implies that the person who
causes damage not only bears the cost, but also is first
of all responsible for the damage and must try to avoid
or minimize it. Otherwise, the principle would be of a
purely ex post remedial nature. If a country could buy
as many allowances as it needs to fulfill its Convention
targets, it could keep emitting CO2 and contributing to
the effects of climate change. Although it is "in compli-
ance" with the international agreements, it would cause
further pollution. Considering these circumstances, an
unrestricted trading system seems to be difficult to rec-
oncile with the polluter pays principle.
The third principle is the so-called proximity principle,
requiring that pollution be eliminated close to its
source. 543 Like the previously discussed principles, it is
included in Article 130r of the EC Treaty. It was also
taken up by the Basel Convention on the Control of the
Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Wastes and
542. See WWF, Press Release, Glimmer of Hope for
Closing Loopholes in Kyoto Climate Change Agreement, June
12, 1998 (visited April 13, 2000) <http://www.
panda.org/news/press/news_216.html>.
543. See Quinn, supra note 521, at 374.
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Their Disposal ("Basel Convention"),544 which provides
that wastes may only be exported if the exporting coun-
try does not have adequate disposal capacity, or if the
wastes are required as raw material for recycling or re-
covery industries in the importing country. In addition,
the Convention not only requires member states to de-
velop adequate facilities for environmentally sound
management of hazardous and other wastes located
within its national borders "to the extent possible," but
also to ensure that transboundary movement of such
waste be approved only when the exporting state lacks
sufficient facilities to ensure "environmentally sound
and efficient disposal."
The proximity principle would clearly be violated by an
unrestricted trading scheme if CO2 and other air pollut-
ants had the same effects as other types of pollution.
But as demonstrated above, CO2 damages the ozone
layer and harms all countries in the same way. It does
not cause local "pollution." Thus, the potential violation
of the proximity principle depends on whether one fo-
cuses on the region where the pollution is created or
where it causes the damaging effects. None of the in-
ternational agreements mentioned had to deal with this
issue because the pollution always caused "localized"
damage. However, the language of the principle requir-
ing the elimination of pollution "close to the source,"
strongly suggests that the region where the pollution
was caused is supposed to take care of its elimination,
reminiscent of the "polluter pays" or "causation" princi-
ple. Considering the intent of the proximity principle is
instructive; its purpose seems to be directed towards the
protection of one country from being burdened with the
pollution produced by another country. This interpre-
tation leads one to suppose that the principle intends to
avoid the shifting of damaging effects to other countries.
544. The Convention was adopted and opened for sig-
nature March 22, 1989. The Convention became effective on
May 5, 1992.
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Thus, both the language and the purpose of the princi-
ple suggest that it is not important that the country of
origin be held responsible, but that other countries are
protected from having the burden of the pollution
transferred to them. As a result, it does not matter
where CO 2 is being reduced, as long as other countries
will benefit in the same way from the positive effects of
the reduction. The unrestricted trading system is
therefore compatible with the proximity principle.
In sum, unrestricted trading scheme would violate the
precautionary principle. Furthermore, it is hardly rec-
oncilable with the polluter pays principle, but it is com-
patible with the proximity principle.
D. Designing a Model for an International Trading
Program
A final assessment of an international trading program
for CO 2 can not reasonably be made without considering
the different features it should contain. Its effectiveness
can not be maximized without giving careful attention to
the legal and technical design and implementation of
such a program. 545
1. Introduction: The UNCTAD-Earth Council Pilot
Programme
After spending six years on the research, design and
implementation of an international greenhouse gas
emissions trading system, published in seven volumes
between 1992 and 1996,146 the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD") and the
545. See Marchant, supra note 29, at 628.
546. See UNCTAD, Press Release, Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Forum to be Launched by UNCTAD and the
Earth Council, 6/12/97 (visited Oct. 14, 1998)
<http: //www.unstad. org/en/press/pr2707.html>.
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Earth Council5 47 launched the initial phase of an inter-
national greenhouse gas emissions trading program. 548
This pilot trading program is intended to alleviate the
concerns expressed by countries such as China and In-
dia regarding how emissions trading would work. Ac-
cording to previous UNCTAD studies, emissions trading
is the most cost-effective way to achieve agreed to "caps"
on emissions.5 49 Under the proposed scheme, compa-
nies that succeed in holding their emissions below a
legislated "cap" level will be able to sell the spare capac-
ity allowed by their permits to other companies seeking
cost-effective solutions. 5 0 This would contribute to the
547. The Earth Council is an international non-
governmental organization (NGO) that was created in Sep-
tember, 1992 to promote and advance the implementation of
the Earth Summit agreements. The Earth Council consists
of 18 Members, who represent some of the world's political,
business, scientific and non-governmental communities, and
16 Honorary Members. The Earth Council Institute func-
tions as an advisory board to the Earth Council. See gener-
ally Earth Council, The Earth Council (visited Apr. 21, 1999)
<http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/about>.
548. Other efforts to develop an international emissions
trading system have been made by the Center for Clean Air
Policy (CCAP). See CCAP, New Jersey and the Netherlands
Initiate Historic Joint Effort on Climate Change, Press Release
(visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.ccap.org>. On a national
basis the Canadian Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction
Trading Pilot (GERT) creates a foundation for a possible full-
scale emission trading system in the future. See GERT,
GERT (visited Apr. 26, 1999) <http://www.gert.org>.
549. See UNCTAD, Press Release, Climate Change:
UNCTAD Can Help, Dec. 11, 1997 (visited April 13, 2000)
<http://www.unctad.org/en/press/pr2736en.html>.
550. See UNCTAD, Note To Correspondents No. 31,
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Forum Launched in Chi-
cago by UNCTAD and the Earth Council, June 30, 1997 (vis-
ited Oct. 14, 1998) <http://www.unctad.org/EN/
press/nc9731 .html>.
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early and effective implementation of the Kyoto
Protocol.5 51
Under the auspices of the two organizations, the
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Policy Forum was
established with roughly eighty participants from gov-
ernments, corporations and environmental non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs") joining the dia-
logue. The Forum has established both a "policy
framework" and a "market design and operations"
working group, each with a number of task forces to
work out specific details. Its approved workplan would
enable a market to be launched in the latter part of the
year 2000. The first meetings of the Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading Policy Forum took place on June 19-
20, 1997 in Chicago, U.S., and on November 12-14,
1997 in Toronto, Canada.
The following part will consider the design of the
UNCTAD-Earth Council Programme,55 2 along with other
proposals for GHG trading, and will suggest, based on
Part II, the different elements that an international
trading scheme should contain in order to work suc-
cessfully.
2. Design of an International Trading Program
An international trading program will consist of differ-
ent elements including participants, the traded com-
modity, the allocation of emission rights, the functioning
of the market, the costs, and technical aspects of permit
duration and possible revisions.
551. See UNCTAD, Press Release, Dec. 11, 1997, supra
note 549.
552. See generally A Pilot Greenhouse Gas Trading Sys-
tem: The Legal Issues, UNCTAD-Earth Council,
UNCTAD/GDS/GFSB/Misc. 2 (1996).
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a. Participants
Ideally, an emissions trading program for greenhouse
gases would be most effective if the international agree-
ment encompasses all nations. If the program were
limited to industrialized nations, significant problems
from deforestation and agriculture in developing coun-
tries would be ignored. Also, it would provide incentives
for new industry to locate in unregulated countries. 53
Thus, even if the program started only with developed
countries, it is a matter of great urgency to include de-
veloping countries as soon as possible. It is especially
desirable to include countries with large potential
growth as they will prospectively become significant
emitters of greenhouse gases. 554
However, there is no expectation that an international
trading system would commence with universal partici-
pation, rather, only a limited number of countries would
take part in an initial allowance market.555 Still, even if
only two or three countries signed an initial agreement,
a trading program could be workable and provide envi-
ronmental benefits.5 56 One proposal suggests starting
with the twenty-four OECD member states as they con-
553. See John P. Dwyer, California's Tradeable Emis-
sions Policy and its Application to the Control of Greenhouse
Gases, in CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT
SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 41, 55 [hereinafter Dwyer, Califor-
nia's Tradeable Allowances].
554. See Michael Grubb & James K. Sebenius, Partici-
pation, Allocation, and Adaptability in International Trade-
able Emission Permit Systems for Greenhouse Gas Control,
in CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM,
supra note 29, at 189; Bunli Yang & Arthur H. Rosenfeld, In-
centives to Address Global Warming: Sharing the Responsibil-
ity, in CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A TRADEABLE PERMIT
SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 139, 142.
555. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 189.
556. See id.
20001 455
456 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XI
tribute half the global, energy-related emissions of
C02.557 Later, developing countries would be included.
International emissions trading between firms may be
easier to implement than between countries, but since
countries, not firms, sign international agreements,
trades between companies would inevitably have to be
accounted for at the national level. Otherwise, it could
not be guaranteed that the total private permit holdings
matched the national total of emissions. The participa-
tion of private firms causes a number of issues. First,
international trading between firms in developed coun-
tries and firms in developing countries implies transfers
of currency that governments may not support, espe-
cially if they do not control these transfers. 558 Also, it
might present an opportunity for firms to evade emis-
sion limits, leading to increased emissions, if there is
not adequate regulation and enforcement in both coun-
tries. 59 However, efficiency gains are assumed to be
larger if governments can pass some or all, of their na-
tional permits through to private or state entities, which
can then themselves engage in international trades.
Private entities could probably better exploit abatement
opportunities and thereby enlarge the economic gains of
this approach.5 60
b. Traded Commodity
Some commentators argue that an effective fight
against global warming must attack all greenhouse
557. See Yang & Rosenfeld, supra note 554, at 142.
558. See Rob Swart, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trad-
ing: Defining the Commodity, in CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A
TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 149.
559. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 55.
560. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 189;
Daniel J. Dudek & Tom Tietenberg, Monitoring and Enforcing
Greenhouse Gas Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A
TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 253.
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gases together. An international emissions program
would remain a partial solution and would never be
completely successful, when countless small sources,
such as motor vehicles, are not covered. 561  The
UNCTAD-Earth Council model proposes to initially in-
clude energy-sector CO2,  hydrochlorofluorocarbons
("HCFCs") and hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs"), and even-
tually also include forest-sector CO2, methane and
NO. 562 In theory, it might be true that a trading pro-
gram will only be a full success if all gases are covered.
In practice, however, a policy encompassing all potential
sources could lead to serious problems. Greenhouse
gases stem from a large variety of sources. Carbon di-
oxide is emitted through both deforestation and the
burning of fossil fuels by industrial and transportation
sources; methane is emitted from rice paddies, live-
stock, coal mining operations, and natural gas produc-
tion, as well as storage and transmission facilities; and
halocarbons are produced by industry for both indus-
trial and consumer uses. 563 An emissions trading pro-
gram including all these sources would require reliable
quantitative data about current emissions from innu-
merable sources, including non-industrial sources, and
also data about the countervailing impact of greenhouse
gas sinks. To date, no comprehensive data exists, not
even on industrial sources. 564 It would additionally pose
substantial practical problems to monitor non-industrial
sources. And it is highly doubtful whether it is even
possible to gather data on the absorption capacity of
greenhouse gas sinks.565 Therefore, it has been sug-
561. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 59.
562. See A Pilot Greenhouse Gas Trading System, supra
note 552, at 7.
563. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 55.
564. See id. at 56.
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gested that a modest initial approach restricting the
program to CO2 from industrial sources would attack an
important part of the problem without overwhelming
existing regulatory resources. 566
The second problem is the inclusion of all greenhouse
gases. Again, theoretically, it may seem useful to con-
sider an inter-pollutant trading scheme producing
greater savings, because there would be more potential
trading partners. However, the different gases not only
have completely different radiative forcing potential, but
they are also emitted in completely different quantities.
Methane, for example, has a global warming potential
32 times higher than CO2 and, together with the halo-
carbons, constitutes about 40% of the total global
warming impact.567 The relatively less harmful CO2, on
the other hand, is emitted in much greater quantities
than other gases with greater heat-trapping capacities.
Nevertheless, there exist significant uncertainties con-
cerning the radiative forcing potentials of various green-
house gases at existing concentrations, the dependence
of radiative forcing potential on concentrations and on
the presence of other greenhouse gases, the atmos-
pheric lifetimes of greenhouse gases, and the indirect
effects of greenhouse gases on atmospheric chemistry. 568
It is therefore critical to find an index with which to
compare the environmental impacts of the different
gases. Without adequate scientific information to per-
mit reasonable comparison and a scientifically sound
exchange of emission credits, a substantial risk remains
565. See WWF, Die internationale Klimapolitik am Schei-
deweg [The International Climate Change Policy Facing a Cru-
cial Decision] (visited Sept. 28, 1998)
<http: //www.wwf.de/c_bibliothek/c_hintergrund/c-hintergr
und-kyoto/c-hintergrund-kyoto 1 .html >.
566. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 56.
567. See id.
568. See id.
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that inter-pollutant trades could actually exacerbate the
greenhouse effect. 569 Even-authors generally favoring an
interpollutant trading scheme warn about the inclusion
of sources and gases that cannot be accurately meas-
ured or whose warming potential has not yet been sci-
entifically agreed upon. 70
c. Allocation of Emission Rights
The way in which permits are initially allocated is a
key determinant of a tradeable permit system, as it will
strongly influence the nature and breadth of participa-
tion.571 The UNCTAD-Earth Council program proposes
to allocate emission allowances to the member states,
which would in turn distribute them to their national
sources of emissions.572
Allowances must first be allocated to all the partici-
pants of the international agreement. This means that
national emission limits have to be set, which could
cause a problem if simplistic formulas are being used.
If, for example, the limits are set in proportion to the
population, a massive dislocation in industrialized
countries would result.573 If the national limits were
based on historical emissions, developing countries
would be condemned to permanent poverty, at least for
as long as national economies depend on carbon fuel.574
The parties will therefore have to agree on a different
criterion. This will most likely involve equitable consid-
erations, including perceptions of responsibility for past
569. See id.; Kete, supra note 100, at 102.
570. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 185;
Kete, supra note 100, at 102.
571. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 193.
572. See A Pilot Greenhouse Gas Trading System, supra
note 552, at 6.
573. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 55.
574. See id.
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and current contributions to the problem of global
warming. While the definition of what is equitable is
unclear and must be thoroughly discussed in negotia-
tions, equity arguments have an intrinsic role and im-
pact on structuring agreements.5 75 Criteria to be con-
sidered when basing the initial allocation on equity will
most likely include gross national product ("GNP"), real
GNP, population, land area, and dependence on fossil
fuel production. 76
The industrialized countries have accumulated an
immense "natural debt" in the course of their develop-
ment by clearly dominating emissions since the 1960s.
Considered on a per-capita basis, the differences are
larger still.577 The same result would occur if the crite-
rion for accountability was based on who benefited from
the fuel production or combustion; the industrialized
countries have been the chief beneficiaries of those pro-
cesses and therefore carry the main responsibility for
the emission of greenhouse gases. 578
Once the total national emissions limit has been de-
termined on the international level, the national regu-
575. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 193.
576. See generally Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments
for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address
a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293 (1997).
577. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 194.
578. See id.
Comparing "more" and "less" developed countries regarding total
carbon dioxide emissions cumulatively from 1960 until 1986
under three aspects, country, capita and land, the more devel-
oped countries excessively exceeded the less developed coun-
tries:
Country Capita Land
More developed 2.92 3.18 1.65
countries (per cap-
ita incomes about
US$ 3,000)
Less developed 0.36 0.35 0.49
countries
See id. at 195.
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latory agency responsible for the allocation of the credits
will distribute allowable emissions among sources. If
the agency allocates the rights in proportion to existing
emissions, it favors existing sources and creates a bias
against new ones, which will either have to substantially
eliminate emissions or offset them by reductions from
other sources. This policy would also give an unwar-
ranted advantage to sources that have successfully de-
layed or resisted former pollution reduction obligations.
If the agency lacks sufficient information about the ex-
isting amounts of emissions from each source, this ap-
proach will turn out to be very expensive and time-
consuming.
d. Functioning Market
Like any other market, an allowance trading market
requires both a healthy balance of supply and demand
and rules that guarantee that the market remains com-
petitive. Competition might be restricted if sources re-
frain from selling their surplus of credits due to fear
that the government will impose stricter emission limits
or confiscate banked credits. They could also be afraid
that the value of the credits might increase when they
need it for expansions.579 In order to avoid these doubts
on the industry side, legislatures will have to provide
legally enforceable assurances protecting emission
rights. However, this might not be desirable from the
environmental point of view. As legislators still lack
complete or accurate information about the relationship
between emissions and environmental quality, they have
to rely on the constantly changing and improving scien-
tific knowledge about greenhouse gases. Thus, they
need to be without any constraints to adjust their envi-
ronmental policies as circumstances may warrant.
579. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 58.
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A well-functioning market requires not only adequate
supply, but also adequate demand. In order to ensure
the demand, so that the market is functioning, existing
firms should be included in the program by permitting
trades between existing firms. 580  Requiring existing
sources to reduce emissions by a specified percentage
could also create demand.581 Other proposals to ensure
sufficient demand suggest limiting exemptions. Since
some sources might have difficulty acquiring credits on
the open market, especially for small amounts, emission
banks might be established where they could purchase
credits. 58 2 In order to ensure confidence in the trading
program, an adequate system to register credits and to
monitor and enforce emission limits seems essential.
Furthermore, the trading market must remain com-
petitive and normal trading conditions must not be dis-
torted. Some observers fear that a trading market could
be subject to collusive and cartel-like action. On the
one hand, developing countries are concerned that in-
dustrialized countries will buy up the market. Industri-
alized countries, on the other hand, fear that developing
countries might form an OPEC583 - like cartel, where
major resources are concentrated in a relatively small
group of culturally-related countries. The best medicine
against such potential disturbances is a great number
and diversity of participants. The wider the holding en-
tities, the smaller the chances of undue market power. 58 4
Another measure mitigating these dangers is to con-
tinue rounds to allocate new permits, thus insuring
wider distribution, a more liquid market, and the flexi-
bility required to adapt to changing conditions.58 5 Con-
580. See id. at 57.
581. See id.
582. See id.
583. Organization of Oil Producing and Exporting Coun-
tries.
584. See Grubb & Sebenius, supra note 312, at 191.
585. See id.
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stant re-distribution of allowances is a way to insure
that the allowances will not end up in the hands of a
small number of players. 86 Finally, market abuse could
also be avoided by anti-monopoly rules against price-
fixing and cartel-like actions. These rules could, for ex-
ample, prohibit participants from holding credits more
than 10% in excess of their emission needs.587
e. Costs
The implementation of an emissions trading program
for GHGs will most likely involve extensive capital ex-
penditures for transaction, administrative, and moni-
toring costs. The administration of the individual trades
by a national agency will inevitably cause costs. If
regulators decide to review and approve each trade, the
costs will be significant.588 In addition to the transaction
costs, monitoring costs will also be incurred. These
costs will include bookkeeping and preparation of an-
nual reports on net emissions, independent checks on
the member's national monitoring and reporting pro-
grams, review of the annual reports on net emissions
and determination of their accuracy, and certification of
each member's net emissions for each year.5 89 If the
countries want to make sure that so-called "paper
trades" are avoided, costs will be substantial. Paper
trades occur when sources sell credits. for a reduction
that was established through false or erroneous ac-
counting instead of an actual reduction. 590 Transaction
costs include search costs, negotiation costs, approval
or certification costs, enforcement costs, and insurance
costs. Whereas the searching and negotiating costs for
586. See id.
587. See id. at 192.
588. See Dwyer, California's Tradeable Allowances, su-
pra note 553, at 59.
589. See A Pilot Greenhouse Gas Trading System, supra
note 552, at 9.
590. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 484, at 938.
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big firms will probably decline in the course of time,
they might be impossibly high for small sources, such
as automobiles and home furnaces.591
IV. OUTLOOK
After the detailed foregoing analysis of trading sys-
tems, this Part will not confine itself to summarizing the
results of the legal analysis. It will go further and give
some thought to the question of whether and how trad-
ing might work in the real world. It will begin with the
summary of the results of this Article. This Part will
distinguish between the German and the international
results. The main focus of this Part will be an exami-
nation of certain structural features of a trading pro-
gram and how these features might be shaped in the
real world because of unpredictable and unforeseeable
influences. Even if the trading components are legally
flawless, they might cause some unwanted side effects
when exposed to uncontrollable external factors, such
as administrative or scientific uncertainties. The second
Part of this outlook will discuss the general question of
whether trading is "good" or "bad," and will then ad-
dress some structural elements under the influence of
external factors. Finally, this Part will make some sug-
gestions regarding long-term air pollution policy.
A. A Review of the German and International Systems
The introduction of an SO 2 emissions trading scheme
into the German law system must observe several re-
quirements in order to be in accordance with existing
law. In particular, the precautionary principle will have
to be changed, while the protection principle and the
principle of continuing existence will require an immis-
sions-based model in order to avoid pollution hot spots.
591. See id. at 939. See also Dwyer, California's Trade-
able Allowances, supra note 553, at 59.
GERMAN EMISSIONS TRADING
The first allocation of emission allowances could inter-
fere with Article 12 GG if new sources had to buy them
from existing sources. Therefore, a system that treats
both groups equally is required. Further, Article 14 GG
demands a transitional period for existing sources.
Lastly, the trading system will have to be designed to
meet emission standards as prescribed by the BImSchG
and the Technical Instructions Air, European Council
directives and the Oslo Protocol to the Geneva Conven-
tion on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, so
that no relapse into former (higher) emission levels can
occur. If the statute writer meets all of these structural
requirements, a trading system may well be a successful
tool to reduce SO2 emissions in Germany.
Concerning an international pollution trading pro-
gram, the analysis shows that a trading system that al-
lows countries to come into compliance with their re-
duction targets merely by buying allowances and with-
out any reduction of emissions domestically violates in-
ternational law. It is irreconcilable with the interna-
tional precautionary principle and interferes with the'
polluter pays principle. In order to comply with inter-
national law, the countries will have to agree on a do-
mestic reduction requirement.
B. Structural Features in the Real World
However detailed it may be, the above legal analysis of
trading systems does not yet say anything about
whether these systems would actually be a welcome de-
velopment in other countries or even on a supranational
level. Legal analysts follow their specific approach by
focusing on legal aspects. In the case of the emissions
trading system, legal analysts adopted the recommen-
dation of economists who were enthusiastic about those
"highly efficient" economic instruments and conse-
quently favored their introduction as pollution abate-
ment mechanisms. These economists, in turn, have
mainly been interested in the economic aspects and ef-
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fects of the trading system. This is, of course, a natural
behavior, as each profession has its own analytic meth-
ods and researches according to its inherent approach.
But the area of air pollution control requires a look be-
yond one's own field in order to espy the interdiscipli-
nary effects. Besides the legal and economic aspects,
they include political, ideological and societal effects, as
well as scientific and environmental points of interest.
The following discussion of the emissions trading con-
cept will consider the diverse influences and arguments
to which such a system is subjected.
Before going into structural details, the question that
from the outset of the trading idea until today, has been
hovering above the whole discussion must be ad-
dressed: that is, is emissions trading "good" or "bad"?
This question is essentially a debate between regulatory
and economic instruments. Typically, emissions trading
is regarded as an archetypical economic mechanism in
environmental pollution control, along with environ-
mental taxes and offsets. Viewed more closely, however,
all currently used trading systems, including the SO2
allowance trading program or the RECLAIM program,
are not even close to pure economic instruments. They
are all integrated in a regulatory framework with strict
emission limitations. Therefore, they cannot be consid-
ered purely economic. Bearing this in mind, one must
also be aware that, at this time, no one is talking about
replacing the regulatory system with an economic one.
Even strong proponents of economic incentives consider
them as a complement to the regulatory system. They
are intended to provide an incentive to comply with the
emission limits set by regulatory means. Consequently,
those who might be concerned about an unregulated
free market have little to fear.
Economic instruments are also intended to involve the
industry sector in political decision-making. Among
economic instruments, industrial representatives gener-
ally favor emissions trading over environmental taxa-
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tion. Even if their motivation does not result from a
sudden environmental consciousness, allowance trading
has the unique characteristic of making the market
price for pollution control visible. No other regulatory or
economic instrument provides this important advan-
tage. Industry involvement is a very important step to-
wards pollution control in general and cleaner air in
particular. Such policy creates an awareness of the en-
vironmental costs not only on the side of the industry,
but also on the side of the public. Participation in the
decision-making process always leads to a better under-
standing and acceptance of both economic and social
conditions; it fosters responsibility on the part of the in-
dustry, contributing to a higher interest in negotiating
and developing pollution abatement technologies. Com-
panies entering the allowance trading market will
hopefully engage in investigations of the financial rela-
tions between their production and their contribution to
environmental pollution, and they will expand their eco-
nomic horizon to environmental issues and will ulti-
mately promote emission minimization. Economic in-
struments are a logical consequence of the idea that a
powerful and successful government has public partici-
pation 'as a prerequisite. Thus, economic instruments
can hardly be argued away.
The discussion of whether environmental policy
should include economic instruments appears to be
outdated at this point. The introduction of economic
instruments has been agreed to at the international
level and codified in the Kyoto Protocol. Also, many
countries are showing a growing interest in the Ameri-
can experience of national trading programs and are
contemplating passing similar legislation. We seem to
have passed the stage of the whether or not question.
Rather, the debate should now be directed towards the
structural components of a trading system. Which
structural elements will be necessary to establish a well-
working, environmentally effective and economically ef-
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ficient trading system? What problems might arise even
if the trading system is legally immaculate? Again, such
considerations may not ignore the different aspects
mentioned above.
The decision of which companies will be subject to a
trading program can cause a distortion of normal trad-
ing conditions. It could lead to serious inequities within
one industry sector and could even be the origin of mo-
nopolization. If a company, for legal or financial rea-
sons, cannot participate in the allowance market, it
could be disadvantaged. It might ultimately be forced to
cease operations. Other businesses could buy up these
firms and slowly create a monopoly. This could cause
problems with competition law and economic unwanted
effects.
Even more delicate is the participation of one of the
biggest sources of air pollution on the trading market:
the entire fleet of mobile sources, plus individual emit-
ters. Their constituency could claim to be discriminated
against if they are excluded from the trading activities.
On the other hand, stationary sources could similarly be
interested in the participation of mobile sources as po-
tential trading partners. However, their involvement
would require an enormous administrative effort in set-
ting up a system that would be capable of adequately
considering the numerous parameters. The question is
whether the advantages justify the costs accompanied
by the administrative process.
Besides the kind of emission sources, the kind of pol-
lutants will always be an issue of debate. At first
glance, the more comprehensive in terms of pollutants a
trading system is, the more successful in terms of envi-
ronmental effectiveness it seems. But even if only one
pollutant is being traded successfully, it contributes to
environmental protection. Every single reduction, how-
ever small it may be, should be regarded as a positive
effect. One should not reject a program because of its
restriction to a small number of pollutants demanding a
GERMAN EMISSIONS TRADING
more comprehensive one. This leads not only to a zero
reduction, if the more comprehensive program is not
approved, but also to endless political discussions and
frustration.
The debate about the inclusion of as many emitted
compounds as possible not only buzzes in the context of
air pollution, but it is also an issue in the climate
change debate. As discussed above, some commenta-
tors favor the inclusion of as many greenhouse gases as
possible on the trading market. Because of the lack of
adequate data, this currently cannot be supported. The
international system is, at this time, restricted to a sin-
gle compound: CO,
. 
Whether it will be expanded to in-
clude further gases remains to be seen.
Meanwhile, the main issue concerning the traded
commodity on the international level is the so-called net
approach: countries would be able to count CO 2 sinks
as a reduction credit. The Kyoto Protocol considers two
factors in calculating the reduction commitments. First,
Article 3 paragraph 3 provides that changes in GHG
emissions from "sources and removals by sinks result-
ing from direct human-induced land use change and
forestry activities" shall be used to offset a party's GHG
emissions. Sink activity is limited to "afforestation, re-
forestation, and deforestation since 1990." Second,
parties may gain or transfer emission reduction units
and credits from projects complying with Articles 6 and
16 bis to meet their reduction targets (Article 3, paras.
10-11).592 Annex I Parties may also transfer ERUs aris-
ing from emissions reduction projects or carbon sinks
under Article 6, paragraph 1.
The Kyoto Protocol also envisions giving credit for pre-
serving tropical rainforests and other natural reserves,
as well as for reforestation. 593 As the amount of CO 2 in
the atmosphere increases not only from burning fossil
fuel, but also from destroying forests, it has been sug-
592. See Booncharoen & Gase, supra note 484, at 925.
593. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 489, art. 3, no. 3.
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gested that reduction efforts should take into account
all human activities that contribute to or reduce the
concentration of CO 2 in the atmosphere. While the idea
seems appealing, its practical implementation appears
to be almost impossible. The actual measurement of the
removal of CO 2 from the atmosphere by forests and soils
is highly problematic, 594 and it is doubtful whether such
indeterminable values can be used to comply with in-
ternational targets. Moreover, even if a tree is not being
harvested by man, it will ultimately die a natural death
and decompose, thereby releasing an even higher
amount of stored CO 2. The calculation is purely short-
term based and is thus unjustifiable.
The most important and fundamental element of a
trading scheme will always be a comprehensive moni-
toring and compliance verification system. No matter
how well-functioning a trading system might be, it will
never serve the purpose of providing for clean air if it is
not coupled with intense monitoring of the actual emis-
sions. The U.S. can certainly build on its existing
monitoring devices, which have already been in use.
This might not be taken for granted in other countries,
where previous air pollution control has not been com-
bined with a monitoring system. If an emissions trading
system would now be imported into such countries, they
might be exposed to an overwhelming expenditure of
administrative regulations and financial expenses. This
problem will probably most likely arise in developing
countries that have little experience in emissions moni-
toring and control.
In other countries, such as many of those in Europe,
where pollution control has not been unknown for a few
decades, numerous other administrative difficulties can
occur: how could transboundary air pollution be taken
594. See Smeloff, supra note 496, at 283; Daniel J.
Dudek & Tom Tietenberg, Monitoring and Enforcing Green-
house Gas Trading, in CLIMATE CHANGE, DESIGNING A
TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEM, supra note 29, at 251, 259.
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into consideration? For example, as Germany bases its
emission limitations on immissions, other countries'
pollutants could be responsible for a fair amount of
pollution in Germany. How could such pollution be
measured technically and who would be responsible for
measuring these emissions? The process of following
the different gases from their source, the smokestack,
until their final destination, a forest, is a very time and
cost intensive one. Even if it were possible to follow a
certain gas from its source to its final destination, an
additional problem could arise: who is responsible, if
two kinds of pollutants from two different countries
combine and form a new, possibly more serious, pollut-
ant? Can the responsibility be shared on a proportional
basis? Moreover, how can all these factors be ac-
counted for in the issuance and distribution of the
emission allowances? All these questions have to be
dealt with by the European Union, since they cross na-
tional borders and exceed national responsibilities.
European legislation and administration is still a
lengthy process. Also, the EU would have to erect a
central agency in charge of distributing allowances,
monitoring emissions and verifying compliance. One
might, in this context, ask how the costs for the admini-
stration of the trading system should be gathered. Is it
legitimate to finance it with EU funds, meaning that ul-
timately the taxpayer bears the burden, as trading could
be regarded as a means to provide for cleaner air in all
member states and benefit everyone? Or should only
the market participants pay for the privilege of taking
part in a trading system?
An additional problem would be caused by Switzer-
land and other bordering countries that are not mem-
bers of the European Union. Since they are emitting
pollutants that contribute to higher pollution levels in
member states, their responsibility would also have to
be taken into consideration.
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But even with excellent monitoring devices and meth-
ods of measuring transnational air pollution, one cannot
avoid natural phenomena, like the so-called upwind
pollution, as occurred in the northeast U.S. Scientific
uncertainties such as these are unpredictable. They
make it highly uncertain whether emission trading will
result in better air quality. As seen in the case of acid
rain in the U.S., the upwind trades caused higher pol-
lution levels in the Northeast than before the program
started. Similar effects could occur in other parts of the
world. Without the trading option, such effects would
certainly not evolve.
On the other hand, one must not forget that the 1990
Amendments would never have been passed by Con-
gress if they did not contain the trading mechanism.
Without the new economic instrument as provided for in
Title IV, none of the other provisions serving the final
goal of cleaner air would have had a chance to succeed.
It was clearly a political compromise in this case.
Trading presented a refreshing and attractive novelty
that won support for the overall package of amend-
ments. The same political constellation could occur in
other countries: a trading program as a sweetener for
other, less appreciated, regulations, ultimately leading
to the acceptance by the legislative authority. If the
trading system is coupled with strict emission limita-
tions, if could even be a low-calorie solution. Such a
compromise might seem to be a sweet and sour one, but
it must not necessarily be considered a negative devel-
opment. At least a certain amount of reductions will be
achieved. The fundamental environmentalist might be
strictly opposed to this reasoning, but reality does not
always allow for waiting for the perfect environmental
solution. Legislative compromises are more likely to be
achieved, and therefore should be accepted as slow
steps towards the final goal.
However, this argument requires overall acceptance by
the industry constituency and other market partici-
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pants. This certainly has been, and still is, the case in
the Acid Rain Program. California's RECLAIM Program,
on the other hand, is not as appreciated as the Acid
Rain Program. Whether other trading programs will be
popular remains to be seen. Even if the proposed pro-
gram is being welcomed before and during its initial
phase, it is never guaranteed that the enthusiasm will
continue. After a certain period of allowance exchange,
the technological possibilities for pollution control might
be exhausted. The constant interaction between de-
mand and supply could come to a standstill. Yet the
proposed trading system would have fulfilled its task of
finding the best available control technology and setting
the environmental price. It is a question of great un-
certainty when such developments will occur. Progno-
ses are very hard to make and no one really has dared
to make any predictions yet. It will probably be easier
to estimate the duration of a trading program after the
Acid Rain Program's Phase II, starting in the year 2000,
has been in operation for a few years.
C. Recommendations
If the trading activities start to become slow after a
certain period of time, the CO2 trading program might
provide an incentive for energy companies to invest in
the development of energy saving and alternative fuel
technology. The possibility for the companies to sell
their entire stock of allowances on the market could
create an increased interest in the production of renew-
able energy. Worldwide production of fossil hard and
brown coal is still increasing. The use of renewable en-
ergy sources, including wind and water power, as well
as. solar energy, all of which do not produce CO2, could
result in CO 2 trading becoming completely superfluous.
Whether nuclear energy might also be a viable alterna-
tive is a question of environmental safety.
Furthermore, governments could increase their pro-
motion of research in the areas of energy reduction
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measures and alternative technologies. This would in-
volve research resulting from the exploration of re-
sources to the final whereabouts of any residues. Edu-
cational programs that stimulate reduced energy use
should be developed. The use of energy for electrical
appliances running on a stand-by basis should be
minimized. Currently, two nuclear power plants are ex-
clusively providing electricity for stand-by use in Ger-
many.
If alternative energy technologies were developed in
industrialized countries, they could be transferred to
developing countries, as the Joint Implementation pro-
visions of the Kyoto Protocol suggest. Instead of emis-
sion credits, technology would be the traded commodity.
Technology transfer could even be a much more lucra-
tive policy than emissions trading. Both partners to the
transfer, the investor and the recipient of the reduction
technology, could profit from such activities. However,
before alternative energies can replace CO2-producing
technologies, enormous changes will have to occur.
During this time, the international trading system will
most likely be in operation. Experience has proven that
the inclusion of market-based mechanisms in the Kyoto
Protocol has already resulted in numerous incentives for
businesses to comply early. Nevertheless, an interna-
tional CO 2 allowance trading system within the frame-
work of the climate change conventions should be de-
veloped very carefully regarding its environmental im-
pacts. It should be set up in a way that will guarantee
that industrialized nations cannot buy off their respon-
sibility to make actual CO 2 reductions within their own
countries. This is not only dictated from a political and
moral point of view, but also from a legal one, as de-
scribed above. Regarding the political impact, develop-
ing countries have had the impression that they are in
an unfortunate position and have felt economically dis-
criminated against by industrialized countries since the
origin and promotion of environmental policy in the
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1970s. This impression could be changed if industrial-
ized countries started to export emission reduction or
renewable energy technology to developing countries.
The latter would make significant progress towards in-
dustrialization and, at the same time, increase their
production in an environmentally sound way. Develop-
ing countries would no longer feel that they were the
object of industrial exploitation or discrimination.
Overall, a well-considered combination of different in-
struments like regulations, tradeable or leasable emis-
sion rights, taxes, subsidies, and sanctions at both the
national and international levels appears to be the most
effective solution. While preparing the right mixture of
these ingredients for the menu, the chef should always
keep the final goal in mind: clean air.

